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 This  thesis  is  an  autoethnographic  self-study  of  learning  to  improvise  in  classical  styles.  As  a 
 professional  musician  trained  in  interpretive  performance,  acquiring  the  skills  of 
 improvisation  had  been  a  long-term  musical  and  artistic  ambition;  in  addition  I  was  intensely 
 curious  as  to  investigate  the  reasons  why  I,  as  a  trained  classical  musician,  felt  unable  to 
 improvise.  Over  a  period  of  three  years  I  recorded,  analysed  and  reflected  on  my  progress 
 from  novice  to  expert  (my  first  public  improvisations  in  Baroque  style),  a  process  which 
 provided  me  with  detailed  insights  into  the  conscious  experience  of  improvising  at  all  stages 
 of  learning.  Initially,  I  encountered  difficulties  in  making  musical  decisions  and  felt  unable  to 
 take  creative  ownership  over  the  task.  These  cognitive  and  emotional  barriers  to  improvising 
 I  traced  to  attitudes  of  Werktreue  fidelity  to  the  score  and  a  sense  of  role  in  serving  every 
 detail  of  a  written  score  -  attitudes  acquired  through  institutionalised  training  in  interpretive 
 performance.  Through  learning  strategies  and  increasing  agency  I  discovered  a  new  way  of 
 perceiving  musical  texture  and  form,  these  new  perceptions  being  based  on  a  conceptual 
 impression  of  underlying  structural  principles  and  relationships  which  could  be  realised  in 
 many  different  ways.  Generating  my  own  music  increasingly  through  these  conceptual 
 mental  representations  I  gained  a  better  control  over  the  task,  allowing  me  to  improvise 
 imaginatively  but  within  rule-bound  systems.  Throughout  the  thesis  I  compare  and  contrast 
 the  lived  experience  of  my  study  with  cognitive  theories  of  improvised  performance  and 
 learning  to  improvise.  In  addition  I  draw  on  a  wider  range  of  literature  (outside  of  music 
 cognition):  theories  of  memory  and  attention,  biological  theories  of  consciousness,  implicit 
 learning,  second  language  and  adult  learning,  ideology  and  social  philosophy  to  gain  insights 
 into  all  relevant  aspects  of  my  study  experience.  As  a  result  this  study  offers  a  novel  range  of 
 perspectives  and  insights  into  the  cognitive  processes  of  improvising  throughout  learning, 
 while  also  articulating  the  cultural  issues  arising  from  a  classically-trained  musician  learning 
 to improvise in a predominantly non-improvising musical practice. 
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 Chapter 1 
 1.1 Introduction 
 The idea for this thesis emerged as I finished my masters (MA) dissertation, a short 
 self-study of trying to improvise a Baroque-style Fugue. The experience of this short, ten-day 
 study whetted my appetite for a more lengthy investigation as I realised the enormous 
 potential of developing skills in improvisation through systematically observing and 
 reflecting on one’s own learning process. For many years I had wanted to improvise. 
 Although I had achieved a busy career as a professional pianist, organist and choir director, I 
 felt that something was missing from my musical experience. I felt ‘locked out’ of the music 
 I performed and interpreted: I wanted to be more creative, to make up my own music, to feel 
 more equal to the composer. Looking back on my earliest musical experiences I recalled 
 long-forgotten attempts to compose and improvise music, but realised that I had dropped 
 these interests as my interest in music intensified. To compose or improvise had played no 
 part in my formal musical education, which was focused entirely on acquiring instrumental 
 skills towards a career in interpretive performance. Just as this career path had opened up in 
 front of me as the only viable goal worth aiming for, so had I entirely identified my musical 
 ambitions with this goal. I’d worked exclusively towards technical perfection and 
 professional-level interpretations of a canonic repertoire, neglecting any other branch of 
 musical activity. 
 Years later, the vicissitudes of a musician’s life unexpectedly brought me into sharp 
 contact with improvisation. Taking a much-needed job as a dance pianist, I’d had to quickly 
 acquire skills in improvisation in order to accompany the dancers in exercises which were 
 created in the moment. For a while I’d also taught free improvisation to school children in 
 Portugal as a general education in creative music making. However these skills left me still 
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 frustrated. I could improvise for dance - a highly-stylised musical product - using a limited 
 amount of musical material, but I couldn’t develop or even control this improvising very 
 well. I could also improvise in a contemporary style with more sense of freedom, but this was 
 not what I really wanted to do. What I couldn’t do was improvise on the musical models of 
 repertoire which I felt drawn to. If I tried to improvise a Baroque Prelude and Fugue, or a 
 sonata in classical or romantic style for example, I didn’t know where to start. Anything I 
 tried sounded awful and I usually stopped feeling demotivated. 
 My ambition for the PhD was therefore (i) to learn to improvise in a defined historical 
 style, and (ii) to be able to exercise some degree of conscious control over the form of my 
 improvising. Therefore, instead of just trying to improvise and hoping for the best, I wanted 
 to balance conscious intentions and planning with the constraints of the moment; to follow 
 my imagination, but also master the techniques of musical construction. In this way I arrived 
 at the idea of improvising on particular models of classical music which had a clear, 
 transparent form, and also genres which featured strict contrapuntal imitation. Having made 
 no progress in this style of improvising meant that I could approach the work as a novice 
 which would be interesting for the study. I was confident that, within a research framework I 
 would be able to identify and overcome the obstacles that had previously defeated me. 
 Therefore, in addition to this being a study in skill-learning I hoped also to acquire 
 knowledge about the learning process itself: what did I need  to do , and what did I need  to 
 know  or  to change  in order to improvise? These broad  aims therefore became my ‘research 
 inquiry’ from which all other decisions flowed (Nelson, 2013). 
 1.2 A brief explanation of my approach to the study 
 As this was a learning study I also had to develop a methodology as I gained 
 experience. In principle I followed three separate directions of study which, although running 
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 in parallel, also produced a constant stream of insights and information which greatly 
 enriched and informed the learning process and experience of improvising. These were: (1) 
 practicing the skills of improvisation, which began in a general way to model my improvising 
 on remembered compositional models taken from a wide historical range; but later developed 
 into a more focused, analytical study of Baroque models (especially Preludes and Fugues, 
 Chorale Variations). (2) autoethnographic techniques of data collection suitable for a 
 self-study: principally, keeping a journal to document improvisation sessions, noting my aims 
 and objectives before improvising, and reflecting on the actual experience afterwards. I also 
 made audio and video recordings of my practice and improvised performances. Lastly. (3) I 
 made extensive enquiries into cognitive psychological literature on any subject which seemed 
 relevant to the experience of improvisation and skill learning. 
 At the beginning I studied alone, using emerging insights and data from the research process, 
 also my previous experience as a professional musician, to orientate this work. I was in 
 constant contact with two academic tutors who helped me to maintain objectivity, perspective 
 and focus. After one year of solitary study I felt confident enough to improvise in public and 
 enrolled on a course of thirteen (sixty minute) lessons with Jürgen Essl (organist and 
 professor of improvisation at the HMDH Staatliche für Musik und Darstellende Kunst, 
 Stuttgart), which took place over a period of fourteen months. This experience greatly 
 accelerated my development as an improviser and I was able to plan for a public performance 
 by the end of my third year of study. 
 1.3 Main aims and research questions. 
 The more I read the existing cognitive literature of musical improvisation I felt this 
 research had become too preoccupied with analysing expert improvisation. This was 
 reasonable in the sense that experts showed a marked difference in their behaviour from 
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 ‘normal’, non-improvising musicians, being fluent in their expertise. However, most of these 
 studies observed experts from outside and speculated in a logical way about what  must  or 
 should  be occurring in cognitive terms. The results  and findings of these studies, couched in 
 terms of information processing, had little to do with the actual experience of trying to 
 improvise which, for me, was dominated by strong negative emotions, doubts about how to 
 best organise my thoughts, and self-critical feedback. Clearly then, by documenting this 
 experience and by gradually aligning it with expertise I hoped to fill an existing gap in 
 knowledge using autoethnographic techniques of documentation and reflection. I also felt that 
 there was also little recognition of the experience of improvising within a specific cultural 
 context - namely that of Western classical music, in which improvisation had been largely 
 erased from mainstream musical practice and pedagogy (Moore, 1992; Hill,2017). As a 
 self-study of a practising musician situated within the culture of classical music my study 
 would specifically address the relationship between improvisation and cultural values and 
 beliefs concerning improvisation, building … ‘a broad palette of personal experience and 
 socially-founded perspectives on which specific musical and social interpretations can be 
 based … to understand how it feels and what it means to engage in a particular form of music 
 making’ as Stock (2004, p.25) suggests. Addressing these broader research concerns, I was 
 able to formulate my own goals and objectives in the following questions: 
 1. Why couldn’t I improvise? I was an experienced musician with an extensive knowledge of 
 musical structure and instrumental technique. What was wrong or inappropriate about my 
 existing knowledge? 
 2. What kind of knowledge did expert improvisers possess or use? Did they acquire particular 
 techniques for representing and encoding musical structure? 
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 3. Was improvising skill dependent on personality or emotions? Was I the wrong type of 
 personality? Could I learn to improvise purely by conquering my emotions and critical 
 feedback? Or by becoming less inhibited, more confident about improvising? 
 These general questions provided the background for more specific questions. 
 4. Why could I improvise in free, atonal styles but not using historical, tonal languages and 
 genres? 
 5. Why did I find it so difficult to improvise according to a planned musical structure? How 
 could conscious instructions be incorporated into my improvising without inhibiting the flow 
 of imagination and fluency? 
 This mixture of general and specific questions initiated a path of learning which was 
 open-ended as I had no preconceived notions of what I might discover, no specific waypoints 
 to anticipate. They (the questions) also usefully reflect the mindset with which I started my 
 study, capturing something I later thought of as rather naive in the attitude and expectations I 
 had towards improvisation at this stage. I therefore return to these questions later in the thesis 
 (see Chapter 9), to answer them in the light of knowledge and skills acquired during the study 
 itself. 
 1.4 An overview of the thesis and synopsis of chapters 
 Chapter 1. Introduces the thesis and briefly explains the scope, layout and approach. 
 Chapter 2. Reviews all the literature relevant to my study in learning to improvise: from 
 seminal cognitive theories of improvisation and their influence on learning methods, I 
 broaden my theoretical perspective to discuss all aspects of the learning experience: 
 practice-based approaches to research, theories of skill learning, embodied and emotional 
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 learning, the influence of social and cultural context, help to provide a solid conceptual 
 framework within which the individual experience of a self-study can be referenced, 
 compared and understood. 
 Chapter 3. Explains my autoethnographic approach as the methodology of the study. In this 
 chapter all the problems and challenges of self-study are discussed, especially issues of 
 reliability, trustworthiness, generalisability, which are discussed in relation to similar studies 
 and approaches. I describe my biography, former musical training and experience, so that the 
 impact of my individual approach towards improvising can be better interpreted. 
 Chapter 4. In this chapter begins the thesis itself. I describe my novice experience of 
 improvising, the emotional and cognitive barriers I encountered and how I overcame these 
 through investigating the root of these barriers in wider socio-cultural values and attitudes 
 towards musical creativity. Towards the end of my first year I gained a degree of cognitive 
 and emotional control over my improvising through a process of categorisation  1  in which 
 certain features of the task became familiar and meaningful in my perception.  1 
 Chapter 5. I describe a more analytic and organised approach towards learning. I begin 
 identifying specific problems in my improvising which I try to solve through written treatises 
 of improvisation. When these didn’t provide the insights I needed, I created my own 
 exercises from compositional models, using these as guides for improvising. These exercises 
 gave me a new conceptual  1  impression of musical structure,  on which basis I began 
 introducing rules into my learning, most notably Fux’s (1725/1971) principles of contrapuntal 
 motion, which gave me a secure basis for constructing harmonic textures in diatonic tonality. 
 1  Throughout the thesis I use the subscript  1  to identify  mental processes and perceptions experienced 
 during improvisation (see Chapter 8.2.1 for further disambiguation) 
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 Chapter 6. This charts the development of further conceptual control as I begin formal 
 lessons in Baroque organ improvisation with Prof. Jürgen Essl at the Musikhochschule in 
 Stuttgart. In these lessons I learnt how to bring my improvising more closely to the Baroque 
 style, through selecting and abstracting (conceptualising  1  ) characteristic features of particular 
 genres and models of the repertoire. This type of  generative  improvisation allowed me to 
 improvise imaginatively while using explicit stylistic constraints. 
 Chapter 7. I return to private study, reflecting on skills learnt in Stuttgart and how these now 
 affected my practice strategies. As I was becoming more confident and fluent in my 
 improvising, I discovered that I relied increasingly on implicit, automatic processes and less 
 on conscious, explicit modes of construction. This chapter thus investigates the ways in 
 which implicit learning processes affected my conscious awareness of improvising; discussed 
 with reference to neurological theories of consciousness, also literature in implicit memory 
 and learning. 
 Chapter 8. This follows the final steps of my learning as I prepare for a first public 
 performance of Baroque-style improvising. Automaticity now characterised most of my 
 improvising which, becoming too fast for conscious modes of control, forced me to ‘let go’ 
 and develop a more embodied approach towards improvising. Letting go of literal 
 constructions of the task allowed new forms of conscious awareness to emerge which I 
 experienced as a semantic, metaphoric naming and labelling of movements. I also explore an 
 emerging awareness of whole musical forms (while improvising) which I term schemas  1  . The 
 experience of a first public performance is then described in detail, including the 
 cognitive-emotional techniques used to organise attention and feedback. 
 Chapter 9. In this last chapter I return to my original research questions which I answer in the 
 light of knowledge and skills gained throughout the study, contextualising and comparing my 
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 experience to similar findings in literature. Therefore, this chapter makes ‘a required 
 movement away from the proximal to the distal’ (Nelson, 2013, p.46) as I emerge from the 
 study experience itself to critically reflect on the insights I have gained into improvisation 
 and investigate ways in which these insights could be more generally applied to pedagogic 
 situations and research approaches into improvised performance. From this I emphasise the 
 conceptual  1  quality of improvising knowledge as the  distinguishing feature of expert’s 
 flexible, expressive and fast control of musical structure as a spoken language; also that, the 
 acquisition of such a knowledge base requires a more explicit acknowledgement of  Werktreue 
 idealism in pedagogic contexts. 
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 Chapter 2. A review of relevant literature 
 This chapter is a summary of and reflection relevant literature concerning 
 improvisation, in particular the cognitive processes of performing and learning to improvise. 
 Because my thesis emerged from the lived experience of self study, I found it necessary to 
 include a wider range of research than that found within the field of musical improvisation. 
 Thus theories of skill learning and memory, implicit knowledge formation, development of 
 conceptual control and the influence of emotions on learning and performance are some of 
 the subjects included to reveal the basic assumptions, theories and approach my thesis and 
 research is built on. In addition I should state that, to clarify the reasons for selecting certain 
 literature from general psychology, I have sometimes anticipated material from the thesis 
 itself. Occurring in cases when the connection between the literature and the thesis might 
 otherwise have been obscure, I thus made explicit my use of the research in providing 
 insights and orienting my learning path. 
 2.1 Cognitive theories of improvisation 
 Circling around the seminal writings of Jeff Pressing (1946-2002) who proposed 
 various models for understanding improvisation within a cognitive framework, cognitive 
 researchers have established a body of literature which tries to understand what are the main 
 cognitive processes underlying improvised musical performance, also to account for the way 
 in which expert improvisers (in particular) can manipulate, create and perform musical 
 structure in real time. 
 2.1.1 Pressing (1988; 1998): a theoretical model for an improviser’s knowledge 
 In Pressing (1988), a comprehensive groundwork for cognitive studies into 
 improvisation is laid out. Terms such as motor control, feedback and error correction, and 
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 time scales for the control of movement, indicate his interest in the overcoming of cognitive 
 constraints by expert improvisers. Viewed as a form of abstracted skill learning, Pressing is 
 thus able to propose common features to the experience of learning: 
 ‘In the early stages, a basic movement vocabulary is being assembled and 
 fundamental perceptual distinctions needed for the use of feedback are drawn. In 
 intermediate stages, larger action units are assembled, based on stringing together the 
 existing movement vocabulary in accordance with the developing cognitive 
 framework. These action units begin to enable predictive open-loop response. The 
 ability to perceive distinctions is refined considerably, and internal models of action 
 and error correction are developed. Expressive fluency begins to appear, characterised 
 by a mindful ‘letting go’. By the time advanced or expert stages have been reached, 
 the performer has become highly attuned to subtle perceptual information and has 
 available a vast array of finely timed and tuneable motor programmes. ... All motor 
 functions can be handled automatically (without conscious attention) and the 
 performer attends almost exclusively to a higher level of emergent expressive control 
 parameters’ (Pressing, 1988, p.139) 
 Translated into a musical context, such as my own study of Baroque style 
 improvisation,  would mean that, in early stages, a basic vocabulary such as cadences, typical 
 embellishments, voice-leading textures, harmonic sequences, and so on are identified by the 
 individual who practises these fundamental moves in many different keys and combinations. 
 Intermediate stages would then string these different musical cells together to form longer 
 phrases and sections, with attention being reorientated to accommodate increasingly 
 automated production. In a later publication, Pressing (1998), expands this conceptualisation 
 of expert knowledge for improvisation into two more distinct parts: (1) a generic resource of 
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 ... ‘musical materials and excerpts, repertoire, sub skills, perceptual strategies, 
 problem-solving routines, hierarchical memory structures and schemas, generalised motor 
 programmes, and more ...’ (1998, p.53) described as the  knowledge base  (such as the Baroque 
 cadences, figurations, sequences and voice-leading textures I described); and (2) ... ‘a set of 
 cognitive, perceptual, or emotional structures (constraints) that guide and aid in the 
 production of musical materials’ (Pressing, 1998, p.52), which he terms the  referent . In this 
 way, the acquisition of generic musical materials (the cadences, sequences, embellishments 
 and typical figurations of the knowledge base) is also identified with a set of cognitive skills 
 and strategies used for memorising and producing them in real time; while the creation of a 
 new cognitive structure - the  referent  - is used to  steer and organise these generalised 
 productions towards a particular form or genre (such as a Gigue, a Prelude and Fugue, a set 
 of Choral Variations) or expressive aim (the chromatic intensity of a Passion movement, the 
 ebullient opening Prelude of an Easter service, and so on). 
 By dividing expertise into a knowledge base and referent, Pressing raises several 
 important questions for cognitive researchers: for example, what is the connection between 
 the two forms of knowledge? Are they fundamentally the same thing, but accessed in a 
 different way? If so, then what are the skills used to access the knowledge base during 
 improvisation? Also, how are these different kinds of knowledge acquired and experienced 
 by improvisers? 
 2.1.2 Developments of Pressing’s model 
 By addressing these questions, researchers into musical improvisation have elaborated 
 Pressing’s theories. For example, Kenny & Gellrich (2002) borrow computer terminology to 
 describe the knowledge base as  hardware : ... ‘patterns,  parts of melodies, chord progressions, 
 modulations, voicings, counterpoint ...’ (p.130); leaving the referent to provide the  software 
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 of the operating system: ‘systematic rules that assist with constructing melodies, phrases, and 
 larger musical ideas, working with motifs, and establishing relationships among different 
 parts of the improvisation’ (ibid). In this sense, there is little difference in kind between the 
 knowledge base and the referent: for, if the hardware contains general stylistic vocabulary 
 and techniques, then the software merely serves as its application during a particular 
 performance. Similarly, Berkowitz (2010) also refers to the ‘facts of the skill domain’ i.e., 
 scales, cadence formulas, figurations, sequences, passage work etc., which make up the 
 musical vocabulary of a given style or period, which are then rehearsed repeatedly in order to 
 form a knowledge base. Once these ‘facts’ are integrated into the improviser’s long-term 
 memory, ... ‘a stylistically appropriate musical surface can be superimposed upon them. Such 
 a surface structure requires another stock of formulas ...’ (p.29). From these accounts we gain 
 further insights into Pressing’s original conceptualisation of a generalised knowledge base 
 and a more specific referent. 
 However, while the distinction between the general and the specific is theoretically 
 transparent, it is not clear what the improviser actually does to access or mobilise these 
 different kinds of knowledge during performance. This question is addressed by other 
 researchers. 
 2.1.3 Johnson-Laird (2002): overcoming cognitive constraints 
 Johnson-Laird (2002) uses the knowledge base and referent to frame a theory of 
 performance, asking how improvisers overcome cognitive constraints to generate musical 
 improvisation in real time. He looks at a particular aspect of improvisation ‘the ability to 
 extemporise new melodies that fit the chord sequence’ (p.415) in jazz improvisation and 
 works backwards to deduce three logical possibilities for the improviser to meet this 
 challenge. Each of these possibilities are proposed as algorithms for creativity, and are 
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 concerned directly with the working relationship between the knowledge base and the 
 referent - i.e., the means of accessing relevant knowledge. The first: (i), a ‘neo-Darwinian’ 
 algorithm allows generation of new material to be unconstrained, leaving all the work of 
 choice and selection to processes of evaluation which, in live or performed improvisation, 
 would have to take place in the moment. The second, (ii) is described as a ‘neo-Lamarckian’ 
 algorithm in that the individual, through training only generates appropriate ideas in the 
 moment; this means theoretically that any imagined choice will be acceptable, and thus 
 evaluation during the improvisation is unnecessary. The final (iii) algorithm is a compromise 
 between the two, allowing a degree of selection during performance, on the basis that most of 
 the generated material is appropriate. Johnson-Laird’s use of algorithms highlights the reality 
 of cognitive constraints, particularly at the novice stage (see my account of novice 
 improvising in Chap.4) when new material needs to be consciously generated, selected and 
 assessed simultaneously; it also describes plausible ways in which experts may in fact bypass 
 processes of selection in performance. 
 Johnson-Laird reduces the lived experience of improvisation to a logical or 
 mechanistic view of cognitive constraints as a way of explaining performance. His theory 
 does not therefore look at the choices or decisions an individual performer might make to 
 maintain fluency, i.e., how constraints might be overcome through a more flexible approach 
 to rules or by suppressing critical feedback. His theory also relies on the concept of working 
 memory as a limited processing engine which experts must necessarily bypass (as if musical 
 structure was one type of information), whereas more recent research conceives of working 
 memory in more flexible terms, as an emergent property of all activated and relevant brain 
 systems, as Postle (2006) describes: ‘working memory may simply be a property that 
 emerges from a nervous system that is capable of representing many different kinds of 
 information, and that is endowed with flexibly deployable attention’ (p.29). Accordingly, if 
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 we conceive of working memory as an emergent feature of conscious awareness rather than a 
 specialised processing system of the brain, then its role in the improvising experience may 
 vary greatly depending on the individual’s level of expertise. This better defines the role of 
 working memory as an important aspect of a more general cognitive style of processing, 
 being defined through an individual’s preoccupation and interest (i.e., their monitoring and 
 selection) in particular features of the task, and reflecting their previous cognitive 
 engagement with those features. As a result I find Johnson-Laird’s purely cognitive approach 
 too limited in scope to be really useful in providing insights into expert performance. 
 2.1.4 Kleinmintz et al. (2014): the role of feedback and evaluation 
 Using a similar two-stage model of idea generation and evaluation to explain creativity in 
 improvised performance, Kleinmintz and colleagues (2014) explore how different 
 backgrounds in training and experience affect the second (evaluative) stage of the process. 
 This they measured using ‘a continuum ranging from stringent to lenient evaluation’ (p.1) on 
 the basis that ‘evaluating one’s own creative product or that of someone else as deviant may 
 inhibit that individual’s ability to generate creative products, thus reducing the number of 
 ideas produced (fluency) and their quality (originality)’ (p.2). Because they wanted to see the 
 effect of evaluation on creativity, they purposefully compared non-improvising 
 (classically-trained) musicians with others who regularly practised improvisation in a range 
 of styles. It was thus predicted that a background in classical training would produce effects 
 of conformity in creative idea generation, inhibiting these individuals from fluent or original 
 response. Using a range of specialised creativity tests, the researchers’ predictions were born 
 out as they observed musicians who regularly practised improvisation responding more 
 quickly and imaginatively than non-improvisers; behaviour which they attributed to greater 
 leniency regarding the evaluation of creative ideas. Thus, this study provides a theory of 
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 failure to learn which is applicable to real learning situations; situations in which improvisers 
 constantly inhibit their own creative flow through the assessment criteria they use for 
 feedback. 
 2.1.5 Clarke (1988): generating musical structure in real time 
 Addressing the question of how improvisers  generate complex musical structure in 
 real time, Clarke (1988) proposes three different types of mental representation which help to 
 organise and access memorised material. The first (i) is through an ‘associative chain of 
 events’ by which the flow of new music is cued through association with the music currently 
 being played. In this scenario an improviser works without a formal plan of any sort, 
 allowing new material to emerge sequentially as the playing progresses. The second (ii) is 
 through  hierarchical  representations of musical structure  in which all musical events and 
 decisions can be traced back through the hierarchy to more long-term, structural events. 
 While this appears to introduce an explicit formal plan, Clarke suggests that such a plan may 
 be automatically rather than consciously followed, through practice and learning. The last 
 (iii) is through ‘repertoire selection’, i.e., cueing known material, formulae and phrases in a 
 verbatim fashion, which are linked together to form new musical structures through a 
 ‘varying degree of relatedness’ (Clarke, 1988, p.9). 
 It is interesting to view these different representations in terms of their operational 
 effect over improvising. It is certainly possible, as Clarke himself suggests, that some 
 improvisers rely entirely on the third model, in which only over-learnt automatic productions 
 are strung together in a modular way. Equally possible is that improvisers use all three of 
 these mental representations of structure as different techniques for improvising, and for 
 adapting to the constraints of the moment. Clarke’s theoretical models for cognitive 
 processing of musical structure can be understood as universal (I cannot imagine another, 
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 fourth, way of representing musical structure in real time), and thus provide a theoretical 
 basis for further experimentation. Clarke himself does not offer a reason to select one 
 representation over another and for this reason I found it is useful to reflect on my own 
 mental representations of structure throughout my study, while also noting the effect of 
 different types of representation on the improvising process. More studies of this nature 
 would be needed however before this kind of theory can be usefully applied to learning 
 contexts. 
 2.1.6 Berkowitz (2010): acquiring an improviser’s knowledge 
 While the cognitive theories so far reviewed describe improvisation in terms of 
 generalised skills, other researchers study the specialised skills associated with improvisation 
 in historical musical idioms. Berkowitz (2010) reviews a number of historical treatises of 
 improvisation (including C.P.E. Bach’s  Essay on the  true manner of playing keyboard 
 instruments  [1753], and Carl Czerny’s  A systematic  introduction to improvisation on the 
 pianoforte  [1836]), from which he deduces three pedagogical  themes. These are: 1. 
 Transposition : in which the same phrase is repeated  but in a different key or pitch group, in 
 order to ... ‘foster a stronger representation of the formula’s components and internal 
 relationships’ (p.46); 2.  Variation  of musical formulas,  patterns or solutions in order to 
 perceive these ... ‘not as fixed phenomena, but as flexible frameworks for future 
 improvisations ...’ (p.51); and 3.  Recombination :  a technique by which the improviser recalls 
 memorised material from previous tasks to create new musical structures. 
 These techniques elaborate the theoretical concept of Pressing’s  knowledge base  and 
 referent  as they describe specific techniques of acquiring  both a basic vocabulary of patterns 
 or productions and the means of adapting these to create new musical structures. What is 
 interesting is the way in which Berkowitz describes moving from a particular formula - i.e., a 
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 scale or cadence in the key of F major, to a more abstract representation of the same formula 
 through the pedagogic exercises of transposition, variation and recombination. In effect, by 
 mentally recreating the formula in different situations, the improvisers awareness of musical 
 patterns and formulas becomes freed from the particular and made available in a more 
 generalised, conceptual way, as Berkowitz describes: ‘Within the conceptual categories of the 
 knowledge base, core archetypes can coexist with the many varied ways of realising them. 
 The flexibility in realisation of an underlying schema is fundamental to the notion of formula 
 ...’ (p.53). 
 This description of a qualitative change in knowledge - from a literal, score-based 
 perception of musical structure, to a more useful, conceptual perception - corresponds closely 
 to my own learning experience which I describe in this study; yet I differ from Berkowitz 
 when he attributes too much of this process to the pedagogical methods and exercises 
 themselves, as if the mere act of transposing alone ... ‘allows for the knowledge base to grow, 
 filling it with formulas in all keys that can be reproduced instantaneously and automatically’ 
 (p.45); or  variation  itself which ... ‘can foster  a stronger representation of the formula’s 
 components and internal relationships’ (p.46). This may seem a rather subtle distinction, but 
 it is nonetheless extremely important, for, as Vygotsky (1986) states: ‘The cultural task per se, 
 however, does not explain the developmental mechanism itself that results in concept 
 formation ... Learning to direct one’s own mental processes with the aid of words or signs is 
 an integral part of the process of concept formation.’ (p.108). Therefore, Berkowitz, in his 
 review of historical treatises, omits to account for the contribution from the individual in 
 securing insights necessary for skill development. 
 2.1.7 Callahan (2010): memory and musical structure 
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 Callahan’s (2010) investigation of improvisational memory allies cognitive 
 techniques closely to the musical structure of the keyboard music of the Baroque era. In this 
 way, Callahan considerably extends purely cognitive models by asking exactly what musical 
 material or information is learnt by the improviser and how (seemingly fixed) formulae, 
 patterns and phrases could be recreated to form new, improvised music. Thus he proposes a 
 model which incorporates both the generic musical texture of this style and the means by 
 which it can be manipulated: a hierarchical structure of three horizontal layers:  dispositio, 
 elaboratio, decoratio . At the base of the hierarchy,  a musical structure can be seen as an 
 ordinal sequence of principal events: the  dispositio ,  which, in the case of a free prelude, 
 might be two or three contrasting sections of different tempi, motifs and related tonalities. 
 These principal events are realised through musical texture, the  elaboratio , or middle level in 
 the hierarchy, containing the voice-leading rules and relationships which bind together 
 polyphonic and harmonic elements. The voice-leading elements of the  elaboratio  can in turn 
 be improvised into  decoratio  patterns and textures. 
 Through the model of  dispositio, elaboratio,  and  decoratio,  Callahan is able to 
 demonstrate different techniques by which the improviser’s task can be elevated beyond the 
 mere verbatim learning of patterns and formulae, and these can be reduced to two important 
 principles which are particularly relevant to my own study. The first principle is that each of 
 the typical basic patterns or formulae mastered by a Baroque keyboard improviser (for 
 example a cadence or harmonic sequence), is conceptual in nature and thus capable of 
 considerable variation at the level of the  elaboratio .  This source of improvisational freedom 
 is illustrated in Figures 1 and 1a. 
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 Figure 1.  A cadential formula in C major (an element  of  dispositio ), yields one solution of the 
 elaboratio  or voice-leading texture. 
 Figure 1a.  The same formula yields a different solution  of the  elaboratio 
 A single element of  dispositio , a cadential formula  in C major, yields one solution of 
 the  elaboratio  or voice-leading texture (Fig.21) which  can be inverted without disturbing the 
 original formula (Fig.21a). When we consider the fact that each variation and inversion of 
 voice-leading patterns accepts another level of variation at the level of the  decoratio , for 
 example, through extended virtuosic scale passages in either of the upper two voices, then 
 Callahan’s model illustrates a clear conceptual relationship between underlying principles and 
 ‘surface’ realisations. 
 The second principle I have taken from Callahan’s work concerns his elaboration of 
 the hierarchical model to provide equality throughout the three levels of the structure. As he 
 describes: ... ‘a hierarchical conception allows existing musical material to be digested on 
 several levels simultaneously; an improviser can consider its large-scale organisation, it's 
 more local generating principles, and its surface-level realisation independently ... As a result, 
 he or she can reproduce some aspects of the memorised music while varying others - 
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 applying its motivic content to a different set of skeletal voice-leading progressions (i.e., 
 preserving  elaboratio  while varying  decoratio ), or  rendering its same underlying voice 
 leading by means of different diminution formulas (i.e., vice versa)’ (p.57). This equality is 
 very important for, given the hierarchical model of structure, it might be assumed that music 
 could only be generated through a series of chords or harmonic events to be elaborated; with 
 the focus of the improviser being directed mostly at the base of the structure, i.e., the 
 dispositio.  Callahan however, goes some way to rectify  this problem, for not only does he 
 describe how Baroque keyboard textures were characteristically constructed through 
 voice-leading relationships at the  elaboratio  level  of structure, rather than through mere 
 elaboration of chords, but also how musical structures could be generated through melodic 
 motifs at the  decoratio  level of structure, which  are illustrated in Figure 2. 
 Figure 2 . The opening bars of a Toccata in A minor  by Georg Muffat (1653-1704). 
 On one level of analysis, Figure 2 is an elaboration of three harmonic events using 
 stock formulae or figurations. However, it is clear that the musical interest does not lie in the 
 underlying harmony but rather in the level of imitation and contrapuntal relationships at the 
 elaboratio  and  decoratio  level. Thus, although the  music corresponds to a hierarchical 
 construction in theory; in practice (i.e., in an improvised context), the need to continually 
 reconstruct an imitative motivic cell over each chord would compel the improviser to focus 
 on the higher levels of  elaboratio  and  decoratio.  It is this aspect of constructive choice that 
 Callahan explores in his thesis, showing that although the improviser may rely upon an 
 assimilated vocabulary of formulae, these formulae are not fixed at every level to produce 
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 verbatim textures; rather it is a vocabulary of patterns at each independent level of the 
 hierarchy, so that different  decoratio  elements (as  in Figure 22) can create new relationships 
 with  elaboratio  voice-leading patterns (over lower-level  dispositio  formulae) in an almost 
 infinite number of combinations. 
 2.1.8 Summary of cognitive theories of improvisation 
 The cognitive theories I have selected establish the basic principles of cognitive 
 investigation into improvisation, namely the acquisition of a generalised knowledge base (of 
 musical patterns and automated moves) and its mobilisation in performance through the use 
 of a  referent  (mental representations of musical structure  particular to a moment in time). In 
 general, this research reflects on the fluency with which experts seemingly overcome the 
 constraints of novices to create imaginative and expressive new musical structures in real 
 time, and applies the principles of an older body of more generalised research into skill 
 learning. For example Schneider & Fisk (1982) observed that, while learning a new skill, 
 individuals gradually progressed from ‘slow, generally serial, effortful, capacity limited’ (p.2) 
 performance to qualitatively different kind of control which is ‘resource free, autonomous, 
 fast, accurate, and coordinated’ (p.3). Clearly, new types of mental representation arise 
 through the extended experience of doing the task, but these crucial qualitative changes in 
 perception and control can only be guessed at by researchers who observe the performance of 
 others, but not the underlying motivations and decisions of the lived experience which leads 
 to this performance. 
 This makes it difficult for the student of improvisation to use the theories of cognitive 
 research in ways which can inform their learning experience. As Kingscott & Durrant (2010) 
 express: ‘students like, at least to begin with, to know what is more convincing or less 
 convincing … when the possibilities are almost infinite, what is a good musical decision?’ 
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 (p.128). In my own study I found this particularly frustrating regarding the theses of 
 Berkowitz (2010) and Callahan (2010), which come so close to my own musical-historical 
 field of interest. Callahan (2010), for example, though illustrating not only the 
 musical-structural potential for variation, but also the processes of memory and recall on 
 which this could function, offers no criteria for choice, thus leaving the operation of the 
 theory, to the (mysterious) artistic discretion of the improviser; while Berkowitz (2010), who 
 advances right up to an explanation of the decision making processes behind the theories 
 retreats at the very moment of revelation into a mere naming of the theories involved. Thus, it 
 is ... ‘differentiation and coalescence [which] help to explain the reorganisation of the 
 improviser’s knowledge base during rehearsal’ [Berkowitz, 2010, p.90]; as if the terms 
 ‘differentiation’ or ‘coalescence’ themselves possessed implicit powers of communicating 
 knowledge formation and creative decision making. 
 2.2. Perspectives on learning to improvise 
 I have criticised the above cognitive theories of improvisation for approaching an 
 improviser’s knowledge too impersonally, or even mechanistically, in ways which are 
 difficult to relate to the lived experience of improvising. It is now worth looking at theories 
 which specifically address the experience of learning to improvise in different social 
 situations and contexts and over an extended period of time; also the role of emotions and 
 decision making processes in forming knowledge, and the qualitative changes involved in the 
 progress from novice to expertise. 
 2.2.1 Kingscott & Durrant (2010): three stages of learning 
 Kingscott & Durrant (2010) draw on their own phenomenological experience as 
 practising improvisers (in jazz and classical organ respectively) to propose a three-stage 
 model of learning. Initially ... ‘we suggest that musicians first gain material and specific skill 
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 generation through practice – the ‘concrete’; second, they depend on sense perception to 
 develop further new musical ideas – the ‘dynamic’; and third, they become dependent on 
 social interaction, placing improvising skills in a ‘social’ context’ (p.130). The first two 
 stages then assume a rigorous, technical approach to acquiring general patterns - i.e., a 
 knowledge base, followed by a repertoire of possible applications of these patterns - i.e., 
 referents. The authors thus propose that it is on this basis that more artistic, ‘sense perception’ 
 skills and abilities emerge, with artistic freedom portrayed as the ultimate goal, dependent on 
 complete technical fluency. 
 The learning theory emerging from this study is clearly a reflection of the researchers 
 own experience, arising from their motivation to achieve excellence (i.e., stylistic coherence 
 and technical fluency) within a particular style. As they themselves describe: ‘The 
 manipulation of material within a style is the key skill here, and so the familiarity of that style 
 is paramount – the scales, the harmonic language and progressions. Tuition, then, would 
 ideally develop the ability ‘to music’ in that given sphere – not necessarily to make up 
 something new and certainly not the production of something ‘without preparation’ (p.138). 
 It seems to me that the usage of stylistic compositional models brings something of the values 
 of  Werktreue  perfection into their attitudes towards  improvisation, a fact which limits the 
 usefulness of the theory as a general strategy. For individuals with different goals and 
 motivations, possessing different levels of instrumental technique and with exposure to 
 different types of cultural context, might well benefit from a less technically-orientated or 
 rigid approach to learning. 
 Yet, there are some important findings from the study as both subject-researchers 
 report similar learning stages: (i) an initial period of unstructured learning in which they 
 simply tried to copy the recordings or performances they admired; (ii) a later period of formal 
 39 
 tuition, with a respected teacher and expert in the field, followed by (iii) learning through 
 performance, in which the skills and knowledge acquired in the first two stages are accessed 
 in a new way, towards expressive, communicative ends: [through] ‘a sense of the occasion to 
 determine what is artistically and spiritually needed’ (p.141). Therefore, it is through reading 
 these biographical descriptions of learning, more than through the learning theory they 
 propose, that one gains an idea, a vivid impression of how knowledge for improvising is 
 actually formed and acquired. 
 2.2.2 Kratus (1991): seven stages of learning 
 Kratus (1991) also addresses the whole range of learning to improvise, proposing a 
 seven-stage model of development from novice to expertise. This is as follows: 
 ‘Level 1. Exploration: The student tries out different sounds and combinations of 
 sounds in a loosely- structured context. 
 Level 2. Process-orientated improvisation: The student produces more cohesive 
 patterns. 
 Level 3. Product-orientated improvisation: The student becomes conscious of 
 structural principles such as tonality and rhythm. 
 Level 4. Fluid improvisation: The student manipulates his or her instrument or voice 
 in a more automatic, relaxed manner. 
 Level 5. Structural improvisation: The student is aware of the overall structure of the 
 improvisation and develops a repertoire of musical or non-musical strategies for 
 shaping an improvisation. 
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 Level 6. Stylistic improvisation: The student improvises skillfully within a given 
 style, incorporating its melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic characteristics. 
 Level 7. Personal improvisation: The musician is able to transcend recognised 
 improvisation styles to develop a new style’ (Kratus, 1991, p.37) 
 Kratus’s scheme of learning is valuable in that it identifies the needs of novice and 
 intermediate improvisers as qualitatively different from experts: ‘What is needed is a more 
 precise way of conceptualising improvisation to allow for changes that occur as students 
 develop knowledge, skills and experience’ (p.36). Therefore, at the beginning levels of his 
 approach Kratus models musical-improvisational skills on children’s existing behaviour and 
 cognitive abilities; so that, for example, free exploration becomes increasingly more directed 
 towards coherent patterns and products (levels one to three). This raises the question whether 
 such an approach might be suitable for individuals who might prefer more specific answers 
 for controlling tonality than are implied through (level two) ‘process-orientated 
 improvisation’ as the author proposes. On the other hand, Kratus’s approach seems rather 
 over-prescriptive for general application, not only in his detailed description of individual’s 
 focus of attention: from the process, to the product, and from the overall structure to elements 
 of musical style; but also, in his artistic and aesthetic goals, which reflect a particularly 
 narrow conception of improvising skills - as a means of ‘transcending recognised 
 improvisation styles to develop an original style’. 
 2.2.3 Sudnow (2001): the lived experience of learning 
 Sudnow’s (2001) personal account of learning to improvise jazz (from novice 
 through to fluent expertise) provides some of the most valuable insights to date into the actual 
 experience of skill learning. Unlike cognitive research which tries to provide a theoretical, 
 logical interpretation of learning events, there is no explicit clarification of Sudnow’s 
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 experience; rather, he seeks to describe the internal experience of learning, leaving the 
 interpretation of his text to the reader. In this way, Sudnow’s account communicates vividly 
 and dramatically the confusion and frustration of initial learning stages, followed by a very 
 gradual ability to gain cognitive control over the skill domain. Thus, at the outset of learning 
 he reports: ... ‘I didn’t know where to go, how to even begin to make up melodies ...’ (p.20), 
 and this frustration with his performance is in stark contrast to his aesthetic sensitivity, i.e., 
 his ability to imagine how the jazz ought to sound. 
 Without any external assistance (his teacher is notably unable to communicate his 
 practical knowledge or skill), Sudnow begins a process of unstructured trial and error, ... 
 ‘searching and looking’ as he tries to imitate the performances and recordings he admires. 
 Only after many hours of deliberate practice does he notice emerging qualitative changes in 
 his perception of events and action responses, such as  audiation  (the ability to inwardly hear 
 music in advance of playing) and a kind of sensed, kinaesthetic knowledge which he 
 describes as ‘pathways’ or ‘territories’ through his perception of the task: ‘I could tell what a 
 note would sound like because it was a  next  sound,  because my hand was so engaged with the 
 keyboard that through its own configurations and potentialities it laid out a setting of 
 sounding places right up ahead of itself’ (p.47).  enabling him to aim for sounds in an 
 anticipatory manner rather than acting blindly. Gradually, repeated movements become more 
 automatic and Sudnow describes how his memories for material become more organised and 
 connected, so that sequences of movements become more instantly available and he is able to 
 construct or  re-combine  his improvisations heterarchically  through loose associations of 
 learnt material. 
 Eventually Sudnow reaches a level where, having built up a repertoire of moves, 
 stylistic appropriate responses and sequences, he witnesses isolated moments of totally 
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 automatic procedures: ... ‘a line of melody  interweavingly flowed over the duration of several 
 chords,  fluently winding about in ways I’d not seen  my hands move before, ...’ (p.77). At first 
 he cannot wholly control these fleeting instances of genuine expertise, but gradually learns to 
 perceive events in ways which encourage similar occurrences: ... ‘I sing  with  my fingers. One 
 may  sing along with  the fingers, one may use the fingers  to blurt out a thought, and one may 
 sing with  the fingers’ (p.79). Ultimately he describes  a kind of embodied, kinaesthetic 
 knowledge for generating musical structures (i.e., recombination) in a kind of anarchic use of 
 language which, none the less is a valuable attempt at communicating the phenomenal 
 experience of improvisation: ‘Getting the time into the fingers and hand, coming down for a 
 saying to be just so, having a soundful way right at hand in these first rather cautious yet 
 increasingly smooth sector shifts, I began to find ... that I could undertake new shaped and 
 rated courses with well-at-hand route segments’ (p.112). 
 Sudnow’s account is unique in that it attempts to capture in writing the rarely 
 documented experience of improvising during novice and intermediate stages of learning. 
 Thus, from his account I am able to perceive three main streams of development running in 
 parallel through the narrative. These are: (i) Sudnow’s conscious intentions and awareness of 
 improvising, including his goals for improvising at different stages and his perception of the 
 constraints and features of the task; (ii) emerging skills and abilities which appear seemingly 
 autonomously and independently of his conscious intentions, and (iii) the formation of 
 knowledge structures and connections which occur in the background (unconsciously) yet 
 consistently influence and shape his improvising experience. Of course, Sudnow’s extremely 
 idiosyncratic approach to language, means that his text is capable of wide interpretation; yet, 
 in spite of this criticism, I am able to interpret a clear sequence of cognitive advances in 
 Sudnow’s learning, similar (for example) to Kratus’ (1991) seven-stage plan, or Kingscott 
 and Durrant’s (2010) three-stage model of learning. For example, Sudnow clearly develops 
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 his conceptual pathways (through the texture) or groupings of motor movements, before 
 being able to apply these to particular musical, structural goals; and these capabilities precede 
 expressive fluency by a long period. 
 In conclusion, Sudnow’s first-person experience supports rather than departs from 
 theories of skill acquisition; therefore, his account is significant not because he challenges a 
 well-established field of research, but because he offers information about improvising which 
 is usually omitted from written texts: that is, the nature of the individual’s  perception  of 
 events at different stages of learning. Thus, from Sudnow we learn how new knowledge 
 emerges into perception to effect qualitative changes in one’s perspective of the task; how 
 this perspective feeds back into one’s processing of the task, reorganising the knowledge 
 base, leading to new skills, and so on; so that each level of progress towards expertise can be 
 seen to be dependent, as Sudnow (2001) describes ... ‘upon the acquisition of facilities that 
 made it possible’ (p.44). 
 2.2.4 Learning to improvise in different social contexts 
 The accounts of learning to improvise just reviewed, have all approached 
 improvisation as an unfamiliar skill to be learnt in addition to a grounding in score-based 
 interpretation which is at the heart of western classical music. In contrast to modern western 
 systems of music education and training, other world cultures treat improvisation as integral 
 to learning music and thus, improvisation frequently features as a pedagogical tool, used to 
 communicate instrumental techniques and knowledge about music. For example, 
 Dunbar-Hall (2009), describes how students of gamelan music in Bali learn to imitate the 
 teacher without notational aids, copying his demonstrations and thus quickly internalising 
 musical patterns which are used as building blocks to reconstruct new musical forms. 
 Returning again to western culture, historical contexts show that improvisation was similarly 
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 integral to practice, as shown in the partimenti schools of Naples (18th century) and Paris 
 (19th century). Especially in the Italian model of teaching, knowledge was transmitted 
 through practical demonstration through a hierarchic social structure of increasingly adept 
 students serving as  maestrini  (tutors) to younger  novices, while the  maestro  (principal) gave 
 daily lessons to the most advanced (Sanguinetti, 2007) 
 As these models show a diverse range of attitude and practice towards improvisation, 
 it is therefore important to acknowledge that learning and performing improvisation may be 
 facilitated or considerably obstructed by the historical and cultural context in which it is 
 ‘always situated and embedded’ (Borgdorff, 2012, p.165). In my own study, these studies 
 became relevant as I recognised my own cultural situatedness within the ideals of Werktreue 
 interpretive performance, and thus improvising on models of canonic classical repertoire gave 
 me a feeling of entering a new and strange domain where habitual instrumental techniques 
 and learning strategies were useless, and entirely new modes of behaviour were required. 
 Hood (1960), who taught a range of Eastern musical styles to american students referred to 
 this phenomenon as ‘bi-musicality’, in which students often had to unlearn habits of 
 score-dependency in order to open themselves to new, oral methods of imitation and rote 
 learning. As he notes: ‘the person with no musical training again has an advantage over the 
 music student who misses the printed page and who, in the beginning, finds it frustrating not 
 to be able to “see” where he is going’ (p.56). Similarly, Dunbar-Hall (2009) describes himself 
 having to overcome ‘a raft of [habitual] learning strategies’ (p.157) in order to progress and 
 acquire skills in gamelan music. 
 In this sense we can see how learning to improvise transcends the domain of music 
 theory or even skill learning to become a form of social practice. Smilde (2008), describes 
 how the student ... ‘learns through participation in a community of practice, starting in a 
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 peripheral position and gradually participating in the community’s activities, learning 
 cognitively, emotionally and socially, and slowly reaching a more central position, achieving 
 full membership in the community’ (p.245). This process of social transformation and 
 integration becomes relevant to my study when I leave my solitary practice and enter a 
 community of improvisers within a higher institution of learning. Integration into this 
 community allowed me to acquire invaluable information about improvising which was 
 communicated through patterns of behaviour I was able to observe in the lessons I attended. 
 Thus, Leahey (2004) states ... ‘It is through social interaction - not through solitary hunting, 
 foraging, and reproduction - that individual cultures survive and flourish’ (p.442), while 
 Collins (2013) asserts that expert skills ... ‘can be acquired only by immersion in the society 
 of those who already possess it’ (p.254). 
 2.2.5 Learning to improvise within musical institutions 
 In the previous section I described some of the difficulties which Western classical 
 musicians, situated within a largely non-improvising musical culture, need to overcome in 
 order to mobilise their skills in improvisation. The continuing practice of organ improvisation 
 within musical institutions is a rare exception to a general rule in which classical musical 
 institutions perpetuate a non-improvisatory culture in which the values of  Werktreue  service 
 to the score predominate. Thus, Sawyer (2008) talks of ‘the core flaw at the heart of our 
 musical culture’ … ‘the implicit assumption that the nature of musical performance is to 
 accurately execute a composer’s past vision. Instead, we need a transformation of our musical 
 culture, one that upends the relationship between performer and composer, one that places the 
 performer at an equal status with the composer, and one in which both performer and 
 composer contribute creatively to music’ (p.1). In this way Sawyer articulates the wider 
 implications of improvisation to disturb existing cultural values and power relations which 
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 are transmitted through specialist musical institutions. Introducing the practice of 
 improvisation within such institutions therefore creates specific challenges, as the following 
 researchers report. 
 Hill (2017) describes a number of beliefs about improvisation which exist in classical 
 music communities. These are, that ‘the creative potential of performers is somehow 
 inferior’, or that ‘because a decision is spontaneous … it is unprepared or that it comes out of 
 nowhere’, or that  ‘a creative work must be entirely original’, or that ‘improvisation belongs 
 in jazz and various world music and vernacular traditions but not in serious western art 
 music, especially not in classical and romantic music’ (p.223). Such beliefs can be described 
 as working ideologically or  hegemonically  to suppress  and subvert improvisational practice, 
 as Quicke (2010) describes: Hegemony is all embracing. Its own mode of operation also 
 involves the interweaving of discourses, usually in ways that nullify, neutralise, tame and thus 
 incorporate the opposition’ (p.245). Thus, Dolan (2005), explicitly addresses the effect of 
 culturally-informed beliefs and habits about music in his pedagogic approach to improvising: 
 ‘Classical musicians are usually trained to know exactly what, and how, they are supposed to 
 play: this may explain why the idea of proceeding into the ‘unknown’ territory of 
 improvisation might feel intimidating’ (p.111). To overcome this fear, Dolan uses what he 
 calls the ‘natural schemes’ - physical gestures which express and explore emotions - aligning 
 these gestures afterwards with ‘learned schemes’ through the theoretical analysis of musical 
 scores. In this way, students learn first to express themselves, to identify and communicate a 
 gesture, movement, and only after to interpret this gesture within a stylistic or accurate 
 musical form, an approach to improvisation which is closely related to the  eurythmic 
 exercises of Jaques-Dalcroze (1921). 
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 Spiegelberg (2008), in contrast to the afore-mentioned pedagogues, proposes a strict 
 rule-based and written approach as an introduction to improvisation: ... ‘the composition 
 assignments have very strict parameters, giving the students the comforting experience of 
 paint-by-numbers rather than a frighteningly blank canvas’ (p.79). Based on the idea that 
 ‘both activities [improvisation and composition] are essentially processes of creating new 
 music’ (p.76), the essential difference being that composition simply allows more time for 
 reflection and selection - he proposes that exercises in composition are the first step in 
 inducing creative practices among individuals unaccustomed or fearful of creating music. 
 Once people are comfortable with the idea of creating their own music, Spiegelberg suggests 
 using the compositions as templates for aural imitation and memorised performance, thus 
 developing skills in imaginatively reconstructing music; skills which support improvising 
 music in real time. Thus his pedagogic approach, labelled ‘comprovisation’ is proposed to 
 overcome the problems of novice creativity in experienced classically-trained students. 
 Similarly to Dolan, Spiegelberg bases learning processes on cognitive theories, especially 
 those of Pressing (1998). Thus, through the structured exercises ‘comprovisation’ students 
 aim to acquire not only ‘a generalised knowledge of the style and musical language’ (p.78), 
 but also a repertoire of  mental ‘schemata’ (i.e., piece-specific  referents ) enabling students to 
 structure music in real time. 
 It should be noted that other authors reject such structured methods of teaching 
 improvisation as inappropriate for educational institutions. Hickey (2009) for example, states 
 that ...  ‘teaching  improvisation [according to compositional/stylistic  models], in the 
 traditional sense, is not possible’ (p.285), while the improviser Joelle Leandre (2006) remarks 
 that ... ‘when we talk about improvisation it is about life. That’s why we cannot teach 
 improvisation. It would be pretentious to teach life to someone else!’ (p.562). Yet, it is not 
 my purpose to introduce a discussion about appropriate pedagogic methods at this stage. 
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 Rather, I include this brief survey of institutional teaching because it gives some insights into 
 the difficulties I faced during the initial stages of the study which I attributed to habits and 
 beliefs acquired through former conservatoire training. 
 2.2.6 Learning to improvise through motivation, confidence and feedback 
 Another line of cognitive research takes a wider view of learning to investigate the 
 role of motivation, emotions and feedback in influencing an individual's ability to improvise. 
 Shevock (2018), for example, interviewed three professional improvisers to understand how 
 their confidence affected their expertise. Defining confidence as ... ‘the ability to maintain a 
 positive perception of self and abilities derived from a feeling of safety’ (p.103), Shevock 
 proposes that, without confidence, people feel inhibited or ‘blocked’ from improvising. 
 Taking this as the focus of his interviews Shevock encouraged his subjects to describe 
 important aspects of their learning experience which allowed their skills to function and 
 develop. These were: (i) the importance of a criticism-free learning environment particularly 
 at early or novice stages; (ii) early exposure to recordings and concerts of other improvisers; 
 and (iii) the presence of influential teachers who guided them through a sequence of positive 
 learning experiences. In a similar way Smilde (2008) associates significant learning events 
 with ‘the concept of  empowerment : positive feelings  of agency and ability through which an 
 individual not only develops more confidence, but also fundamentally changes their 
 relationship with the world about them. I interpret these studies to highlight an important 
 factor of improvising knowledge which is procedural, i.e., based in action.  Thus, an 
 individual’s disposition for action will have a considerable effect on their ability to acquire 
 this kind of knowledge, as Borgo (2007) notes when he describes a successful teacher as one 
 who instills ‘in the people he works with, enough confidence to try and attempt what they 
 want to do  before  they know how to do it (p.76). 
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 Another important attribute of the improvising experience is often described as ‘flow’ 
 - in which the individual feels a notable sense of wellbeing when involved in a cognitively 
 complex task. The concept of flow was first developed by Csikszentmihalyi (1988), who 
 states: ‘the universal precondition for flow is that a person should perceive that there is 
 something for him or her to do, and that he or she is capable of doing it. In other words, 
 optimal experience requires a balance between the challenges perceived in a given situation 
 and the skills a person brings to it’ (p.30). Csikszentmihalyi observed flow states as a 
 characteristic of expertise across domains, yet other researchers suggest that flow is 
 accessible to novice and intermediate learners through a judicious matching of task 
 constraints to suit the particular skill level of the student. Thus, Dolan (2005): … ‘The sense 
 of flow may be integrated from the very beginning of the learning process, together with the 
 practice of structural, harmonic and stylistic elements, which need to be mastered and fully 
 internalised’ (p.112). Likewise, Custodero (2007), whose research involved children’s 
 creative music making, observed that children, through improvisation,  naturally sought out 
 flow states : ‘studies of children’s musical engagement and flow experience in classrooms 
 have shown they are active agents, creating their own challenges by adapting musical tasks to 
 suit their skills using strategies such as anticipation, expansion and extension’ (p.94). 
 These studies therefore highlight an important aspect of improvising knowledge 
 which is not so much the  what  of learning, but rather  the  how : the way in which individuals 
 approach the task, mobilise and access their existing skills to acquire new knowledge, engage 
 in creative experimentation, and so on. As Kenny & Gellrich (2002) state: ‘significant 
 psychological processes ... complement and inform the automation of knowledge bases. 
 Performance that incorporates flow states and risk taking may in fact hold the key to 
 achieving optimal levels of musical communication, providing a clue as to why some 
 musicians are able to access their knowledge bases more fluidly and creatively than other 
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 similarly skilled but less inspired improvisers’ (p.120). Learning optimal ways of accessing 
 knowledge may then be a key factor in the expert’s skill development, and for this reason 
 some pedagogues base their teaching strategies on facilitating such modes of access. For 
 example, Kristiina Junttu (interviewed by Hill, 2017) describes: ‘It was the attitude that you 
 can simplify everything to where you can work with it. Find that skeleton, play with the basic 
 things, and then do some modulations, change the metre, change the harmonisation ...’ 
 (p.225). 
 2.2.7 Learning to improvise as an adult/mature student 
 Berkowitz (2010) states that: ‘during Johann Sebastian Bach’s childhood, he was 
 surrounded by music and musicians, and one can imagine that he was exposed nearly as 
 much to tonal music as he was to German. In such an environment, it is not hard to imagine 
 how, given early training on an instrument, the ability to speak the musical language fluently 
 through improvisation would develop nearly spontaneously, as does the capacity for 
 spontaneous speech’ (p.99). This imaginative description compares improvisation to learning 
 a language in ways which highlight the advantage the child has over the adult. Whereas the 
 child (under normal conditions) is situated in a natural learning situation as part of their 
 necessary and expected growth towards adult competence and maturity, an adult’s learning 
 situation is perhaps more artificial, the result of decisions taken to learn a new skill, or to 
 acquire new knowledge. This is certainly the attitude of Després et al. (2016) who divided 
 their interviewed subjects into ‘native’ improvisers: those who ‘started to improvise 
 “naturally” from the beginning of their instrumental learning [as children]’ (p.173), and 
 ‘immigrant’ improvisers, who learnt through formal training as mature or adult students. By 
 dividing their subjects in this way, Després and colleagues found that those who had learnt as 
 children were not as explicitly aware of their motivations for improvising or of the strategies 
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 used to develop their skills. Immigrant, adult improvisers on the other hand improvised for a 
 definite reason: ‘In one way or another, the  immigrant  improvisers  we interviewed felt that 
 creativity had been left behind in their initial training, so they sought out improvisation as a 
 means of creative  self-expression ’ (p.174). This self-consciousness  continues with the adult 
 improvisers so that they are also more articulate about their emotions while learning and 
 performing. 
 Another contrast between adult and children’s improvising is explored in Custodero’s 
 (2007) study in which both age groups undertake a similar improvising task. Whereas the 
 adults are more self-conscious and inhibited about improvising (particularly when using a 
 tonal language which they intuitively associate with their knowledge of tonal repertoire), the 
 children are more able to treat the exercise as a game and soon enjoy a relaxed and freely 
 experimental approach to the study. Custodero thus concludes that the child’s ‘awareness of 
 time is situated in the present rather than projected to the future ... and the child’s ‘instinctual 
 curiosity enables long periods of exploration, rewarded and maintained by the expectation of 
 growth’ (p.78). The contrast between child and adult learning of improvisation is so often 
 compared to the (seeming) ease with which children learn to speak their first language, in 
 contrast to the difficulties of the adult struggling to speak a second language (i.e. Després et 
 al. 2016) that it is almost a cliché of improvising literature; yet, while this comparison is 
 considerably more complex in reality than a superficial comparison merits, there is a body of 
 research into second language learning which provides valuable insights into adult learning of 
 improvisation. 
 2.2.8. Learning to improvise compared with language learning 
 An important aspect of adult learning is therefore the previous experience and 
 knowledge which they bring to the task. I have already reviewed how other researchers, 
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 (Dunbar-Hall [2009] and Hood [1960]) needed to overcome habitual modes of perceiving and 
 processing music in order to engage in new musical cultures. Researchers into foreign 
 language learning are also concerned with the effects of habitual modes of cognition which 
 interfere with individuals’ perception of a new language. Ellis (2011) describes this problem 
 in terms of learnt attention: ‘In contrast to the newborn infant, the L2 learner’s neocortex has 
 already been tuned to the L1, incremental learning has slowly committed it to a particular 
 configuration, and it has reached a point of entrenchment where the L2 is perceived through 
 mechanisms optimised for the L1. Thus the L1 implicit representations conspire in a “learned 
 attention” to language and in the automatised processing of the L2 in nonoptimal, L1-tuned 
 ways.’ (p.40). This is, of course, highly relevant to studies of improvisation in which 
 musicians bring many years of experience in one way of music making (effectively their L1 
 skills), needing to adjust this to perceive music in a different, improvisatory way (requiring 
 L2 skills). In these situations Ellis suggests that students need to have their attention guided 
 towards relevant, salient features of the stimulus in order to initiate new processing skills 
 which, over time, can become habitual: ‘Declarative rules can be used for conscious, 
 attentive, usually slow, regulation of output. Sufficient practice under such guidance can 
 result in the tuning of output modules ... so that eventually these sequences can be performed 
 automatically, without further attentional demand’ (Ellis, 1994, p.16). 
 Therefore, there are many situations in which ‘especially adult learners find overt 
 rules psychologically satisfying’, as Davies (1980, p.21) notes. Yet, there are limitations to 
 the rule-based style of learning, as Sharwood-Smith (1994) aptly describes: ‘the person who 
 knows the rules of French might well assume that they ‘knew’ more French as a result and 
 would feel frustration when all their technical knowledge of grammar seemed to leave them 
 in the lurch on arrival in the Gare du Nord’ (p.38). What Sharwood Smith and other language 
 researchers thus propose is that two distinct learning approaches for adult students are 
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 necessary: one, which is directed towards a conscious understanding of salient rules and 
 features; another, which is not explicitly guided but emerges through practice or  production 
 of the language in real-life settings. This is because rule-based knowledge cannot be 
 mobilised fluently and automatically, but results only in ‘the behaviour of speakers who 
 express themselves in a second language which they master explicitly but which they have 
 never had an opportunity to use in conversational settings and who construct their utterances 
 laboriously, with long pauses’ (Paradis, 1994, p.399). Thus, rule-based learning must give 
 way to more unconscious production, and a different  implicit  learning style suitable for 
 situations when ‘the material to be learned is more randomly structured with a large number 
 of variables and when the important relationships are not obvious’ (Ellis, 2011, p.38). 
 In this way, the research of second language acquisition highlights important aspects 
 of the learning process of adults which give insights into learning musical improvisation. The 
 fact that (improvisatory) skills and control over spoken language in real time depend on 
 different, and possibly incompatible, cognitive processes, as Paradis (1994) describes: ‘the 
 speaker may  either  use automatic processes  or  controlled  processes, but not both at the same 
 time’ (p.404), has real implications for the experience of a student learning to improvise. It 
 was this clarity in understanding the learner’s needs and perspective which drew me to 
 language research. For example, Sharwood-Smith (1994) clearly describes the challenge of 
 production knowledge: ‘It therefore becomes more obviously necessary to determine what 
 takes place first, what second and what takes place simultaneously … Performance rules 
 determine what happens millisecond by millisecond, second by second’ (p.37); these words 
 capture precisely the experience of the novice improviser who, possibly in full possession of 
 theoretical knowledge of his/her subject, desperately casts about for a suitable action to 
 perform. In this way language studies provide a useful resource for understanding how a 
 rule-based knowledge can be translated into action. They add insights and detail to the 
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 learning theories of improvisation already reviewed: for example, Kingscott and Durrant 
 (2010)’s proposal for a third learning stage occurring through social and communicative 
 interaction, or Berkowitz’s description of the improviser Robert Levin’s experience of 
 learning through performance: - ‘his theoretical training with Boulanger led to active, explicit 
 awareness of rules and structures, whereas his sense of stylistic formulas was developed far 
 more implicitly’ (Berkowitz, 2010, p.85). 
 2.2.9 A summary of learning perspectives 
 In this section I have looked at literature which gives insights into the experience of 
 learning to improvise. Whereas cognitive theories of improvisation tend to focus on the 
 knowledge and performance of experts, this research considers the different stages and modes 
 of acquisition underlying expert performance, through the study of children, novices and 
 intermediate students of improvisation. Socially-situated learning examines the implicit 
 processes of absorbing knowledge through observing experts and peers; also how 
 surrounding cultural values, beliefs and expectations might facilitate or obstruct an 
 individual’s learning experience. In this way, research into learning sheds a new light on 
 cognitive theories which often try to reduce improvising knowledge to information 
 processing models similar to computers. By considering the individual’s lived experience of 
 improvising (as described by Sudnow, 2001), important aspects of learning and knowledge 
 acquisition come to light: for example, an individual’s willingness to act, their 
 self-confidence as an improviser, their emotions while improvising (disposition for flow 
 states), the effect of previous experience and biography and so on, directly influence an 
 individual’s ability to access knowledge, to focus, to experiment, and their motivation to 
 continue learning. Lastly, I include literature into second language learning which provides 
 insights specifically into the learning needs of adult novices, these insights addressing many 
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 of my own questions concerning decision making and the organisation of actions as I begin 
 my own study. 
 2.3. Practice-based approaches to knowledge development 
 As a self-study in learning to improvise I needed a research framework which 
 coordinated a number of different areas of activity - artistic goals, musical practice, skill 
 development and academic enquiry. In the following paragraphs I review a number of 
 theoretical frameworks and models which offered a guide for situating my study within 
 existing knowledge and approaches. 
 2.3.1. Action research vs. autoethnography 
 Approaching the question of research design was  initially problematic. Clearly, as a 
 self-study (of one person), I needed a qualitative model of research which was convincing, 
 articulate and meaningful for other readers, useful and practical for my own learning, and 
 ultimately academically rigorous, as an original contribution to knowledge as expected of a 
 PhD study. In some ways, as a practice-based, reflective learning experience which also 
 combined research theories, my study matched the model of ‘action’ research. As Thomas 
 (2013) describes: ‘The central aim is  change  and the  emphasis is on problem-solving in 
 whatever way seems most appropriate. It is flexible in design: the assumption is built in 
 firmly at the beginning that as the research proceeds you will go back to revisit your aims, 
 assumptions, beliefs and practices, think about all of these critically and revise them’ (p.147). 
 While aspects of this design appealed to me - especially the flexibility of following a path of 
 learning wherever it led, also the disciplined structure of  ‘planning, acting, observing, and 
 reflecting’ (Davidson, 2015, p.7) which I needed to inform my learning and to clarify my 
 different roles as participant-researcher throughout the study - I soon realised that the action 
 research plan was not flexible enough, as it required an explicit statement of aims and 
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 objectives to be explored at each cycle of investigation. My problem, as I started to 
 improvise, was that it was firstly very difficult to identify an aim or articulate a strategy 
 which corresponded to the actual experience of improvisation. (As soon as I tried to 
 improvise, new constraints emerged from those I had anticipated. It was useless to try and 
 impose a strategy on this experience: I simply had to follow the path which actually emerged 
 through improvising and see where it led.) Secondly, I was in search of knowledge for 
 improvising, which meant I didn’t know what it was I needed to know. It was an entirely 
 open-ended inquiry; a sense-making expedition of a new and unfamiliar landscape which was 
 only revealed to me when I tried to improvise. 
 The sense of studying myself as a participant in an unfamiliar or foreign environment 
 which arose (unexpectedly) through the initial experience of improvisation led my study 
 more towards the aims of anthropological research, as Malinowski (in Myers, 1992) 
 describes: ‘the relationship of theory and method; inductive versus deductive research 
 strategies; participant observation; the importance of open-mindedness and self-criticism; the 
 linking of apparently unrelated data; the difference between observation and insight …’ 
 (p.24). As the primary methodology for this type of social study was ethnography, it soon 
 transpired that an auto-ethnographic approach would be my best model. Similarly to action 
 research, ethnography is often motivated by the desire for change (Kruger, 2008), which 
 matched not only my efforts to acquire new knowledge and skills, but also a wider and more 
 profound desire for cultural change which becomes increasingly relevant as I challenge my 
 existing knowledge and experience to progress as an improviser. Banks & Banks (2000) 
 describe: ‘an ethnographic impulse, in which the writer looks outward towards culture for a 
 sense of place and identity, with the autobiographical impulse, in which the writer looks 
 inward for a site to interpret cultural experience’ (p.234).  In this way I began to move 
 towards a research model in which cultural values and situatedness could be investigated 
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 alongside an entirely open-minded attitude towards the acquisition of improvisational 
 knowledge. 
 2.3.2. Learning to perform 
 Autoethnographic literature offers a number of models for self-studies in learning new 
 musical performance skills. For example, Knight (2009), who learnt to improvise jazz on the 
 trumpet, writes a vivid, narrative account of his experience in which he describes influential 
 conversations with musicians and friends, and significant events which motivated and 
 directed his learning. These are interspersed with poetic passages which capture the lived 
 experience of improvising and learning. Knight then reflects on the wider implications of the 
 cultural and musical segregation which is revealed in his own journey from a 
 non-improvising school training in music to a real world environment of jazz music - ‘I 
 began to wonder what I was doing playing music that developed in a completely different 
 physical, spiritual and social environment to that in which we live’ (p.81). Dunbar-Hall 
 (2009), in the same collection acknowledges the complexities of research in which one’s own 
 personal development is involved: ‘research into Balinese music was also research into my 
 own learning and teaching processes’ (p.154). This leads him to stringent self-analysis 
 throughout his study, resulting in his recognition of the different ‘layers’ of previous 
 experience which he brings to the study (i.e., as a performer, teacher, administrator, and so 
 on). Explicitly recognising these ‘multiple identities’ helped him to better structure his 
 research questions to reflect the influence of previous experience on present learning 
 processes. 
 John Baily, who immersed himself in the musical culture of  Afghanistan suggests a 
 research framework for self-study which brings together insights into the culture, practice and 
 cognition of musical performance. For example, the opportunity to discover through practice 
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 how music is generated: ‘the structure of the music comes to be apprehended operationally, in 
 terms of what you  do , and by implication, in terms  of what you have to  know ’ (Baily, 2008, 
 p.122); the communication of ‘theory and terminology’ through teaching contexts in which 
 information is more naturally and intuitively shared than other, more formal, research 
 contexts such as interviews; a knowledge of the influence of ergonomics on musical structure 
 and texture through first-hand experience in instrumental techniques; a deeper understanding 
 of ‘modes of enculturation’, i.e., the relationship between musical practice and cultural values 
 which recall Gaunt’s (2017) description of ‘an environment in which the whole approach to 
 being a musician could be absorbed, including underlying principles and values, habits of 
 mind, and elements of daily practice’ (p.32). Finally, Baily (2008) suggests that self-studies 
 of learning are valuable because they gain access to the cognitive processes of performance: 
 ‘how the performer mentally represents the task performed, and how that representation is 
 utilised in the process of performance’ (p.124). 
 This last aspect of Baily’s thesis is important because other researchers, i.e., Kenny & 
 Gellrich (2002) record the impossibility of accessing actual mental representations, due to the 
 fact that ‘improvisers themselves cannot access their own subconscious processes at the 
 moment of creation’ (p.121). Because Kenny & Gellrich were reporting the accounts of 
 expert improvisers, it seems that the conscious awareness of mental representation can only 
 occur under certain conditions in which: (i) the researcher, through the practice of self-study, 
 is trained to notice and report their own thinking while simultaneously performing, (ii) the 
 improviser is not an expert (who by implication performs fluently and automatically) but a 
 novice or intermediate learner who constructs the task through conscious calculation and is 
 thus more aware of the mental representations used. This supposition reflects the accounts 
 provided by Baily (2008), for example, Rice’s (1994) account of learning the gaida bagpipe 
 in which the details of mental representation disappeared: ‘I went from tense, slow playing to 
 59 
 relaxed fast playing in the blink of a concept … I now understood that the myriad sounds I 
 perceived as melody and ornamentation were, from a player’s point of view, unified into a 
 single concept as ways of moving from tone to tone’ (p.125). These factors highlight the 
 usefulness of self-studies which record the whole process of learning, and can therefore 
 provide access to ways of constructing the task which would otherwise be lost when ‘later 
 forms of cognitive schema … absorb earlier ones completely’ (Bruner, 1967, p.65). 
 2.3.3. Practice as research 
 As more artists turn to academia to explore and expand  their work (Borgdorff, 2012; 
 Nelson, 2013), a growing body of literature known as artistic practice as research, 
 abbreviated to APaR (Gritten, 2016), has emerged to align and orientate artistic enquiry 
 within traditional models of academic research. Borgdorff, thus describes: ‘the transformation 
 of artistic practices to artistic research, and the transformation of academia to a domain that 
 also provides a place for non-discursive forms of knowledge, unconventional research 
 methods and enhanced modes of presentation and publication’ (p.xiv). Clearly my own 
 multi-modal enquiry into improvising knowledge fell into this bracket, therefore it is 
 interesting to identify some characteristic problems of this type of study. 
 ●  ‘One matter that requires constant attention is the doctoral candidates’ lack of 
 academic training, particularly in writing skills’ (Borgdorff, 2012, p.63). 
 ●  ‘The erratic nature of artistic discovery - of which unsystematic drifting, serendipity, 
 chance inspirations, and clues form an integral part - is such that a methodological 
 justification is not easy to codify’ (Borgdorff, 2012, p.165) 
 ●  The danger that artistic practice might dominate the study: that original aims and 
 objectives become lost along with a realistic time schedule, as ‘practitioners typically 
 get so engrossed in the practical work’ (Nelson, 2013, p.30) 
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 These points I selected as being most relevant to my situation. My relative 
 inexperience as an academic I describe in detail as part of my biographical background, a fact 
 which had several implications: the difficulty in finding an appropriate language style for 
 presenting the personal experience of learning as an academic thesis; the necessity of 
 involving literature without, as Nelson (2013) describes, feeling ‘obliged to reach out for a 
 weighty theorist to ground [my] project’ (p.30); of needing to incorporate a wide body of 
 relevant literature yet also feeling that I lacked the experience to critically review the theories 
 offered or to develop and assert my own theoretical findings. Not surprisingly I often felt 
 overwhelmed by the scale and scope of my study: I needed to constantly review the 
 boundaries of both practice and research elements, to decide which literature would be 
 relevant even as the events of learning unfolded and took me in many new directions; I also 
 needed to balance practice for many hours each day in order to develop enough skills to 
 produce significant data for the study. These, and other problems, created significant 
 challenges to the methodology of my study, for which I looked to literature in the APaR 
 movement for solutions and advice. 
 The principal theme of advice is that it is ‘the creative process forms the pathway ... 
 through which new insights, understandings, and products come into being’ (Borgdorff, 2012, 
 p.146), rather than the demands of the thesis leading the artistic practice. This was important 
 as it allowed me to focus primarily on the musical goals (the development of improvisation 
 skills and knowledge) and to prioritise the data arising from this focus. This focus led me 
 towards the adoption of a narrative style which vividly recreates the learning experience and 
 is reflected in the actual structure of the thesis itself, in which narrative events and reflective 
 analyses of these events in relation to literature are freely intermingled. 
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 So what of the knowledge and findings resulting from this study? How does the 
 artistic experience become translated into the language and currency of academia at the level 
 of a PhD? What about one’s contribution to existing knowledge? To answer the first of these 
 questions Nelson (2013) suggests that one’s inclusion of and reference to relevant literature is 
 crucial for grounding the thesis within ‘a lineage of similar practices’ (p.29). For example, in 
 my situation, an extended literature review of cognitive theories, current studies in classical 
 improvisation, learning theories and autoethnographic accounts was necessary in order, not 
 only to define the state of existing knowledge but also how a reflective self-study might 
 contribute ‘substantial insights’ (Nelson, 2013) to that body of literature. Perhaps more 
 challenging and subtle though is the translation of artistic experience to the academic 
 language of the thesis, or (in my case) the necessity of articulating the inner experience of 
 learning to improvise over a period of several years. Borgdorff (2012), talks of ‘thinking in, 
 through, and with art’ (p.143), but my study was less concerned with artistic products and 
 more with skill learning and the acquisition of procedural knowledge. Perhaps it was this, the 
 learning aspect, which brought together my practice and research most closely, for, as much 
 as I wanted to improvise, I wanted to understand something about this process. I wanted to 
 know how to improvise, but I also wanted to know about knowing; and for this I needed 
 literature to guide me. 
 In this way, throughout my study, I used the insights of literature (especially that of 
 cognitive psychology, also theories of implicit and ecological learning) to inform my learning 
 experience. These insights helped me to gain objectivity, and to situate my own skill learning 
 experience within wider contexts in which similar parameters and features were already 
 marked out. The discipline of reading, writing and reflecting took this learning much farther 
 than if I had simply practiced the organ. Through literature I learned how to articulate my 
 inner experience, to capture the changing perspectives of a developing knowledge base 
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 extended over a period of several years, and of relating that which was ‘grounded in 
 sensorimotor experience and action’ (Duby & Barker, 2017, p.2) to existing cognitive 
 theories. For example, the problems of describing one’s own sensed, embodied and semantic 
 knowledge (in contrast to theoretical, declarative or discursive knowledge) is touched on 
 through ethnographic techniques of illuminating ‘the obvious’ (Kruger, 2008), which, as 
 Nelson (2013) points out, involves a strong critical faculty: ‘required to dislocate habitual 
 ways of seeing’ (Nelson, 2013, p.45). In this way, APaR authors urge artistic practitioners to 
 incorporate artistic experience within academic traditions and standards; to recognise and 
 integrate this experience with other relevant studies, and finally to communicate this to an 
 academic readership. As a framework for coordinating the two sometimes conflicting worlds 
 of art and research, Nelson (2013) proposes three distinct knowledge areas: 
 (i) ‘know-how’, concerns the discreet, personal experience and semantic knowledge 
 of artistic actions, explored in my case through acquiring the skills of improvisation. 
 (ii) ‘know-what’ - a related knowledge which emerges through critical reflection 
 during the research process and provides insights which can be communicated to others. 
 While I gained ‘know-what’ continuously throughout my study (which involved a parallel 
 pursuit of literature as it did the skills of improvisation) this type of knowledge increased 
 especially through the process of writing up which initiated the articulation of learning within 
 the framework of a thesis. 
 (iii) ‘know-that’ - in which knowledge acquired through the research and artistic 
 process combined is codified into a theoretical proposition or findings which summarise the 
 study and provide a basis for further research to continue a similar inquiry. This final 
 knowledge emerged in my case only through subsequent drafts of writing up; as I condensed 
 the experience of the study into written chapters, sought a narrative thread to this experience, 
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 searched out themes (principally of conceptual learning), contextualising and comparing 
 these with current knowledge and other improvisers’ experience to reach more generalisable 
 conclusions. 
 2.3.4. Ecological, situated learning 
 Clearly, improvising, like any action-based skill involves forms of control which 
 extend beyond theoretical or consciousness knowledge. Although action often starts from a 
 theoretical position (i.e. Anderson [1982] describes how a learner may receive: ‘instructions 
 and information about a skill. The instruction is encoded as a set of facts about a skill. These 
 facts can be used by general interpretive procedures to generate behaviour’ [p.370]), as soon 
 as a person engages in the action itself, other forms of bodily, sensed information emerge 
 from the experience, and it is only through manipulating this information that the person 
 gains mastery over the task. For example, when learning to ride a bike: ‘One can give the 
 beginner a few more or less empty rules, but the balancing activity happens when the rules, 
 such as they are, no longer play any role’ (Johnson, 1987, p.74). It is for this reason that 
 Anderson (1982) in his description of generalised skill learning talks of a transition or 
 conversion of one type of knowledge which he terms declarative (meaning, conscious, 
 theoretical and reflective) to another type which is procedural, based in actions, and 
 hierarchically organised towards achieving goal states. These qualitatively different types of 
 knowledge have already been discussed in relation to second language learning (see 
 para.2.2.5.1), where researchers highlight the fact that the procedural knowledge used for 
 speaking (effectively the action-based part of language) is not available to consciousness in 
 the same way as declarative knowledge: ... ‘the ability to produce the correct sequence of 
 words in their proper inflectional form, whatever processes have been used to reach this 
 result. These remain in fact for ever opaque to introspection’ (Paradis, 1994, p.402) 
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 As I have stated throughout the review of improvising literature, the difficulty of 
 articulating unconscious (implicit) cognitive processes in the experience of improvisation 
 creates a limit to researchers' understanding of improvising knowledge; and thus, it becomes 
 an important goal of my thesis to express and articulate the lived experience of implicit 
 learning processes, including knowledge which arises through bodily awareness, as Stuart 
 (2009) describes: ‘the formation of kinaesthetic and nervous patterns established through 
 somatosensory engagement and the repetition of goal-directed muscular actions and 
 reactions’ (p.42). Over time, this physical, bodily-centered knowledge (hereafter referred to 
 as embodied and situated knowledge) can be seen as  adaptive  because it involves a gradual 
 development of thought and behaviour working to coordinate and optimise the individual’s 
 response to their surrounding environment. Borgo (2007) thus writes about ... ‘an ecological 
 approach [to learning, which] emphasises the structure already inherent in the environment 
 and views perception as a type of “resonating” or “tuning” to environment information’ 
 (p.74). In this way, the concepts of embodied and situated learning offer a useful framework 
 for understanding learning and skill development over a substantial period of time, and 
 incorporate and emphasise the individual perspective of the learner situated not only in a 
 physical environment but also a social one, i.e., Edelman (1989): ‘The brain and nervous 
 system cannot be considered in isolation from the world and social interactions’ (p.29). 
 Researchers who recognise the role of the body in shaping and directing knowledge 
 often criticise traditional cognitive approaches for (i) treating the mind as something detached 
 from an individual’s perception and situation (Borgdorff, 2012); (ii) for assuming our ability 
 to understand our environment - the meaning we attach to events and features of the 
 environment -, comes from the environment itself, rather than being constructed by the 
 individual (Edelman [1989, p.260]: ‘we should not reify [information] as a prior or immanent 
 property of the world); and (iii) for treating human cognition as a kind of 
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 information-processing machine rather like a computer, so that any ‘facts’ perceived will 
 result in universal-type responses. Thus, to consider the context of musical improvisation: 
 rather than imagining the experience or knowledge of musical improvisation to be a universal 
 property (gained perhaps through completing certain exercises or methods), a situated, 
 embodied approach to learning accepts that only through continuous exploratory actions in an 
 imaginatively-constructed environment can each individual be said to arrive at their own 
 Umwelt  (Duby & Barker, 2017) - with their own individual  way of perceiving and acting (in 
 this case improvising) on that world. As Johnson (1987) states: ‘one’s understanding is one’s 
 way of being in, or having, a world’ (Johnson,1987, p.137). 
 Clearly theories of ecological and situated learning bring cognitive theories of 
 perception and learning much closer to the lived experience of improvisation. They reflect a 
 strong sense of dislocation I experience when starting to improvise; a sense of entering a 
 novel environment, of not knowing how to act or react to events triggered by my actions; of 
 entering into a form of dialogue with that environment which is partly shaped by my former 
 musical and biographical experience but also influenced by present choices and reflection. 
 The idea of adapting - of honing and training one’s responses through implicit processes of 
 knowledge formation - is also a valuable concept for understanding a complex process of 
 skill learning over an extended period of time. Yet, although these theories are valuable in 
 understanding many aspects of the improvising experience, I do not reject more abstracted or 
 universal cognitive theories or argue for an entirely individual response to improvising. On 
 the contrary, I believe there are common features to skill learning just as there is a common 
 understanding of musical structure, as Gurwitsch (1984) describes: 
 ‘Each person experiences his own act of meaning apprehension which he cannot share 
 with anybody else. Yet through all these multiple acts, distributed among any number 
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 of persons, and for each person, varying from one occasion to the other in the course 
 of his life, the same meaning is apprehended. If this were not so, no communication, 
 either in the mode of assent or dissent, would be possible’ (p.61). 
 If we do not view common features to structures of understanding as restrictive but as a basis 
 for considerable diversity between individuals; or, alternatively, that many different journeys 
 of perceptual learning might result in the acquisition of a specialised kind of knowledge and 
 experience, then it is possible to juxtapose theories of embodied, individual cognition 
 alongside more abstracted, universal descriptions of improvising cognition (for example of 
 Clarke, Pressing, and Johnson-Laird). Therefore, although I accept and integrate theories of 
 embodied and situated cognition, using this approach to help me articulate and describe my 
 individual  Umwelt  of improvising; I also explore the  motivations and choices which construct 
 the  Umwelt , to understand how these, ultimately result  in common, shared features of the 
 improvising experience. 
 2.4. Defining the knowledge base: general psychology vs. music research 
 The section of the thesis illustrates my use of literature which extends beyond 
 musical-cognitive studies and research concerned with improvisation. While it was important 
 to embed my study in current knowledge concerning musical improvisation, I also needed to 
 distance myself from music-related literature and to look elsewhere for insights into skill 
 learning and motor control, first and second language learning, theories of emotions, implicit 
 learning and. There were several reasons for this: (i) that musical-cognitive studies 
 themselves interpret and select from this literature, so to take my insights from these studies 
 meant introducing another link in a chain of interpretation. This seemed to me rather risky as 
 it introduced the possibility of errors and inaccuracies as one went further from the source. 
 (ii) I was often curious to investigate the source material of theories which appeared in 
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 music-cognition studies, to have a clearer idea of the original theory. In addition, (iii) musical 
 cognitive studies discouraged me when I detected implicit values concerning improvisation 
 and musical practice, particularly the idea that improvisation is an area of extraordinary skill 
 or the preserve of genius. Goldman (2016) also notes that, in spite of a considerable diversity 
 of approach on behalf of researchers: ‘there are some common threads that run through these 
 perspectives on improvisation. These include issues concerning novelty, freedom, 
 indeterminacy, spontaneity, constraints, and other related concepts’ (para. 1.2). As I myself 
 began my learning process (the outcome of which was totally unknown), I preferred to 
 distance myself from literature which I felt anticipated, shaped or constrained my goals and 
 motivations for improvising. This led my research into the following directions (which I 
 summarise briefly below): 
 2.4.1 Emotions and learning 
 The role of emotions in learning is rarely mentioned in cognitive theories or 
 pedagogical manuals of improvisation, yet accounts of novice learning often mention difficult 
 emotional experiences involving shame and embarrassment (i.e. Després et al., 2016). As my 
 own study also reports strong negative emotions, particularly at the outset of learning, I 
 investigated the effect of emotions on learning and on cognitive processing in general. 
 Goleman (1997) reports that, due to the evolution of the human brain structure which is based 
 on older limbic systems (of pre reflective senses linking learning and memory), our emotional 
 responses are quicker to respond than our (later, cortical developments of) reflective, logical, 
 thinking responses. He talks of ‘neural hijackings’ in which emotions overwhelm a person, as 
 ‘a center in the limbic brain proclaims an emergency, recruiting the rest of the brain to its 
 urgent agenda’ (p.14). This is I believe important for understanding something of the 
 performance experience of novice improvisers such as myself, who found it very hard to 
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 think logically in the moment of improvising, suffering instead a kind of panic and cognitive 
 confusion, particularly if other people were listening. While this might seem to be the most 
 extreme emotional response to improvising, other researchers report on the effect of emotions 
 on attention and decisions which have a significant impact on an individual’s learning 
 potential. Pekrun and colleagues (2014) for example, state that: ‘emotions control the 
 student’s attention, influence their motivation to learn, modify the choice of learning 
 strategies, and affect their self-regulation of learning’ (p.6), while Aragão (2011), in his study 
 of adult second-language learners, defined their learning emotions as ‘bodily dispositions for 
 situated action’ (p.302) - meaning that a person experiencing, for example, embarrassment 
 while improvising may feel unable to act in ways which were more available for a person 
 who was unembarrassed or confident. Thus, we can understand that emotions play a 
 significant role in the learning and performance experience of improvisation, often preceding 
 the individual’s ability to reflect or process the task more logically, and constraining their 
 choices for action. 
 2.4.2 Theories of memory relevant to improvisation 
 The problems of defining memory processes in relation to improvisation are legion 
 and beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate fully. Musical cognitive studies are often 
 concerned with the memorising of scores and the reproduction of this type of verbatim 
 musical memory under performance conditions (i.e. Chaffin and Imreh, 1997; Herrera & 
 Cremades, 2014); yet, clearly the use of memorised material is different for improvisation 
 where recall is not verbatim but rather conceptual, based on the improviser’s knowledge and 
 representation of musical structure and the use of motor patterns for realising these structures. 
 I thus investigated the literature of conceptual memory as I became more aware of my own 
 conceptual learning and my growing ability to categorise features and events during the 
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 experience of improvisation. Of major interest were theories which offered a biological or 
 neurological explanation of memory centred on just this type of conceptual perception and 
 development, such as Gerald Edelman’s TNGS (theory of neural group selection): … ‘in rich 
 nervous systems, memory is the specific enhancement of a previously established ability to 
 categorise … Memory thus arises from alterations of synaptic efficacies in global mappings 
 as a result of the facilitation of particular categorisations or of motor patterns’ (Edelman, 
 1989, p.109). 
 At a later stage in my learning I looked to literature which could explain my transition 
 from conscious, guided control to more automatic productions. Snyder’s (2000) description 
 of semantic memory  2  - a long-term memory process in  which theoretical knowledge is 
 gradually blended with lived experience - invoked the idea of  recognition,  through which 
 action, perception and cognition could be united in an instant response. This corresponded 
 closely with my sensation of increasing implicit control and embodied awareness (rather than 
 conscious, calculated control of earlier stages of learning), and set me hunting for more 
 interpretations of this new, inwardly-sensed meaningfulness to my actions as an improviser. 
 Neisser (2014) continues the idea of recognition through his descriptions of constructed 
 perception, in which the individual anticipates action responses through the activation of 
 memories of previous responses: 
 ‘What is the information—the  bone  chips—on which reconstruction is based? The 
 only plausible possibility is that it consists of traces of prior processes of construction. 
 There are no stored copies of finished mental events, like images or sentences,  but 
 only  traces  of  earlier  constructive activity. In a sense, all learning is “response” 
 learning; i.e., it is learning to carry out some coordinated series of acts’ (p.271) 
 2  Although Snyder is writing within the context of musical literature, his descriptions of memory 
 processes are often general in nature and can be understood without reference to cultural values or 
 specific applications. 
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 Thus, in a similar fashion to Snyder (2000), Neisser is centering acts of cognition (i.e., 
 processing and control over the musical stimulus) in the individual’s memory for previous 
 actions; which offers insights into important aspects of the improvising experience at this 
 stage of learning: (i) the letting go of theoretical or declarative constructions of the task and 
 an increasing dependency on more individualistic modes of construction; (ii) the seemingly 
 impossible speed of processing which occurs in fluent improvising; (iii) the sensation of 
 meaningfully recognising certain musical events and features and knowing instantly how to 
 respond in the moment. 
 Lastly, as I began to extend these types of embodied control and implicit recognition 
 over larger sections of musical structure, I studied the more philosophical writings of Johnson 
 (1987) and Kant (1781/1998) who describe the use of  schemas -  an embodied form of mental 
 representation which is both flexible (conceptual) yet also detailed and capable of organising 
 explicit sequences of response. Kant’s description of cognitive-processing of triangles serves 
 as the basis for this literature: ‘In fact it is not images of objects but schemata that ground our 
 pure sensible concepts. No image of a triangle would ever be adequate to the concept of it. 
 For it would not attain the generality of the concept, which makes this valid for all triangles’ 
 (p.273). This description of the triangle can be usefully transferred to the realm of 
 improvisation in which conceptual musical structures (such as sequences of harmonies) 
 maintain their identification in the improviser’s mind despite different ways of realising these 
 structures in terms of time and key signatures, and surface figurations. It is Johnson (1987) 
 though who extends Kant’s  schemas  to an entire system  of inwardly-sensed  metaphoric 
 mental representation and control which I adopt in Chapter 8 to illustrate my own experience 
 of guided control over automatic productions and (eventually) whole musical forms. 
 2.4.3 Implicit vs. explicit learning 
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 The process of knowledge formation, according to biological theories of 
 consciousness and ecological theories, creates neuronal structures which help to predict our 
 responses and thus quicken and facilitate our behaviour in an increasingly familiar 
 environment. For example, Clark (2013) describes how: ‘perception, cognition, and action ... 
 work closely together to minimize sensory prediction errors by selectively sampling, and 
 actively sculpting, the stimulus array. They thus conspire to move a creature through time and 
 space in ways that fulfil an ever-changing and deeply inter-animating set of (sub-personal) 
 expectations’ (p.186). While offering a convincing explanation of an expert improviser’s 
 ability to streamline their responses by anticipating or translating the musical stimulus into 
 familiar mental representations, it also sheds some light on novice difficulties in which 
 habitual  ways of thinking (i.e., as an interpretive  performer) might need to be overcome in 
 order to begin a new way of perceiving the musical structure (as an improviser). But what of 
 the relationship between conscious and unconscious thinking? 
 In some ways the dichotomy between conscious and unconscious learning echoes the 
 discussion concerning the use of rules in foreign language learning. This is because 
 pedagogical methods rely on conscious strategies for stimulating and guiding implicit 
 learning processes; that, in spite of the ubiquity of implicit learning, there remains a rooted 
 conviction that what one thinks, or focuses on is important during the learning process. 
 Carpenter (1986) in a discussion of pedagogic approaches in mathematics, describes three 
 approaches to this problem: ‘The first model proposes that advances in procedural knowledge 
 are driven by broad advances in conceptual [conscious] knowledge. The second proposes that 
 advances in conceptual knowledge are neither necessary nor sufficient to account for all 
 advances in procedural knowledge. The third model concurs with the first that advances in 
 procedural skills are linked to conceptual knowledge but proposes that the connections are 
 more limited than suggested by the first model’ (p.117). While the scope of these models is 
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 inconclusive it is at least a type of discussion that extends the findings of improvisation 
 literature which usually goes no further than acknowledging the existence of two different 
 forms of knowledge. Squire (2004) goes further in defining a role for conscious awareness 
 which: ‘is the ability to detect and encode what is unique about a single event, which by 
 definition occurs at a particular time and place’ (p.174), an implication of the effect of 
 conscious thought in leading and organising implicit mechanisms towards particular goals. It 
 is also Squire (2004) who, by applying these findings to the contexts of learning, suggests 
 that ‘what is important is not only the task that is to be learned but also what strategy is 
 implemented during learning, which in turn reflects which memory system is engaged’ 
 (p.174). Thus I took this as the beginning of a model in which conscious awareness, through 
 attentional focus, directly influences the encoding of experience and the facility in which 
 memorised productions (i.e., the knowledge used for improvised performance) can be later 
 retrieved. 
 2.4.4 Skill Learning 
 It is interesting that, in parallel to my growing  awareness of the role of unconscious, 
 implicit learning mechanisms in acquiring knowledge for improvisation, I should, at the same 
 time, highlight the use of cognitive strategies in the same learning process. Yet, the fact is, as 
 my study illustrates, that there is a complex relationship between these two distinct forms of 
 control which is not only fascinating but extremely significant for any individual’s learning 
 path. One author who particularly influenced my conscious approach to improvising in this 
 respect was John Robert Anderson (b.1947), whose ACT (the Adaptive Control for Thought) 
 models of human cognition emphasise the links between conscious instruction and the 
 development of procedural (implicit) knowledge. For example, the following text describes 
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 how clear, explicit instructions trigger a series of actions and feedback responses in 
 approaching a mathematics problem: 
 P1.  IF  the goal is to do an addition problem, 
 THEN  the subgoal is to iterate through the 
 columns of the problem. 
 P2.  IF  the goal is to iterate through the 
 columns of an addition problem 
 And the rightmost column has not been processed, 
 THEN  the subgoal is to iterate through the 
 rows of that rightmost column 
 and set the running total to zero. … 
 P9.  IF  the goal is to iterate through the rows 
 of a column 
 and the last row has been processed 
 and the running total is of the form 
 “string + digit,” 
 THEN  write the digit 
 and set carry to the string 
 and mark the column as processed 
 and POP the goal.’ (Anderson, 1982, p.371): 
 Understanding how learning could be organised as an explicit sequence of cognitive 
 actions and responses (the individual’s ‘flow of control’ [Anderson, 1982, p.380]) towards 
 clearly-defined goals later encouraged me to attempt a similar kind of approach in my 
 improvising. Thus, as I proceeded with my learning I continually tried to clarify all aspects of 
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 my knowledge, and often referred to Anderson’s analyses of cognitive processes to help me 
 structure and organise my thoughts. In Anderson (1983) all forms of conscious representation 
 are related to three types: ‘a temporal string, which encodes the order of a set of items, a 
 spatial configuration; and an abstract proposition, which encodes meaning’ (p.45). These 
 three codes form the basis of an investigation into my own mental representations of musical 
 structure while improvising (see Chapter 6.3.3). 
 2.4.5 Developing conceptual memory and control 
 Berkowitz (2010) discusses the development of a conceptual memory for 
 improvisation as a facet of expert performance: ‘in the moment of performance, the 
 improviser need not be faced with the overwhelming task of consulting a cumbersome 
 collection of possibilities at any given moment, but can instead draw from a conceptually 
 organised system of knowledge’ (p.54). He also provides a useful definition of concepts as 
 used by improvisers: ‘higher-level categories of musical materials that have particular 
 musical functions (e.g. cadences) or that have the capacity to accomplish specific 
 musical-physical goals when improvising (e.g., how to get from one note ...to another in a 
 certain number of beats or notes)’ (p.54). However, the actual acquisition of conceptual 
 knowledge is portrayed rather passively, for example, as a result of practising variants of a 
 formula: ‘Learning variants also allows for more efficient organisation of the knowledge 
 base, categorising formulas in terms of their underlying schemata [i.e., concepts] by analogy, 
 induction, and inference’ (p.55). 
 Vygotsky’s (1986) research, which investigates the language development of 
 adolescents, describes the acquisition of conceptual thinking in anything but passive terms: ‘it 
 is a functional use of the word, or any other sign, as a means of focusing one’s attention, 
 selecting distinctive features and analysing and synthesising them … the result of such a 
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 complex activity in which all basic intellectual functions take part ... [which] cannot, 
 therefore, be reduced to association, attention, imagery and judgement, or determining 
 tendencies’ (p.106). Thus Vygotsky invokes processes of decision making, experimentation, 
 imagination and feedback in conceptual development, which go way beyond the presentation 
 of certain exercises as Berkowitz (2010) describes, and which reflected more closely my own 
 experience as an improviser. 
 The socio-cultural studies of Vygotsky (1986) describing concept formation in 
 children are reinforced by neurological theories of concept formation proposed by Edelman 
 (1989). Edelman links concept formation to brain structures ‘that can categorise, 
 discriminate, and recombine patterns of activity in different global mappings [established 
 neural connections linking sensory, motion and emotional areas of the brain]’ (1989, p.144) 
 and describes the necessity of neurological activity which is ‘independent from current 
 sensory input’, working instead with memory representations to form new, meaningful 
 relationships from ‘the values and categorisations of sensory experiences themselves’ 1989, 
 (p.145). He highlights again the fact that concept formation and perception is not a given 
 attribute of learning, arising from ‘any inherent logical order, classical categorisation or prior 
 explicit programming’ (Edelman, 1992, p.110), but the result of the individual’s intentions to 
 coordinate and align their control over a stimulus (such as language) in order to meaningfully 
 communicate with others. Ultimately then, from this literature I understood an acquisition of 
 underlying concepts in musical structure as arising from the desire to manipulate this 
 structure in meaningful, communicative ways comparable to learning a spoken language: 
 ‘meaning arises from the interaction of value-category memory with the  combined  activity of 
 conceptual areas and speech area’ (Edelman, 1992, p.130). 
 2.4.6 Summary of general psychology literature 
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 These paragraphs summarise the main literature that I have drawn upon from outside 
 of the field of music psychology and improvisation studies and which was particularly 
 influential in mobilising my learning. By looking outside of the specialist domain of music 
 into areas such as artificial intelligence, implicit learning and skill learning, emotional 
 intelligence and neurological theories of consciousness, I found not only a range of practical 
 insights which influenced and informed my experience in improvisation, but also a freedom 
 from prevailing cultural values which, I later discovered, shaped and regulated a great deal of 
 the practice of classical music, and which I needed to critically question in order to develop 
 as an improviser. 
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 Chapter 3. Methodology 
 3.1 Understanding autoethnography as a framework for self-study 
 To adopt an autoethnographic approach to this study was a complex decision, based 
 on several factors. Originally I had approached the task (perhaps rather naively) in a more 
 detached spirit, thinking that I would study my learning entirely objectively or ‘empirically’ 
 and, by doing so, discover a new cognitive theory of improvisation and learning of general 
 use. However, the reality of the experience being much less theoretical than I had anticipated, 
 it made more sense to emphasise the personal element of the study rather than try to suppress 
 it. In addition a research design was needed to give value to the narrative element of the 
 learning experience, as it was through this narrative that I began to interpret and understand 
 the emerging themes and findings which contributed to the knowledge of the thesis. 
 An autoethnographic approach is obviously embedded in the parent discipline of 
 ethnography, which I associated closely with research into  foreign  musical cultures. Because 
 of this I did not at first consider it relevant to my own interests: after all, was I not learning 
 new skills within a familiar culture and music style I was long accustomed to? However, the 
 actual experience of novice improvising (in which I acted as a stranger within a foreign 
 environment) corresponded so closely to ethnographic reports of unfamiliar cultural contexts 
 that the research approach gradually took hold of my imagination. Revisiting 
 autoethnographic accounts of learning and studying, particularly those of Baily (1988), 
 Dunbar-Hall (2009) and Knight (2009) who all learnt improvisatory techniques as adult 
 learners from a background in western music, I realised that this approach to qualitative 
 research would enable me to express the actual lived experience of learning to improvise 
 without the problems of translating this experience into ‘scientific’ language (Barr [2019] 
 complains of losing one’s voice in ‘academic jargon’), or making facile generalisations based 
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 on the experience of one (Thomas [2013, p.144] quotes the saying  ‘Einmal ist keinmal ’ to 
 explain that one study provides no general findings yet also points out ‘how many more do 
 we have to study before we can say that we can generalise?’ - a particularly relevant question 
 for self-studies such as this). Moreover, autoethnography provided a flexible framework for 
 the unpredictable path of my learning ... ‘in which unsystematic drifting, serendipity, chance 
 inspirations, and clues’ formed an integral part, (to borrow Borgdorff’s [2012, p.165] 
 description); a reference for my necessary investigation of surrounding cultural values which 
 my attempts to learn to improvise made me more critically aware (Barr, 2012); and a guiding 
 process in which to not only develop as a musical improviser and academic researcher, but 
 ‘to share those experiences, motives, and achievements with others’ (Nethsinge, 2012, p.2). 
 Taking an autoethnographic approach thus meant placing myself at the forefront of 
 the research rather than portraying my involvement as a neutral or passive instrument on 
 which to test various ideas. As both researcher and the subject of the research the insights I 
 gained from my experience in improvisation are explicitly interpreted as  situated knowledge . 
 Thomas (2013) describes this kind of writing as having ... ‘an undeniable  position,  and this 
 position affects the nature of the observations and the interpretations that they make’ (p.144). 
 Writing as an autoethnographer meant communicating my own perspective of events and 
 interpretation of a complex cognitive development and skill learning process over a period of 
 time. This subjective involvement in the research, rather than compromising the study, 
 offered instead ... ‘an immediacy and intensity in the author’s feelings and thoughts, which 
 might not be conveyed through descriptions of behaviours about other people’ (Krüger, 2008, 
 p.69). While the autoethnographic approach was empowering to my position as a self-study 
 researcher, it also brought a degree of challenge, especially in terms of writing. For just as the 
 lived experience became the focus of the research, so did this experience have to be 
 constructed as a  narrative , meaning I had to articulate  a multitude of mixed information - 
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 subjective emotions and impressions, facts, dates, recordings, written journal entries written 
 over three years; to connect and thread all these events into a clear and logical sequence; to 
 incorporate relevant literature from studies in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, biology, 
 musicology without becoming academic or ostentatious (Nelson, 2013); to produce a text 
 which was academically convincing as a PhD thesis to a panel of academic adjudicators, as 
 well as a wider circle of colleagues and practising musicians (one of my ambitions was to 
 publish the thesis as a guide for other classical musicians). Thus, one of the biggest 
 challenges of an autoethnographic approach is the style and quality of writing which must not 
 only convey information, but also convince the reader as to the  validity  of the study, as Ellis, 
 Adams & Bochner (2011) explain: ‘for autoethnographers, validity means that a work seeks 
 verisimilitude; it evokes in readers a feeling that the experience described is lifelike, 
 believable, and possible, a feeling that what has been represented could be true. The story is 
 coherent. It connects readers to writers and provides continuity in their lives’ (p.10). 
 3.1.1. Understanding one’s ideological and cultural situatedness 
 One important aspect of the autoethnographic approach is that the research process 
 becomes a tool for facilitating personal growth. For example, Bartleet (2009) overcame 
 problems in her musical practice as a conductor through the process of studying and 
 documenting her work. As insights emerged through the exercise of writing she was able to 
 re-conceptualise her relationship with the printed score and achieve better communication 
 with her musical colleagues. Thus, personal development might be through articulating 
 moments of revelation (epiphanies) during the study, or through a more gradual change in 
 consciousness of one’s cultural and social situation: ... an awakening of the critical 
 consciousness, allowing students to recognise connections between their individual problems 
 and experiences and the social contexts in which they are embedded’ (Barr, 2019, p.1110). 
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 This literature became relevant to my study in learning to improvise as I experienced a 
 conflict with cultural values inherited through my training as a classical pianist; these values I 
 increasingly perceived as inhibiting my efforts to improvise. Uncovering my 
 culturally-formed values and beliefs about music: understanding first how they existed in the 
 musical life I was accustomed to, and secondly how they affected my own thinking about 
 music and my perception of myself as a creative artist were issues which became central to 
 the success or failure of my learning path  3  . 
 Ethnomusicologist Steven Feld asks: ‘What are the sources of authority, wisdom and 
 legitimacy about sounds and music? Who values and evaluates sounds'? Who can be valued 
 and evaluated as a maker of sounds?’ (Feld, 1984, p.386-7). Using these critical questions as 
 a lens allowed me to see my musical training in a new way: not as a simple exercise in skill 
 learning, but as something more culturally defined. A musical training in which creative 
 practices such as improvisation had been entirely excluded, while my role as a purely 
 interpretive musician had been rigorously pursued, firstly by my teachers, secondly by myself 
 as I increasingly aligned my own career ambitions with those I perceived existed in the 
 cultural framework which I surrounded me, and thirdly by the social institutions in which all 
 my musical practice took place. Thus, within the study experience itself, what began as a 
 ‘close examination of sound structures and symbols’ led unexpectedly to a wider ‘analysis of 
 the patterns of human action and thought that infuse these structures with meaning in specific 
 social situations’ as Stock (2004, p.19) predicts. 
 Uncovering the depth to which these ideas of musical creativity affected my ability to 
 learn to improvise was not easy and, although a feature of my novice learning, remained a 
 3  Banks & Banks (2000) also reflect on the cultural issues emerging through autoethnography: ‘the consolidation 
 of the ethnographic impulse, in which the writer looks outward toward culture for a sense of place and identity, 
 with the autobiographical impulse, in which the writer looks inward for a site to interpret cultural experience’ 
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 contributing factor throughout my study. In this sense I was led to literature such as Goehr’s 
 (1994) historical study of aesthetic ideals governing musical practice, and also to marxist 
 philosophers Gramsci (1891-1937) and Althusser (1971) who gave me insights into 
 socio-cultural practice, explaining how existential ideals, regulating the practice of cultural 
 institutions, are personally absorbed in a process of psychological domination, or  hegemony 
 (Lasch, 2007). My eager absorption of this literature illustrates how the research process 
 influenced my thinking, for as I reflected on my early training and detected ‘inconsistencies 
 in positions taken by individuals or groups’ (Stock’s, 1992), I utterly changed my perception 
 of the classical musical culture in which I was situated, so that my development as an 
 improviser runs parallel to a similar development in critical awareness as I become more 
 creatively empowered. To be explicit about this process is important because it also reflects 
 my  situatedness  as a researcher and that my interpretation  of experience (for example that I 
 identify certain ideals as barriers to improvising) is based on theoretical constructs which 
 cannot be separated from ‘facts’ of skill development such as fluency as automaticity. Thus, 
 as Tenni, Smith & Boucher (2003) describe: ‘Data is never theory-free. What we choose to 
 write and how we choose to write it is constructed based on the ways we understand the 
 world, our practice and ourselves’ (p.5) and, as a result, an overriding goal of this thesis is to 
 be explicit about my ways in which I consciously constructed the task of improvisation and 
 how these constructs changed throughout the study. 
 3.1.2. An immersive research experience 
 To learn to improvise fluently to the level of public performance meant immersing 
 myself completely into the practice of improvising. The learning experience was therefore 
 not something separate from my everyday existence, but an integral part; in some ways it 
 became the focus of my life, a direction and a force for change. I improvised for several 
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 hours every day over a period of three years, reflecting, researching and constantly analysing 
 the experience. This approach can in some ways be compared to the ethnomusicologist who 
 is immersed in ‘a disorientating foreign culture and unknown environment’ (Myers, 1992, 
 p.22), for much of my learning involved  sense making  of the novel experience of 
 improvisation. Therefore I interpret much of my acquisition of knowledge and skill as 
 adapting  to a novel environment in which I learn to  act increasingly effectively and 
 agentically; and it is for this reason that I draw upon ecological theories of learning (e.g., 
 Edelman, 1989) to explain my experience. In this way, too, my study departs from purely 
 theoretical studies of improvisational skill such as Johnson-Laird (2002) or Pressing (1984), 
 adding to and testing such theories, for, as Baily (2008) advocates, ‘learning to perform at an 
 advanced level of proficiency’ gives access to hidden knowledge, not only through the 
 experience of overcoming problems of musical construction, interpretation, and instrumental 
 technique, but also through being on ‘the inside’ of a cultural practice as practitioner rather 
 than on the ‘outside’ as scientific observer. 
 After a year of solitary study, I discovered a teacher sympathetic to my situation as an 
 adult learner and interested in my work as a psychological researcher. I thus enrolled with 
 Prof. Jürgen Essl at the Musikhochschule in Stuttgart as an external (Kontaktstudent), 
 receiving more than ten hours of lessons over a period of 14 months. As a fellow student I 
 was also allowed to attend others’ lessons and thus gained access to a musical practice in 
 which improvisation on Baroque models was a part of everyday musical activity. Zemp 
 (1979) describes how information which would not be accessed through formal interview 
 techniques is naturally transmitted between master and student in a learning context: 
 ‘Conversations about music occur quite naturally in the course of making new instruments 
 and during practices ... By learning to play himself, the ethnomusicologist becomes a 
 musician and participates in these conversations; he learns the terminology in its habitual 
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 context ... [Expert musicians] speak more readily of musical structure when a beginner makes 
 mistakes’ (Zemp [1979], in Baily [2008] p.123). Thus, when Jürgen explained historic uses 
 of registration and ornamentation, possible approaches to musical forms, corrections to my 
 improvising and different possibilities, he communicated information which would have been 
 difficult to access had I approached him purely as a researcher. Learning alongside other 
 students I also learned something about their preoccupations: what they liked or didn’t like 
 about improvising, how they responded to the different tasks of improvisation: what for some 
 was a source of pleasure and discovery, for others a dreaded chore. Thus, in the period that I 
 improvised within a community of practice my study gains from this wider 
 ethnomusicological experience. 
 3.1.3. Problem-finding: an open-ended/ open-minded approach to research 
 Before I began my study I did not know what to expect, i.e., what I might learn about 
 improvisation, or in which direction the learning experience might take me. I was also 
 anxious not to inhibit my experience by setting deadlines or anticipating what ought to 
 happen. This meant that an open-ended approach to the study was more appropriate for me, 
 as I intended to record as accurately as possible what actually occurred, and follow the path 
 of learning wherever it took me. In comparison with other qualitative research designs (i.e., 
 action-research) therefore, in which goals and objectives are more defined for each cycle of 
 action, I adopted a problem  finding  approach, as Borgo  (2007) describes: ‘Artists adopting 
 problem-solving techniques begin with a relatively detailed plan and work to accomplish it 
 successfully. Those employing a problem-finding approach, by contrast, search for interesting 
 problems as the work unfolds in an improvisatory manner’ (p.80). This approach is generally 
 considered more suitable for ethnographic research which tries to avoid predicting outcomes 
 of unknown situations. Krüger (2008), for example, recommends starting from ‘broad and 
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 general questions so as to gain a deeper understanding of participants’ experience’ (p.17), 
 while Myers (1992) quotes the ethnographer Malinowski (1922) in saying: ‘Preconceived 
 ideas are pernicious in any scientific work, but foreshadowed problems are the main 
 endowment of a scientific thinker, and these problems are first revealed to the observer by his 
 theoretical studies’. Gritten (2016) too, aligns artistic research with this approach, which he 
 proposes should be ‘driven by an exploration of open-ended questions, issues and problems’ 
 (p.6). 
 In reality, a problem-finding approach to learning was quite challenging as it meant 
 that I never knew what was round the corner, how I might best respond, or even if the 
 direction I was going in was a good or profitable one! It was only after I reached a certain 
 level of development that I was able to relax and say ‘Now I have achieved x, y, or z’ and 
 thus I could look back and see a path of logical development from the beginning of my 
 journey to my present situation. Yet, in spite of these difficulties, the problem-finding 
 approach seems to be common to learning trajectories of improvisers, as Levin recalls: … ‘I 
 just sat down and started playing … You start practicing … and you start to improvise … you 
 like what you’re doing, or you don’t like what you’re doing’ (in Berkowitz, 2010, p.88). 
 Likewise, Sudnow (2001) describes an extended initial period in which he tried to make 
 sense of the emerging experience, learning more through blind experimentation: ‘aimed from 
 the outset, and nearly always, for the most complex of doings’ (p.39) than conscious design. 
 In both cases, it was only after a considerable period of open-ended experimentation that 
 these improvisers were able to bring their learning path under more conscious control, and to 
 make explicit plans and predictions of the actual improvising experience. 
 3.2. Biography and background 
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 A self-study of learning would be incomplete without also knowing something of the 
 personality of the writer, and the ‘significant parts of a life story [which] actually form a 
 musician’s identity’ as Smilde (2008, p.244) proposes. It is also characteristic of 
 autoethnographic studies to include ‘a full confession of the scholar’s autobiography’ (Myers, 
 1992, p.22) in order to better appreciate the  situated  position of the researcher; therefore, in a 
 similar self-study, Nethsinge (2012) explicitly examines his biography to understand how his 
 ‘musical background, understandings, learning, music-making abilities, and skills have 
 formed [his] present identity as musician, educator, and researcher’ (p.2). I therefore use the 
 following paragraphs to convey relevant facts about my previous musical and professional 
 experience which lead up to this PhD study. From this I hope to explain something about my 
 interest in improvisation, my ambition to become an improviser; also the way in which my 
 previous learning and professional experience has been shaped by cultural values. From this 
 biography can then be better understood the way in which I construct the task (Tenni, Smith, 
 & Boucher, 2003), my perception of myself as a musician, learner, researcher and improviser; 
 perceptions which define the experience I describe in the central part of the thesis 
 3.2.1. Musical experience 
 I was born into a musical family. Both of my parents were professional classical 
 musicians and had received a conservatoire training. Music was then a fundamental part of 
 our family life. My mother taught and played the piano and the organ; she also sang 
 semi-professionally in the local opera company and was responsible for a number of local 
 choirs; while my father played piano and violin and was responsible for musical education in 
 our county. I was taught to play the piano when I was five years old, and entered the local 
 cathedral choir aged seven, so that, between these two disciplines, I was a fluent sight-reader 
 by the time I was nine years old (it is customary for choristers in English cathedrals to 
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 prepare new repertoire on a daily basis). This emphasis on sight-reading was reinforced 
 through my piano experience, for, after my initial lessons, I was left alone to explore the large 
 collection of scores which surrounded the piano in our home. My early musical experience 
 then was solitary and intense, as I retreated to the piano in times of stress, and immersed 
 myself in playing for the sheer musical pleasure and reward. Although my musical 
 experience was focused primarily on repertoire, I remember being frustrated with this purely 
 interpretive work. I wanted to be closer to the composers I played: I copied their portraits, 
 often tried to compose pieces and sometimes tried to improvise. However, although my 
 parents were polite about my compositions, it was clear that such efforts at musical creativity 
 (in comparison with the classical canon) were not to be taken very seriously. Once, when I 
 tried to improvise I was told to stop and play a ‘proper’ piece of music, after which I stopped 
 this line of musical enquiry. 
 When I was nine years old, I won a scholarship to attend a specialist music school. I 
 quickly decided that I wanted to become a professional concert pianist, began to practice 
 several hours a day, and gave up academic subjects whenever possible. Musically speaking, 
 my days of freedom to explore repertoire were over. From this point onwards, my training 
 was much more rigorous: I was given pieces to prepare for weekly lessons, pieces which had 
 to be learnt from memory and usually performed in public recitals. Practicing was scheduled 
 (I was assigned a practice room) and loosely monitored, meaning that if my teacher heard me 
 playing other repertoire than that he had set he wanted to know why I was wasting my time! 
 Visiting artists would give masterclasses and feedback on our progress to becoming 
 professional pianists. I and my colleagues in the piano department regularly compared 
 ourselves to professional standards of performance, aiming to bring our interpretation and 
 technical performance of the score to the highest possible level of perfection. This made 
 sense to us as we were continually assessed on our performance, and any deviation from the 
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 printed score was seen as a failing in our performance. Such values were replicated in the 
 competitions and festivals we entered, so that, by the time I left school I had but one idea in 
 my mind - to be as perfect in my technical performance as possible, for only through 
 perfection (so I believed) would I win a competition and have the opportunity to build a 
 career. At no point in my training was improvising discussed as something I might do; nor 
 did I attempt to teach myself. Although my piano teacher was a capable jazz pianist, there 
 was no question of using these skills within the classical domain, as to do so would constitute 
 ‘messing around’ with the score, which was strictly forbidden. 
 Later, when I entered a London conservatoire of music, I felt the same expectations of 
 my musical performance from teachers and colleagues. The narrowness of my musical goals 
 which, ignoring factors of expressive communication and agency, aimed only for technical 
 perfection, caused me increasing problems. The more I aimed for perfection in my 
 performance, the less this became attainable. Instead I began to suffer stage fright so each 
 performance became increasingly characterised by an internal struggle for control. Although I 
 had some success as a solo pianist, I felt defeated and depressed about this career path and 
 began to explore other options of earning a living as a musician. 
 3.2.2. Improvising experience 
 At first I worked mostly as an accompanist, particularly for singers and local opera 
 companies. However, needing a more stable income, I applied for a job as a dance 
 accompanist in a performing arts school. For this work it was necessary to improvise or 
 adjust written music to fit the rigid frameworks of set phrase lengths and rhythms which 
 made up the ballet exercises. I gladly accepted the challenge of learning to improvise and 
 after a difficult transition period, learnt some basic harmonies which I found I could adjust to 
 nearly every situation. In this experience I learnt through doing, as I needed to accompany 
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 four or five hours of dance classes a day which left little time for reflection or practice. My 
 main problem at first was overcoming my sensitivity to wrong notes, and this was greatly 
 helped by the fact that (on most occasions) the dancers either didn’t notice or were too polite 
 to comment! I realised after a while that they listened to music in a different way than I did, 
 using the rhythms, the energy of the music, or the contours of the melody as the impetus for 
 their dancing. Thus, the goals of performance in the dance class were very different to those I 
 had experienced during my conservatoire training (in which success or failure depended on 
 faultless technical competence) and this was a valuable experience for me as I began to 
 appreciate how differently people might listen to my musical performance outside of the 
 world of competitions and musical institutions I was used to. 
 Working as a dance pianist kept me busily occupied for a year as I managed to scrape 
 together a few harmonic patterns and generally constructed all my material from this safe, but 
 constricted zone. Later, I tried to advance my skills and develop the musical language I used 
 for the dance classes: I wrote out exercises, tried to structure the exercise more clearly, follow 
 a clear tonal plan and so on, but these efforts met with limited success. Usually, the pace of 
 the exercise was too quick to think in this way, and the necessity of staying in touch with the 
 ongoing dance movements meant that any experimentation had to be sacrificed to fluency. I 
 was still sensitive to errors and couldn’t stand it if I went wrong, lost my place or ran out of 
 ideas. Looking back, I realise that I always wanted to make a good impression on people 
 listening and, if I felt they were listening critically, I would try hard to control every note. 
 Because of this, I found that, rather than developing in fluency or expressivity, my 
 improvisation was becoming increasingly inhibited. On some days it seemed I could hardly 
 get anything right: when I played I needed to make a decision - about a chord, or a melodic 
 direction, and these choices paralysed me as I didn’t have the time to work it out. In these 
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 situations, the only option (I felt) was to retreat into safety, but this resulted in a music so 
 banal I felt ashamed. 
 Eventually I gave up this work as a ballet pianist, gaining employment instead as 
 principal pianist with a new contemporary music group in Portugal. This job felt like 
 returning to the scores and the stage of the classical music world once again, but in a more 
 positive way than formerly. I was working with composers, conductors and colleagues who 
 valued my chamber-music skills, technical expertise and score-reading abilities. Performing 
 and interpreting new scores was unlike the conservatoire traditions of interpreting historic, 
 canonic repertoire; and, most importantly, I was appearing regularly on the stage, getting 
 valuable experience in public performance, overcoming my stage fright and growing in 
 confidence. As a contemporary pianist I built a reputation in Portugal, and after a while was 
 invited to teach improvisation in a local music conservatoire. In this institution I designed and 
 taught a course of free improvisation to young musicians (aged 13 to 18 years), normally in 
 groups of five or six players. In these lessons I explored ways of constructing music in real 
 time, using narratives (i.e., stories taken for the news) or contrasts (long/short notes, 
 fast/slow, high/low registers), playing to film, and writing graphic scores. Tonally, we used 
 simple scale systems such as pentatonic, gregorian modes, or wrote our own scales, and these 
 constraints seemed to allow the children to organise their music expressively without ruining 
 the fun or inhibiting their freedom to act. I would have liked to extend our work to using 
 diatonic (major/minor) scale systems as a basis for improvising, but felt unable to do this as I 
 remembered my difficulties as a dance pianist. In particular I felt I was unable to control 
 tonal improvisation; I lacked a clear basis on which to make decisions quickly in the moment 
 without feeling paralysed over working out the next steps. 
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 One other aspect of my improvising experience should be mentioned: my relationship 
 with the organ which ran in parallel to my professional career as a pianist. Since my early 
 experience of being a cathedral chorister, I’d been fascinated with this instrument, the scale 
 of its sound world and its magnificent repertoire. Later, in my teens, we’d lived opposite a 
 church with a three-manual organ which I was allowed to practise whenever I wanted. I 
 practised mainly Preludes and Fugues by J.S.Bach, G.F. Handel’s Organ Concertos, and the 
 Organ Symphonies of Ch.M. Widor, trying to achieve musical effects from an instrument 
 which had none of the registration and colours intended by any of these composers! As I 
 focused more on establishing a career as a professional pianist, my organ studies waned, but 
 fifteen years preceding the PhD study I found myself once more with access to an organ as I 
 began helping out in our local village church, accompanying the services. This sparked a 
 period of more serious study, leading to examinations at the Royal College of Organists, 
 where I received first the Associateship and then the Fellowship. 
 One day, I chanced to hear a programme on BBC Radio 3 which featured the 
 improvisations of Parisian church organists. Travelling from church to church, the radio 
 presenter recorded the improvisations and also interviewed the organists about their approach 
 to the task. This programme ‘blew my mind’; it was an absolute musical and cultural 
 revelation for me as I couldn’t imagine how such dramatic and virtuosic effects could be 
 achieved ‘in the moment’. Of course, I tried to achieve similar effects on my village organ, 
 thinking that I could transfer the techniques of ballet improvising to this new situation. 
 However, I hated the results of my improvising on the organ which sounded gauche, 
 disconnected and horribly unconvincing. Because of this negative experience I found 
 improvising particularly hard on the organ. My problems of selecting material which had 
 started at the piano, were exacerbated at the organ where wrong notes seemed to scream at 
 me, and only the most precise movements and coordination was acceptable. Putting aside the 
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 problem of improvisation I tried composing pieces instead for organ, with more success in 
 that I managed to achieve some of the effects I wanted. However, my sights were firmly fixed 
 on improvisation which seemed to me a much more impressive and glamorous goal to aim 
 for. I admired improvisers very much, began listening to improvised organ performances and 
 dreamed of this unique performance approach in which composition was blended with 
 virtuosity, expressive agency and control in one wonderful action. 
 3.2.3. Academic experience 
 The decision to enrol in an academic institution at a late stage in my career was rather 
 spontaneous, arising out of the exams I had earlier taken at the Royal College of Organists. 
 These exams had awoken my interest in academic study, which I now wanted to take further. 
 Learning of the Psychology for Musicians course at the University at Sheffield, I signed up 
 with rather mixed feelings at first as I wondered if I would be able to cope with the demands 
 of a masters course. Until this point I had generally avoided academic subjects in my life, 
 giving these up whenever possible in order to focus purely on practical music making. Also 
 my earlier, rather negative experience of musical institutions made me a bit wary that 
 university life might be similarly restrictive. These doubts however were soon replaced by the 
 excitement of discovering psychology. To be able to systematically reflect on the processes of 
 thinking and feeling seemed very liberating, and, as I began to assimilate the standard 
 literature and subjects of music psychology, I realised what a profound effect this study 
 would have on my professional life. Studying and writing about performance anxiety, the 
 different ways in which musical structure and expression is perceived by listeners, or 
 constructed by performers helped me to change the way I approached performance. I felt 
 stronger on stage, more in touch with the public, more willing and able to communicate 
 expressively when I played. 
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 Towards the end of the masters course I wrote two assignments which prepared the 
 ground for this study: one was a critical look at learning and performing practices in classical 
 music which could be described as hegemonic (situations in which individual freedom is 
 constrained by implicit ideals). I discovered the literature of marxist social critics (Althusser, 
 1971; Lasch, 2007; Riley, 2011) and other voices such as Mikhail Bahktin (1895-1975) who I 
 felt, looked through the ordinary, everyday constructs of social life, penetrating the hidden 
 values and beliefs on which this life was constructed. My admiration for these writers caused 
 me to apply the same critical methods to the social practice of classical music, and to 
 perceive some implicit values and beliefs which constrained and dominated this particular 
 aspect of Western culture. The second was a self-study  4  in trying to improvise a fugue which, 
 though it produced only limited results in terms of my improvising skill development, 
 showed me the beginnings of a systematic approach to analysing the improvising experience. 
 By speaking my thoughts aloud during the improvising experience, reflecting on my 
 experience afterwards and analysing the music I improvised, I was able to glimpse a 
 fascinating world of cognitive processing of musical structure in real time. How much more 
 valuable would a self-study of improvising be over a longer period of time, in which real skill 
 development occurred. Thus, as a result of these two assignments, I felt anxious to make an 
 extended and systematic enquiry into my difficulties improvising; to draw on the insights and 
 methodologies of psychology to better understand, articulate and overcome the perceived 
 barriers to diatonic/tonal improvisation which I had so far encountered; also to explore the 
 effects of hegemonic cultural values and beliefs on former musical development; and to draw 
 on literature in skill learning (i.e. Gobet, 2016; Schneider & Fisk, 1982) to acquire the skills 
 in improvisation which had so far been denied me. 
 4  Full title: ‘So you want to improvise a fugue? An  investigation of the cognitive and emotional 
 processes involved in a novel task in improvisation 
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 3.2.4 Conclusions arising from biographical section with relevance to 
 improvisation 
 I now summarise the main points arising from this autobiographical section which I 
 believe influenced and shaped my individual approach towards improvising as I began this 
 study: 
 ●  I had received a narrow, intense training in musical conservatoires focused 
 exclusively on the skills of score interpretation. Creative practices such as 
 composing and improvising had been excluded and discouraged as part of this 
 training. 
 ●  This training had prepared me for an extensive and varied experience as a 
 professional pianist and organist but I felt frustrated in being excluded from 
 creative practices and unable to improvise my own ‘classical’ music. 
 ●  That even limited skills acquired through improvising for dance classes did 
 not provide me with creative insights. I felt unable to develop these skills 
 creatively, or transfer them to a more classical language or style of music; 
 neither could I use these skills to improvise on the organ. 
 ●  That my academic writing experience and knowledge of literature was 
 relatively new (compared to my musical experience). Nevertheless I had 
 obtained a Masters degree in music psychology and through this had 
 developed a special interest in studying the cognitive and emotional processes 
 of improvisation, also the ways in which cultural ideology influenced musical 
 practice. 
 These, then, were the skills and experience which I brought to the study and 
 motivated the research questions formulated above. 
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 3.3. Documentation and data collection 
 Capturing a personal creative, or learning process can be problematic when the 
 methods of capture themselves become a source of distraction. Newman (2008), who studied 
 his own composition processes, reviews a number of self-studies which suffered from data 
 collection being too rigid or rigorous. Towards the end of his study he abandoned his own 
 verbal speak-aloud protocol which aimed to capture ‘the moment-to-moment 
 decision-making of a composer, especially over the entire scope of the composition of an 
 entire work’ (p.8), as he found it intrusive into his creative flow of ideas. Thus, Roels (2013) 
 who made a similar study of composing notes that: ‘Putting too much weight on the data 
 collection method risks forcing the creative process into a tight procedure and undermining 
 the notion of a real world study’ (2013, no page number given). While modern methods of 
 digital recording facilitate a more ‘naturalistic’ setting in which one can ignore the methods 
 of capture, a more descriptive, interpretive form of data collection was also needed to record: 
 the flow of cognition and control, my perception of the events of learning, the changes 
 occurring in my knowledge over a considerable period of time. Thus, in addition to digital 
 recordings I also wrote extensively in a journal, using this to record my thoughts and 
 impressions before, during and after improvising. 
 By using multiple methods of data capture I allowed myself considerable freedom, as 
 I could choose the method which seemed most appropriate to the moment. All my equipment 
 was easily accessible - the logbook was always to hand, an audio recorder was permanently 
 set up to the organ and could be activated at the touch of a button. Even the more complicated 
 filming could be set up within a few minutes, using just a mobile phone and a tripod. In this 
 way I used each resource when I felt motivated to do so; to help me learn, gain knowledge 
 about my work and to encourage me to improvise. Thus I avoided a more inflexible or 
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 disciplined approach to data capture which might have become arduous and dominated the 
 experience; aiming instead for a more natural flow of data which might... ‘capture and reveal 
 moments of discovery’ (Nelson, 2013, p.28). At no point did I edit  my data, following the 
 direction proposed by Tenni, Smith & Boucher (2003): ...‘we must write about what we really 
 prefer not to write about. It is not about presenting ourselves in a good light  in charge, 
 competent, controlled, organised and so on, or how we might like to be seen. Rather, it is 
 about writing rich, full accounts that include the messy stuff - the self-doubts, the mistakes, 
 the embarrassments, the inconsistencies ... (p.3). 
 3.3.1. Audio 
 I started recording my improvising from the beginning of my study. At first these 
 recordings were occasional - events when I had access to a good organ, or improvised for a 
 public service. I found these early recordings rather depressing as they didn’t sound very 
 expressive or convincing to me. Listening to them drew my attention to the product of 
 improvising at a time when I needed to focus more on the processes of learning, therefore I 
 didn’t use this method again until I felt more advanced in my learning experience. During my 
 second year I began regularly recording my practice sessions. In order to overcome the 
 inhibiting effects of recording I set up a system which I could activate every time I 
 improvised. The recordings were made using the midi output of the electric organ and 
 captured in a music software programme. The advantage of this system is that it didn’t affect 
 the way I practised or the sound of the organ; also the recordings could run for hours without 
 creating large file sizes. In this way I became accustomed to recording myself; I felt I could 
 behave in the same way as when I practised without recording, sometimes pausing to write 
 notes in my journal or try things which may not sound good, without worrying about the 
 recording itself. An unexpected benefit of the midi recordings was that they could be 
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 visualised in the software programme as graphic representations of sound. These graphics I 
 later used to help me understand at a glance the structural shapes and forms of my 
 improvising, and to better control the overall sense of direction. 
 3.3.2. Video 
 While I grew accustomed to recording my improvisation as audio files, the extensive 
 size of video files made this medium more problematic. Throughout the study, filming was a 
 rarity and thus a more intensive experience, a type of data collection which strongly 
 influenced the experience of improvising. I found this type of recording to be brutally 
 objective, a feature which could at times be useful, at other times less so, depending on my 
 confidence and learning situation. For example, at first I was annoyed by how much I 
 hesitated to stop and calculate my next steps, and feeling unable to correct this feature of my 
 performance at the time, I therefore stopped filming. Later however, when I was more fluent 
 in my improvising, I used the objective nature of filming to correct this tendency, which 
 pushed my performance beyond the continuous slight hesitations of my comfort zone. 
 Therefore filming became a more relevant and effective learning tool as I neared the level of 
 performance. It helped to improve my posture at the organ, make my body language more 
 communicative and expressive - to push my performance towards a more convincing fluency 
 and expertise. 
 As I prepared for my final recital the fact that it would be filmed created a sense of 
 occasion to which I wanted to respond. I therefore organised the improvised programme more 
 than if it had been just a live performance, as I felt I was creating a permanent record of my 
 learning achievements. I planned the design of the film, thought about how I would 
 graphically represent information about the organs, the registration I used, the lighting, and 
 97 
 how I would myself appear. In this way, the work of filming helped to bring my improvising 
 to a peak of performance. 
 3.3.3. Field notes 
 While the former, digital modes of data collection might be considered more 
 objective, I believe my field notes (later referred to as my ‘journal’ and ‘personal notes’ in 
 the thesis proper) capture more accurately the more interesting cognitive and emotional 
 processes of the learning experience. This is because I used the journal to collect all my 
 thoughts and impressions about the experience. Writing these notes served not only as a 
 method of data collection but also as a therapeutic device for articulating my emotions while 
 improvising and for overcoming negative feedback during the first months. The journal 
 allowed me to compare my conscious plans and anticipations of improvising with the actual 
 experience which was initially very confusing; by detailing the events of each session in the 
 journal however, I gained a different perspective: spotting patterns of intention and response 
 which were different to impressions gained during improvising, noting also moments of 
 agency and control which signified better connections in my knowledge and emerging skills. 
 Practising improvisation was often an emotionally intense experience as I tried to make sense 
 of the task and correct many features of my performance simultaneously. Criticising my own 
 playing in order to improve it often created a tendency towards global, negative impressions 
 of myself and my work, particularly after a long session. The act of writing however 
 corrected this impression by providing me with evidence of positive achievements, recorded 
 during the session, which would otherwise have been forgotten. I thus achieved a degree of 
 objectivity, and sense of direction (meta-learning) through taking notes which would not have 
 been possible had I just practised. 
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 As a written record of the whole experience, the journal also provides valuable access 
 to former states of learning and perspectives of improvising which, under normal learning 
 conditions would be overlaid and assimilated by new forms of experience (Bruner, 1967) and 
 the cognitive developments which accompany skill learning (Anderson, 1982). Thus, to read 
 information about my former preoccupations of improvising, how I articulated my problems, 
 experienced the task, also allows me to revisit former ways of constructing improvisation; 
 ways which can be directly compared to my present learning situation and allowing me to 
 better understand what knowledge I have gained, what has been learnt, practised, what 
 features have changed, emerged, disappeared from awareness and so on. 
 3.3.4 ‘Talk-aloud’ protocol 
 Talk or speak-aloud protocol (also known as verbalisation) offered itself as an obvious 
 technique in making explicit the accompanying thought processes of improvisation. Davdison 
 (2015) describes studies in which musicians accessed ‘new knowledge about one another and 
 their processes as they worked’ (p.4), though in self-studies, the act of continually speaking 
 one’s thoughts can become intrusive. Newman (2008) who, as already noted, abandoned his 
 talk-aloud protocol during his study questions the validity of this method in capturing all of 
 his thoughts while composing, for example during moments of high cognitive activity, or 
 more automatic processing. In my own experience I had had mixed success using talk-aloud 
 protocol to document a short learning study in Fugal techniques (see Chapter 3.2.3). At first, 
 speaking my thoughts was a positive experience: it seemed to make the learning experience 
 more explicit and accessible, I felt able to articulate problems and design strategies. After a 
 while though, I realised that I could only report thoughts of which I was consciously aware 
 and that this method of capturing data was prioritising such thoughts to the exclusion of all 
 else. This worried me as I might be suppressing or neglecting more implicit forms of 
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 learning, awareness and control. Therefore I decided to reject talk-aloud protocol as 
 unsuitable for a long-term study of learning and to use only my journal for recording relevant 
 thoughts and impressions. My intention while improvising was then to allow my thoughts 
 complete freedom to roam where they willed, and not to constrain these by constantly 
 articulating them. 
 Notwithstanding this decision, there were occasions when I felt a strong urge to speak 
 aloud during improvisation and the influence of this action on my perception of the task and 
 in acquiring skills is discussed in the thesis (see Chapter 7.5.1) 
 3.3.5. Conversations with other improvisers 
 Throughout the period of this study, I sought out opportunities to talk to other 
 musicians, whether novice, student or expert, about their experience in improvisation. 
 Initially, I hoped to gain an external source of data about the ways in which other individuals 
 processed the task, or explained the ways in which they organised their knowledge and 
 represented aspects of musical structure. This kind of detail about the cognitive skills of 
 improvisation I felt was often missing from interviews with improvisers, and it would be 
 useful to compare their experience with my personal data as it emerged through the study. 
 Notwithstanding these ambitions, I was aware of the difficulties in persuading experts 
 to articulate knowledge which may be predominantly tacit and therefore studied other 
 approaches to the problem of interviewing. Wopereis and colleagues (2013), for example 
 state that ‘asking renowned experts to scrutinize their expertise is not as self-evident as it 
 seems …  experts often have problems articulating their expert knowledge’ (p.222). The 
 approach of these researchers was thus to ask interviewees to respond freely to statements 
 such as “A good improviser is someone who . . .” (p.225); statements which they later 
 analysed using multivariate sampling techniques ‘to identify key characteristics’ of 
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 improvisational expertise such as ‘risk-taking, creation, responsivity’. Deprés’s study (2016) 
 also interviewed (a smaller sample of) eight performing classical improvisers, examining the 
 texts for emerging themes or ‘categories’ which illustrated differences in learning styles 
 between ‘native’ improvisers (those who improvised from the beginning of learning) with 
 ‘immigrant’ improvisers (those who learned later in life). While these studies revolved 
 around specific research questions and aspects of improvising knowledge, Uitti's (2006) 
 interviews  with over forty contemporary classical improvisers were more open-ended and 
 less constrained, allowing the improvisers to speak for themselves about issues which 
 concerned them. In this way, they read less like a formal interview and more like a 
 conversation between friends. For example, Uitti might start from an open question ‘Shall we 
 speak about the things that you are doing now?’ (p.439) or a more tailored one, based on his 
 knowledge of the interviewee: ‘You had a classical background. With whom did you work?’ 
 (p.475), and these questions then stimulated a discussion which the interviewer simply helped 
 along. 
 This ‘informal conversation’ approach appealed to me as it resulted in more 
 information concerning individuals’ practice and performance techniques, their source of 
 inspiration, interpretations of wider social-historical context and so on. Therefore, my 
 motivation in talking to other improvisers was to follow the open-ended, semi-structured 
 approach of Uitti (2006), while aiming for a much more informal setting and atmosphere, so 
 that the expert would not feel self-conscious or tempted to interpret their thoughts to fit the 
 research question, and so on. The problems of this open-ended approach to interviewing I 
 only later appreciated, for, as I spoke to a range of different improvisers I soon realised that it 
 would be difficult to directly compare their experience of improvising with my own. Each 
 individual, approaching the task of improvising in their own way, thus had their own musical 
 and artistic goals, their own cognitive style, skills and choice of musical language. Often, as 
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 they talked, I was amazed at how different their approach to improvising was from my own! 
 For example, one interviewee was an experienced composer who improvised sketches from 
 his compositions; another subject was a college student, unwillingly learning to improvise 
 fugues in a Baroque style; another was a retired harmony teacher who only improvised 
 harmonisations of hymn tunes. How could I align such different personal backgrounds and 
 musical aims and objectives with my own experience? 
 My approach therefore has been (i) to allow each individual to talk freely about the 
 aspects of improvisation which were important to them; allowing them to define the topics of 
 the conversation, while (ii) keeping my own preoccupations and concerns in the background 
 as ‘a framework of issues, leading to possible questions, leading to possible follow-up 
 questions …’ (Thomas, 2013, p.198) until I saw an opportunity to introduce them into the 
 conversation. In this way I ended up with a diverse series of descriptive accounts, snapshots 
 taken of different lives in improvisation, rather than an organised library of knowledge which 
 might triangulate my own findings. However, as these conversations reveal much about the 
 individuals’ own experience, I include their statements wherever relevant throughout my 
 thesis, and longer transcripts are included in Appendix D. 
 3.4 Interpreting the thesis 
 The aims of autoethnography are to make the individual experience relevant to a 
 wider community of readers, and to go beyond the interests and aims of the individual writer. 
 It’s therefore important that my text is meaningful and expressive to a third party not only of 
 the knowledge and skills I gained in improvisation, but also of wider cultural issues, for 
 example, my life and experience as a practising classical musician and of a learning process 
 occurring in conjunction with this practising culture. Banks & Banks (2000) state that: ‘we 
 write so as to invite readers to share our emotional responses to our professional activities 
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 and their consequences; that we might write to broaden the perspectives of nonacademic 
 readers and enhance their practical understandings of everyday life’ (p.236), and these words 
 serve as a reminder that my text aims to reach a wide field of both professional and 
 non-professional musicians with an interest in musical improvisation; also academic circles 
 with a possible specialist interest in music psychology, as well as other academic disciplines 
 with interests in autoethnography, skill learning and performance, and so on. With this wide 
 field of readership in mind, the following paragraphs will serve to clarify my own roles and 
 perspectives in constructing the text; also to make the reader aware of the main themes 
 present in the thesis, these themes serving as a guide to orientate the reader from the 
 beginning, so that they may more easily interpret and understand the text with relevance to 
 their own life experience. 
 3.4.1 A text of many layers 
 One way of understanding the richness of information in an autoethnographic study is 
 through the plurality of perspectives and skills which one person brings to their account. 
 Dunbar-Hall (2009) described these perspectives as ‘layers of consciousness’ as he 
 interpreted his learning experience of Balinese music in different ways through previous 
 experience as a musician, teacher and university administrator. Similarly, in the biographical 
 section above I revealed a mixed range of experiences which, I anticipated, would shape and 
 influence my learning experience of improvisation. However, in addition to these initial 
 layers of perspective, I would also like to consider new perspectives gained through the study 
 itself as I acquired knowledge of improvisation and experience in learning; also later, more 
 mature perspectives which emerged through writing up and reflection.  These can then be 
 listed as follows: 
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 1.  Initial perspectives: a professional musician experienced in interpretive 
 performance; a novice improviser in Baroque styles of organ music; a relative 
 newcomer to academic writing and research, having just completed an MA in 
 music psychology. 
 2.  Practice perspectives: I gain insights into the task of improvisation and the 
 study experience; I become more familiar with selected literature as it assists 
 my learning; I gain new knowledge of myself as I develop creative skills and 
 improvise in public. 
 3.  Study perspectives: I acquire academic experience through writing the thesis; I 
 gain a new, more distal, meta-perspective of the whole study - a process of 
 noticing emergent themes and interpreting the experience through these 
 themes. 
 Each of these different perspectives on the study provided me not only ‘with a series 
 of research lenses to understand my learning’ (Dunbar-Hall, 2009, p.158) but also valuable 
 access to former stages of learning; for, If I had written the thesis purely from the point of 
 view of expertise it would lose much of its value and relevance as an account of learning. 
 Therefore, to fully exploit each layer of perspective, I have separated narrative sections of the 
 thesis (see Chapters 4-8) which capture the immediacy of novice and intermediate learning, 
 from findings and conclusions (see Chapter 9) which were written with the advantage of 
 greater experience and a more connected knowledge base. Chapter summaries, which reflect 
 on the salient points of learning stages (see Chapters 4.4, 5.4, 6.4, 7.7, 8.6) also draw on 
 intervening ‘practice’ perspectives as I compared my emerging experience with theories and 
 perspectives from literature. In this way, my approach reflects what Ellis, Adams & Böchner 
 (2011) describe as ‘the procedural nature of research’ (p.6) to include the reader in the same 
 plurality of perspectives and approaches that I experienced. 
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 3.4.2 Dominant themes in the thesis 
 Tenni, Smith & Boucher’s (2003) warning of ‘the importance of engaging in cycles of 
 data analysis early and regularly’ is appropriate in my case, for throughout my study I had 
 been focused predominantly on musical practice - acquiring the skills of improvisation to a 
 degree which made the study worthwhile and significant. Achieving these skills while 
 simultaneously exploring a wide base of relevant literature left me little time for reflection 
 and analysis on the  whole  learning process. Therefore,  it is not surprising that the process of 
 ‘writing up’, rather than summarising my knowledge, began instead to influence and develop 
 my perception of what I had learnt. For the first time in over two years, I put aside my daily 
 improvising practice and began to revisit earlier events in the learning cycle, comparing these 
 events with more recent ‘ways of knowing’ (Goldman, 2016). Until this point I had been 
 absorbed by a sequence of changing perspectives and emerging insights resulting from the 
 skill learning experience. I now had the opportunity to connect this series of fragmented 
 perspectives, to study the study itself, and acquire a new sense of meta-awareness of the 
 whole process, as Nelson (2013) describes: ... ‘a required movement away from the proximal 
 towards the distal can be effected through critical reflection. The more embodied experience 
 moves away from the proximal, the more it becomes possible to articulate its import in 
 additional modes, including the intellectual, as patterns ‘emerge’ into discernible forms’ 
 (p.3). 
 Breakwell, Hammond and Fife-Schaw (2000) describe a process of  coding  in which 
 the researcher reads and rereads a text ‘looking for recurrent discursive patterns shared by the 
 accounts under analysis’ (p.258); yet, for me it was through both writing  and  reading that I 
 began to notice the presence of dominant themes which, appearing under different guises, 
 linked seemingly disparate experience across the months of study. Coding in this way 
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 involved much trial and error and it took several drafts of the thesis before arriving at a final, 
 stable interpretation of events. Teasing these subjects and themes out of the learning 
 experience was also accompanied by continuous reflection on the experience of improvising. 
 In this way, I noted emergent themes at the end of each chapter, partly as a summary of 
 events taking place during a particular period, but also to keep the thesis coherent: these 
 various themes served as a framework to connect and make sense of the whole experience in 
 learning to improvise, from my novice attempts to my first professional engagement. Some 
 themes, such as emotional considerations or conceptual perceptions emerged as the principal 
 subject of a particular chapter or period of learning, while others, in particular questions of 
 learning strategies or knowledge acquisition were continually present and provided a lens 
 through which I could better organise and understand my lived experience. All of these 
 themes are fully discussed in the final chapter (9) in which I summarise and reflect on the 
 salient points of the whole study. 
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 Chapter 4 
 Starting to improvise (months 1-12) 
 4.1 A novice perspective of improvising 
 What happened when I tried to improvise? During this time I often worked as a 
 freelance organist. Arriving at a new church and a new organ to accompany the sunday 
 morning service gave me many opportunities to improvise, yet I often didn’t have the 
 courage to try, and when I pushed myself to ‘have a go’ the effects were (I thought) 
 disastrous. A typical scenario ran as follows: I would approach the task with an active mental 
 image of what I would play, i.e., I had a clear idea of the material and could run it without 
 any doubts or pauses in my mind (on the bus or the train on the way to the church). However, 
 as soon as my fingers touched the keyboard another reality seemed to take over, as my notes 
 record: “Utter disaster. My fingers simply refused to play the imagined themes, executing 
 instead a series of ‘safe’ broken chords’ (Personal notes, 21  st  October 2015). The gulf 
 between my ambitions and my ability to realise these ambitions was never so wide as at this 
 point and the situation facing me had an especially cognitive flavour, described by the 
 following graphic which represents a continuum of choice between what I wanted to do, and 
 what I was able to do. 
 In general then, my experience was that I would start near the ‘desirable’ with some 
 expression of my musical imagination but, finding that I could not continue in this style or 
 develop the musical ideas without wrong notes, would scurry towards the stilted chords and 
 slow movements of the ‘possible’, as represented in the graphic of Figure 3. 
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 Figure 3 . A graphic representing the range of choice between the possible and the desirable 
 as a continuum. 
 4.1.1 Negative emotions 
 As a professional musician, trained in the conservatoire tradition of interpretive 
 performance, I habitually aimed for the highest degree of accuracy in my musical 
 performance. Thus, I was extremely sensitive towards the errors of my novice attempts at 
 improvising. Even when I tried to improvise in private I found it was ‘a fight against fear’, 
 for although I wanted to try out ideas and experiment in a free and uninhibited way, my 
 emotions of shame and embarrassment either brought the process to a halt, or forced me to 
 drastically try and control what I was doing. Goleman (1997) describes such situations - 
 where emotions take precedence over rational intentions - as  neural hijackings : ... ‘a centre in 
 the limbic brain proclaims an emergency, recruiting the rest of the brain to its urgent agenda 
 ... before the neocortex, the thinking brain, has had a chance to glimpse fully what is 
 happening, let alone decide if it is a good idea’ (Goleman, 1997, p.14). These words thus 
 capture my novice experience of improvising (although it might seem an exaggeration to 
 invoke such strong emotional reactions from an activity such as musical improvisation) 
 which was dominated by feelings of shame and embarrassment which I felt powerless to 
 control. 
 Two recordings taken from one practice session half way through my first year, 
 illustrate the influence of these emotions on my improvising. The first recording ( Audio_1 ) is 
 of the opening few minutes of the session and begins with dramatic musical gestures in a 
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 chromatic, romantic style. The pace of the improvisation is also quite fast and it’s clear that 
 I’m playing quite fluently without stopping the music to think or reflect. However, due  to an 
 increasing sense of the awfulness of my playing throughout this session, (aggravated by the 
 public setting of the church which meant I continually anticipated listeners) I became less and 
 less able to try ideas. A little later in the session ( Audio_2 ) the ebullient opening material is 
 reduced to just two voices, moving at a very slow tempo with many pauses as I check each 
 movement before moving forwards through the music. I should mention that this occurred in 
 spite of a clear strategy I had made for the session to practice a symphonic-style of 
 improvising. I had no wish to practice simple diatonic textures in slow tempos; yet, I felt 
 unable to do anything else as I tried to avoid the criticism of my own thoughts: an 
 emotionally-inspired decision recalling Overskeid’s (2000) assertion, that individuals: 
 ‘invariably choose the alternative which leaves [them] with the best feeling’ (p.285). 
 At this stage then, it seemed to me that my emotions formed a barrier to my ability to 
 improvise, especially in public situations when I became anxious I might be overheard. The 
 effect of this anxiety on my ability to learn also caused me some concerns, as I recorded in 
 my journal 
 ‘I am in danger of: 
 1. being chained to a series of ghastly harmonies. 
 2. being unable to actually control/develop a harmonic style.’ (Personal notes, 21  st 
 October, 2015) 
 The frustration I felt over the results of each improvisation session was exacerbated 
 by the fact that I was used to being technically in command of my performance. I knew I 
 possessed enough instrumental skills to perform difficult and complex works; also that I had 
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 a deep theoretical knowledge of musical structure. Yet, I felt unable to unite these skills in the 
 moment of improvisation because of the dominant, intrusive nature of my emotions. I 
 sometimes wondered how I might improvise if I was hypnotised: if, by overcoming my 
 embarrassment or attentional vigilance, might I then be free to explore my imagination (an 
 experiment I unfortunately never had the courage to attempt!) 
 4.1.2 Undermining self-beliefs 
 To my mind, my experience was the opposite of what Dolan (after Csikszentmihalyi, 
 1988) describes as ‘flow’ when improvising. Flow states are often presented as a kind of ideal 
 mental state in improvisation, in which: ... ‘people lose their sense of time and enjoy a strong 
 satisfaction and immediate feedback (Dolan, 2005, p.94); or ... ‘A merging of action and 
 awareness ... a loss of self-consciousness, a sense of clear goals and reception of immediate 
 feedback; and a sense of feeling highly challenged and highly capable’ (Custodero, 1999, in 
 Dolan 2005). I imagined this sense of flow to be a characteristic of expert improvisers such as 
 the organists who had inspired me to learn (from legendary historic figures such as Pierre 
 Cochereau (1924-1984) and Marcel Dupré (1886-1971) to those of the present day such as 
 David Briggs or Olivier Latry). Comparing my own halting efforts and noting too, how 
 content they looked, how absorbed and seemingly at ease they were with the task, I 
 questioned whether my character was in fact suited to improvising. Investigating the 
 psychological literature on personality types, I encountered Ben Zur, Breznitz & Hasmonay’s 
 (1993) classification of two characteristic types of behaviour - A and B. The Type A 
 behaviour pattern seemed to describe my own current involvement with improvisation: ... ‘an 
 action-emotion complex that can be observed in any person who is aggressively involved in a 
 chronic, incessant struggle to achieve more and more in less and less time ...’ (p.173), while 
 the Type B described (at least to my imagination) the performance of expert improvisers, who 
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 ... ‘exhibit a calm, pleasant behavioural style, are not pressured by time, and have a sense of 
 satisfaction in their lives ... will tend to flow with the tide of life rather than struggle against 
 it’ (p.174). I record this impression I had of myself to illustrate how, at this stage in my 
 learning, my improvising began with a critical awareness of errors in my improvisation and 
 finished with global judgments about my character being unsuitable for the task. 
 4.1.3 Undefined goals 
 I was at the beginning of learning, and so the idea of expertise - the actual 
 knowledge state of the expert - was a mystery to me. This vagueness about the quality of 
 expertise made the goals of my improvising equally vague and ill-defined. For example, I did 
 not perceive the task in terms of definite actions, i.e., “I will do this or that action” or 
 organise the task as a set of instructions, i.e., “Start with a theme; add a counter melody, etc.,” 
 but made strategies based on generalised observations of expert organists. I recalled one 
 expert who improvised in symphonic style, so I tried to copy his way of improvising; another 
 one, perhaps a more historic figure who improvised a Trio Sonata or Prelude and Fugue, 
 inspired me to do that. This meant that I often tried many different directions and learning 
 strategies in one session. If things didn't go as planned I stopped and tried something else. 
 Unable to decide on one course of action, I had little understanding or control over the events 
 of my learning, and thus, rather than becoming involved in the music (the skills of the task), I 
 became increasingly distracted by my emotions and self-critical judgments about my abilities 
 to improvise. 
 One reason for not defining my goals more successfully at this stage was the fact that 
 I was used to working in a different way as an interpretive musician. After years of 
 experience in preparing scores for concerts I had developed a way of practising in which I 
 ‘just played’ - altering the tempo here and there to allow me to find a technical solution - and 
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 by doing so, I invoked a number of implicit strategies for learning which I had developed 
 over time. I no longer needed to make explicit strategies for learning as I had done when I 
 was younger. I assumed I could use the same implicit approach to improvising, but found that 
 I was unable to represent the task of improvisation in the same cognitive terms as my 
 interpretive work: I simply couldn’t gain any sense of mental control over the task: I couldn’t 
 ‘see’ what to do! I therefore improvised  by ‘just playing’ (in the same way as I usually 
 practiced scores) but merely reacted as best as I could to events and problems as these 
 emerged. My motivation to continue learning might have suffered had I not had the discipline 
 of the PhD to sustain me, for my difficulties were not solely due to emotions: other aspects of 
 the experience intervened between the task and my sense of cognitive control, as I now 
 discuss. 
 4.1.4 Attentional blindness 
 Styles (2006), who observed subjects playing a new video game, reported that: ‘When 
 players first tried the game their initial response was usually panic. They felt the demands of 
 the situation were too high, everything happened too fast, too much happened at once and the 
 situation seemed to be out of control’ (Styles, 2006, p.201). This description of cognitive 
 overload or attentional ‘blindness’ reflects my similar situation as an improviser. I didn’t 
 know which features of the task I should focus on, or what I should ignore; therefore, I felt 
 overwhelmed by the constraints of the task in the moment of improvising. As soon as I 
 played something I was trying to understand, to process what had just happened, also to 
 calculate what I should play next, this being an incredibly demanding cognitive task in real 
 time, as Sudnow (2001) relates: ‘The notes of the path seemed to go by too fast to take hold 
 of them; my hand hadn’t developed the grasp over their working constitution ... there was a 
 frustrating inability to hear myself’ (p.44). 
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 4.1.5 Automatic thoughts 
 One last aspect of novice improvising which was considerably influential at first, 
 was a kind of background thinking or ongoing reflection upon the experience which Beck 
 (1991) describes as ‘automatic thoughts’. According to Beck, these automatic thoughts run 
 parallel to one’s conscious awareness, being a form of continual self-communication and 
 self-regulation of behaviour which requires a particular effort on behalf of the individual to 
 identify. Working with patients as a pioneering cognitive therapist, Beck described this type 
 of discreet, habitual mode of cognition thus: ... ‘these thoughts did not arise as a result of 
 deliberation, reasoning, or reflection about an event or topic. There was no logical sequence 
 of steps such as in goal-oriented thinking or problem-solving. The thoughts “just happened,” 
 as if by reflex. They seemed to be relatively  autonomous  in that the patient made no effort to 
 initiate them ...’ (Beck, 1991, p.36). After reading about the ‘automatic thoughts’ I 
 investigated my own thinking and awareness during improvising particularly over longer 
 periods of time, for I noticed a recurring emotional pattern to my improvising sessions, in that 
 my emotions generally became more negative in direct proportion to the length of time I 
 practiced; thus, if I improvised for just a few minutes, this could be a positive experience, 
 whereas if I improvised for over an hour I became defeated and depressed. 
 To my surprise I discovered that after a period of approximately thirty minutes 
 (perhaps as my mind grew accustomed to the task and began to relax), I would gradually 
 introduce figures into my imagination to witness my improvising. These figures were 
 respected personalities of my musical world: organists, composers, teachers, expert 
 improvisers, colleagues both contemporary or historical. Each time I made a mistake these 
 witnesses expressed their horror and disgust at my efforts; I could literally see them shaking 
 their heads! Naturally, my feelings of shame and embarrassment increased in the presence of 
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 these silent witnesses, but, once I had identified this strange scenario in its entirety, I found it 
 quite easy to ‘turn it off’, and so (as private practice once more became private!) my longer 
 practice sessions became more productive and enjoyable. 
 4.1.6 Summary of novice experience 
 What I have so far described in my experience of novice improvising was the 
 opposite of what Dolan (after Csikszentmihalyi, 1988) describes as ‘flow’ when improvising, 
 in which: ... ‘people lose their sense of time and enjoy a strong satisfaction and immediate 
 feedback (Dolan, 2005, p.94); also ... ‘a merging of action and awareness ... a loss of 
 self-consciousness, a sense of clear goals and reception of immediate feedback; and a sense 
 of feeling highly challenged and highly capable’ (Custodero, 1999, in Dolan 2005). My 
 novice improvising, on the other hand, was dominated by painful emotions and cognitive 
 confusion. I was self-conscious and easily distracted by the presence of other people; I found 
 it hard to focus on the task in a constructive way (as my goals and learning strategies were 
 not well-defined at this stage), and these factors combined to affect my self-esteem and 
 motivation to continue. 
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 Figure 4 . A closed-loop engineering design adopted  to illustrate how emotionally-dominated 
 feedback processes continually stopped my flow of improvising. 
 This disagreeable situation is illustrated  in Figure 4 above which shows a closed-loop 
 engineering design adapted to illustrate the influence of cognitive and emotional ‘feedback’ 
 upon improvisation in real time. The idea of understanding improvisation in this way comes 
 from Pressing (1988) who describes how one’s critical awareness of the improvisation 
 functions as a cognitive feedback mechanism, controlling the flow of the improvisation 
 through ‘intuitively natural possibilities of error detection and correction’ (p.132). What I 
 wish to highlight in this feedback model is the role of emotions and self-criticism, (reinforced 
 by ‘automatic thoughts’ [Beck, 1991] and attentional blindness) which had the effect, not of 
 moderating or refining the flow of improvisation in a rational or cognitive manner (as 
 Pressing suggests), but of influencing events in a much more radical way: by cutting off the 
 processing flow entirely, or by instigating entirely new departures and directions as I 
 abandoned one task and started another. As I have described, I had great difficulties in 
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 maintaining a sense of direction through my improvising at this stage; in working towards a 
 clearly defined goal or working to an explicit strategy. Although I improvised for several 
 hours a day, I disliked the musical results, and usually felt frustrated about my lack of 
 progress. The feedback loop thus illustrates how this behaviour of stopping or changing 
 direction in response to critical feedback can be reinforced through repetition: the more I 
 improvised in this way, the more I felt ashamed, self-critical and sensitive to errors, and the 
 more I continued casting about, never sure of my strategies and looking for a good direction 
 in my work. 
 4.2 Social and cultural influences on attitudes towards improvisation. 
 Because my experience of improvising so far had been quite negative, it occurred to 
 me to question why this should be so? Why were my emotions so strong when I tried to 
 improvise? Why was I so critical about my improvising, and why did this criticism so quickly 
 lead to global judgments about my fitness or suitability to attempt the task? That I must learn 
 the skills of improvisation I was ready to accept; why then could I not engage in learning 
 improvisation in the same way as learning carpentry or electrical engineering? What was the 
 reason for these mental and emotional barriers which arose whenever I started? These 
 questions provoked further reflection concerning my training and experience: why hadn’t I 
 improvised more as a child? Why was improvisation not part of my training? As a student, 
 learning a piece meant also studying the composers’ biography, their performance practice 
 and the wider influences of culture on their music, but the practice of improvisation had been 
 no more than mentioned by my teachers. I had gained no understanding of how a Baroque 
 composer (for example) used improvisation to compose or perform; how improvisation skills 
 had been acquired or taught. Improvisation was just something you didn’t do, so there was 
 nothing to discuss. It was a non-topic. 
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 Realising this, I decided to broaden my focus from the practical exercises and mental 
 processes of improvisation itself, and to read more widely about social and cultural changes 
 in classical music. I was beginning to understand my position not just as an individual 
 musician who wanted to improvise, but situated within a bigger social and cultural context. 
 No doubt I had inherited values and attitudes towards improvisation through years of 
 training; sharing them with colleagues through my professional experience as a musician, 
 with the result that I thought of music (and my role as a musician) as a set of clearly-defined 
 objectives concerning the accurate and stylistic interpretation of a composed score. I had only 
 hazy notions of how music was actually created, particularly in the moment, and this struck 
 me now as an anomaly; for had I not always considered myself to be a creative, imaginative 
 musician? Looking around me I saw my position replicated in a number of colleagues who, 
 like me, had no experience of improvising and considered it to be a mysterious skill 
 completely outside of their own remit. I had never really questioned this situation as I was 
 long used to living within a non-improvisatory musical culture. Yet I now asked myself, how 
 could this happen? The resulting investigation, which drew particularly on Lydia Goehr’s 
 historical critique of musical practice The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works (1994), I 
 now summarise, giving a brief synopsis of the most significant discoveries I made and how 
 these affected (i) my understanding of myself as a (would-be) creative artist within the 
 contemporary culture of classical music, and (ii) my ability to improvise. 
 4.2.1 A historical enquiry: changes in aesthetics and attitudes towards creativity 
 during the late 18th century 
 It is well known that historically, at least until the early 19th century, it was common 
 for musicians in Western Europe to improvise. Scores were often sketchy, unfinished drafts 
 with many details left to be filled in during the moment of performance; indeed, the necessity 
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 for professional musicians to quickly produce music (for the events of the court or church 
 calendar) meant that musicians had to acquire skills of rapid, craftsman-like musical 
 production. The partimenti schools of Italy typify this approach in that they taught students to 
 realise, through improvisation, the upper voices of a given bass line (Sanguinetti, 2007), in 
 effect reducing the task of composition to one line. This highly practical artistic existence 
 naturally fostered similarly practical expectations about music, for ‘to have mastered a craft 
 was to have mastered the rules of a particular form of material production and to have 
 produced a good or useful work of art’ ... (Goehr, 1994, p.150). 
 Throughout the 18th century however, the decline of religion and courtly life which 
 had offered employment to artists for centuries, created new conditions of artistic 
 independence, a fact which brought about a significant change in creative outlook. First 
 artists, and then musicians searched for a new rationale to justify and provide (market) value 
 for their work, as Belting & Atkins (2001) explain: ... ‘now art, remaining alone in the place 
 once occupied by religion, had to be written about in a radically new way. Amid the turbulent 
 beginnings of bourgeois culture, absolute art was the reverse side of an art that had been 
 relieved of all its previous functions’ (p.60). Such a rationale crucially involved new 
 aesthetics which delineated serious art or music from mere craft - ‘absolute art’ or ‘Art with a 
 capital A’ (Gombrich, 1964, p.377). Craft, on the one hand, was associated with the everyday, 
 while ‘Art was beautiful because, among other things, and as it would soon be expressed by 
 romantic theorists, it could transport us to higher, aesthetic realms’ (Goehr, 1994, p.152). As 
 a result, both consumers and creators of art and music became conscious of the consequences 
 of art, that is, the artistic experience, and it is upon this experience that artistic products 
 would come to be valued. 
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 These important new beliefs about art or Art were captured by Emanuel Kant in 1790: 
 ‘In a product of beautiful art we must become conscious that it is Art and not Nature; but yet 
 the purposiveness in its form must seem to be free from all constraint of arbitrary rules as if it 
 were a product of mere nature’ (Kant, 1914, p.187). Kant’s remarks associate human 
 creativity with that of the natural world, and consequently the creative act grows in stature 
 and significance. For artistic creativity, it was perceived, leads to original works, similar to 
 natural phenomena: ‘Genius is the talent (or natural gift) which gives the rule to Art’ (Kant, 
 1914, p.188). In contrast with the usually incomplete and codified (i.e., the use of figures to 
 signify harmonies) scores of the Baroque period, from which performers could perform a 
 version for any particular event, compositions now appeared as finished scores and were soon 
 treated as objects of value in themselves; valued for being timeless utterances in which an 
 original and unique artistic statement was encapsulated. 
 4.2.2 Aesthetics interpreted into musical practice 
 Aesthetical beliefs about a semi-divine creative process resulting in a musical score 
 (itself containing all necessary instructions for performance), were reflected in musical 
 practice, which now effectively divided the labour of musical production between the 
 composer and the performer. Essentially, the responsibility of creativity was now assigned to 
 the composer, while the realisation of the composer’s vision was assigned to a specialist 
 performer possessing the necessary technical and interpretive skills (Goehr, 1994, 
 pp.176-204). By defining and separating the two roles in this way, improvisation became 
 gradually excluded from performance. After all, if the creative work was completed in full by 
 the composer, there was no need for improvisation, or for any creative contribution from the 
 performer. As a result, far from seeing a musical score as a model for improvisation, Bailey 
 (1993) suggests that interpretive performers develop attitudes of reverence towards other’s 
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 works ... ‘the music doesn’t belong to him. He’s allowed to handle it but then only under the 
 strictest supervision’ (Bailey, 1993, p.66). The performer’s role is thus defined through 
 faithful and accurate renditions of the composer’s creative vision, as understood through the 
 score. Such then are the founding ideals of  Werktreue  -  an attitude of ‘being true to the work’ 
 - which motivate the performer to efface their own artistic personality in the service of 
 interpreting another’s artistic vision. 
 4.2.3 Cultural values functioning ideologically within individual musicians 
 Goehr (1994) concludes that such widely-held aesthetic beliefs about how music is 
 created should not be understood as abstract values, emerging perhaps only during 
 discussions about art, but are deeply-held convictions governing the way musicians lead their 
 lives. This is because they shape a society’s perceptions and expectations of what musicians 
 do when they compose or perform or improvise, and thus make up the musical culture within 
 which we exist as musicians. It is this aspect of cultural situatedness - the influence of 
 cultural values in shaping one’s individual beliefs - which I now investigated. Assman 
 (2015), for example, describes how culture provides not only meaning, through ‘a 
 symbolically and socially constructed universe open for endless progress and development’ 
 but also ‘a sense-producing institution … a specifically human form of temporal orientation 
 that transcends the limits of one’s own span of life in both directions’ (Assman, 2015, p.326). 
 It is this sense-producing element of culture which I found most relevant to the way I had 
 developed an idea of myself as a purely interpretive artist without the power or ability to 
 create my own music. It showed me how I did not just passively inherit certain ideas about 
 musical creativity (through an accident of birth as it were), but actively identified with these 
 ideas as I grew up within a wider community of musicians and aspired towards full 
 membership and acceptance within this community. 
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 The idea that individuals actively absorb the values of their surrounding culture, 
 becoming, as a result ‘ideological subjects’, is explored by the marxist philosopher and social 
 critic Louis Althusser (1971), who suggests that: 
 … ‘ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the 
 individuals (it recruits them all) or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it 
 transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called  interpellation 
 or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace 
 everyday police (or other) hailing: “Hey, you there!”’ (p.174). 
 Althusser is basically saying that ideals (such as those concerning the ideals of musical 
 creativity) appeal to us on a personal level. This explains how, as an adolescent becoming 
 aware of my own ambitions to be a pianist, I could have become simultaneously aware of the 
 ‘ideal’ pianist - i.e., a technical superman who could master any score, win any competition 
 through the indisputable fact of his flawless interpretations and instrumental control. In this 
 way, my natural musical ambitions would have been channeled towards the ready-made role 
 of the interpretive performer, a role which was further reinforced through training and 
 increased exposure within a cultural system governed by these ideals. 
 Two other important aspects of ideological thinking I learnt from Althusser. One, is 
 that ideology is implicitly reinforced through behaviour: it is what people do to show 
 conformity with society. Therefore, behaviour which indicates other, contrary ideals is liable 
 to attract criticism from the society whose ideology is (implicitly) rejected. The pressure to 
 conform is thus very strongly reinforced through cultural (i.e., musical) training, and 
 breakaway behaviour, such as improvisation on classical models, might be judged as strongly 
 non-conformist by those who held the ideals of  Werktreue  performance to be sufficient for a 
 musician. As Althusser himself states: ‘Indeed, if he does not do what he ought to do as a 
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 function of what he believes, it is because he does something else, which ... implies that he 
 has other ideas in his head as well as those he proclaims, and that he acts according to these 
 other ideas, as a man who is either ‘inconsistent’ ... or cynical, or perverse’ (Althusser, 1971, 
 p.168). The second point was that ideology is itself misleading, as it does not correspond to 
 reality; rather, ideology represents a very special interpretation of reality: ‘that in ideology 
 men represent their real conditions of existence to themselves in an imaginary form’ (ibid, 
 p.163). With this statement I understood how, for many years, I had pursued a career in 
 interpretive performance in the expectation of musical fulfilment which had never arrived; 
 and how my early, creative ambitions - my first experiments in improvisation - which (I 
 suspected) might have yielded real insights into musical structure and expressive 
 performance had been suppressed, replaced by conformity with the ‘imaginary’ goals of 
 Werktreue  attitudes towards the printed score . 
 4.2.4 Summary of social and cultural influences on improvisation 
 These descriptions of socio-cultural changes in aesthetics and musical practice 
 (Goehr, 1994) and their influence as ideological beliefs over musical thought and practice, are 
 particularly relevant to the institutions of classical music (Althusser, 1971): i.e., the teaching 
 institutions of conservatoires, the performing institutions of concert halls and festivals and 
 competitions, the institutions which promote and disseminate classical music, and so on. As a 
 professional musician I was a product of these institutions, yet I now possessed insights into 
 the nature of ideology, and thus I began to search out and examine my beliefs about musical 
 creativity or my sense of role as an interpretive musician; beliefs which manifested 
 themselves in statements, such as: “You are not an improviser”  or “You should not be 
 improvising”. They helped me to understand why it was so difficult to shake off a need for 
 perfectionism in my performance, as described by Frost et al., (1990): ‘Performance must be 
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 perfect or it is worthless. Any minor flaw constitutes failure’ (p.451), for I was not just 
 conditioned through training in the conservatoire and other institutions to focus on and 
 correct technical inaccuracies; I was also a subject of ‘interpellation’, that is, I had  embraced 
 the ideals of Werktreue interpretive performance, and personally identified my own aims  and 
 ambitions as a musician with these ideals, just as Hegel describes: ... ‘personal individuality 
 and its particular interests ... pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal 
 [and] knowingly and willingly this universal interest even as their own substantial spirit , and 
 actively pursue it as their ultimate end.’ (Hegel, 1991, p.282). 
 4.3 Making progress: addressing initial problems 
 The insights I gained from my cultural and historical studies of musical practice 
 helped me to gain a new perspective on my studies. I now realised that my musical training in 
 interpretive performance had also instilled cultural values and attitudes towards classical 
 music which made it difficult for me to improvise; and while I couldn’t change habitual ways 
 of thinking overnight, I was from this point on, more patient with myself when improvising. I 
 paid less attention to my emotional reactions and began noticing other aspects of the task 
 which I could analyse and describe in cognitive terms. This new period in my learning is 
 marked by a visit to an organ improvisation festival in Berlin in which, for the first time, I 
 observed other student improvisers attempting similar tasks in Baroque improvisation in a 
 series of public masterclasses. 
 4.3.1 Witnessing other novices and intermediate learners 
 The Internationales Orgelimprovisationsfestival in the Kaiser-Wilhelm 
 -Gedächtnis-Kirche, Berlin is an annual event featuring recitals in different styles of organ 
 improvisation. One feature of the festival is that each visiting artist gives a public masterclass 
 on the morning of their own recital. Anyone is welcome to play, though on the occasion that I 
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 visited, participants were mainly students from the organ improvisation class of Wolfgang 
 Seifen at the Universität der Künste in Berlin. My principal interest in attending the festival 
 was to observe the behaviour of students during the masterclasses who I anticipated would be 
 considerably more advanced than myself. To my surprise, I observed that the students in the 
 masterclass were generally nervous and reluctant to improvise in public. In all cases a general 
 request for volunteers to improvise elicited no response: only after the professor had 
 persuaded individuals to play could the classes proceed. Sometimes individuals who had 
 signed up to participate changed their mind and refused to perform. 
 The pedagogical approach of the two masterclasses I watched was quite simple: the 
 expert proposed a theme and suggested ways of improvising on it typical of the organ 
 literature. For example, the theme could be harmonised or embellished as in a Chorale 
 Prelude; or made into a set of variations; even a free-style improvisation was possible. 
 Although the themes suggested were simple (‘Three Blind Mice’ was one of them), as soon 
 as the students started playing it was clear that the tasks of improvisation were not so simple. 
 Principally, problems arose through improvising in a diatonic, tonal language, as I noted at 
 the time: ‘In general, most students' problems arose through the task demands of 
 harmonisation. ...  Problems such as grasping the wrong  harmony seemed to arise from time 
 constraints, i.e., individuals simply lacked the time to work out a solution from the many 
 possibilities. Thus, while they could work out some, or most of the phrase, they could not 
 work out all of it fluently’ (Personal notes, 17  th  May, 2016). 
 This information gave me a new perspective on my own efforts to learn improvisation. 
 I identified strongly with their mistakes, with the frustration they showed in the continuous 
 misalignment of their performance, in which (to borrow terms of language learning) their 
 performance  - or procedural knowledge - differed so  greatly from their  competence  - the 
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 more passive declarative or theoretical knowledge. For example, one student was criticised 
 by a professor for lacking a “logical harmonic movement”, i.e., one in which the direction of 
 the bass line moved in strict contrary motion to the melodic line. The student indicated that 
 he was well aware of this problem; the trouble was that, when improvising, he was forced to 
 accept any chord possible as he reacted within the constraints of real time. Another student 
 was criticised for parallel movement in his harmonisation yet, when he tried to correct this, 
 the result worsened with pauses and slips in his performance. Observing the nervousness and 
 reluctance of the students, also their difficulties in performance, I realised: 
 ●  that negative emotions while improvising were not common amongst novice 
 improvisers 
 ●  that students who were new to improvising characteristically experienced difficulties 
 coordinating their actions 
 ●  that previous musical training in interpretive performance did not appear to facilitate 
 students’ ability to improvise 
 ●  that theoretical knowledge in novice and intermediate students seemed to be far in 
 advance of their procedural knowledge, i.e., they ‘knew’ more than they could ‘do’. 
 These observations helped to situate my own learning experience within a wider context of 
 novice and intermediate improvising. Although I could not interview these students and 
 therefore verify my observations, I subjectively felt my own problems and frustration as a 
 novice were shared amongst many, part of a common situation rather than something 
 particular to my experience, or (worse still) the unavoidable results of my personality. This no 
 doubt helped me to calm down and accept my situation as a novice. I realised there were 
 simply difficulties to be overcome in acquiring new skills over a complex task, and also that 
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 the knowledge and experience I brought to the task were not always a good fit, which made 
 this task of acquisition uncomfortable and confusing in the early stages of learning. 
 4.3.2 Calming down, taking stock and making a strategy 
 Until now, in my improvising sessions, I had usually ranged about trying to make my 
 improvisation sound like an expert without any clear strategy of how to achieve this. This 
 meant that, on the one hand I corrected problems as they emerged, on the other hand I was 
 continuously setting new goals as I remembered different aspects of expert performance: 
 thus, I might start out trying to improvise a whole sonata form movement, but then become 
 distracted by the need to make rapid registration changes, or to create imitative textures. 
 Sudnow (2001) recalls a similar situation when he describes himself ... ‘in pursuit of the most 
 magniloquently organised affairs, each day the bulk of my practicing spent roaming all over 
 the keyboard, rather than lingering in a delimited territory and mastering ways to deal with a 
 sparse course of melodic movements’ (Sudnow, 2001, p.39). Now, however, on my return 
 from the improvisation festival in Berlin, I felt less isolated and sensitive about my learning 
 situation. I was a novice in certain techniques and, having watched other novices, I felt more 
 willing to accept my own situation. Therefore, rather than ‘superimposing’ expertise on my 
 performance (and becoming upset when this failed to work), I began to think more 
 strategically. I lowered my expectations for each session, slowed down the pace (tempo) and 
 aimed for more simple musical results such as coordinating my movements between several 
 chords, or putting two independent voices together. In this way, I began a conscious search 
 for connections between what I attempted to do and the musical textures and shapes which 
 emerged. 
 4.3.3 Recognising the interference of existing skills 
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 I was now beginning to understand how training in interpretive performance was not 
 only insufficient for the skills of improvisation, but also created certain problems. I had 
 noticed in Berlin that students’ actions often did not seem to correspond to their conscious 
 intentions. It was as if their hands were acting ahead of their thoughts, and by the time they 
 had a chance to respond it was too late: the wrong harmony accompanied the chorale melody, 
 the cadence had ended on the dominant, and so on. Noticing these features in my own 
 performance I reflected on the sequence of events in which my actions anticipated my ability 
 to consciously respond in a more accurate way. Schneider & Fisk (1982) refer to a similar 
 process of ‘interference’ from previously learnt action responses. They talk of the ‘difficulty 
 in inhibiting automatic processes’ and ‘large negative transfer effects’ (p.10) as individuals 
 adapt existing skills to new environments. Applying these insights to my own situation I 
 understood that my perception of musical events triggered long-term memories (of scores 
 which I had learnt over the years), before I had a chance to recognise and process these 
 events in the ‘new environment’ of improvisation. Once I recognised this sequence of events 
 in my work I was able to give myself some time to correct it. Consequently I became more 
 committed to very slow and careful work in which I took whatever time necessary to 
 coordinate simple movements between my hands and feet and the events of the music as they 
 emerged. 
 4.3.4 Acquiring new procedures 
 Until this point, each time I started to improvise I was struck by the unfamiliarity of 
 the experience. Although certain aspects of the task were familiar - the organ and, to some 
 extent, the music I produced - the context of improvisation made everything strangely 
 different. My main sensation was that I felt lost and disoriented when I improvised. I wished I 
 had a guide to show me how to organise my actions sequentially; also to show me which 
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 actions and musical decisions were good or effective, and which were bad. I had read in 
 Anderson’s (1982) description of skill learning, that ‘knowledge should first be encoded 
 declaratively and then interpreted’ (p.389) into a new kind of action-specific  procedural 
 knowledge. As I began to structure my improvisation practice sessions more carefully, 
 repeating simple formulae, taking more time to coordinate my actions, and noting the links 
 between these actions and the flow of the music I found that I was beginning to acquire the 
 rudiments of procedural knowledge. For example, I could construct particular sequences of 
 movements; passages of music, certain chords and harmonies began to come more easily; I 
 felt I could ‘go to’ certain places and sometimes even ‘produced a semblance of competence’ 
 as Sudnow (2001, p.38) describes. The following paragraphs attempt to capture my conscious 
 experience of these initial developments which profoundly changed my perception of events 
 within the ‘environment’ of the task. 
 4.3.4.1 New categorisations of the environment 
 Novice improvising, as I have described, was often like driving at top speed through 
 a maze of unknown streets without a map; and this experience of improvising still occurred 
 even when I took time to think about my actions. Yet, in spite of this cognitive confusion, 
 certain events and features of the task began to seem more familiar. Largely because I was 
 starting to improvise within a more circumscribed space (sticking to the same simple 
 four-voice chords or two-part melodies), I was repeating musical events more and more. 
 Although these events stayed the same as usual - a chord in A major, a step downwards in the 
 left hand bass line, and so on, something about them appeared in a new guise, like meeting 
 someone I knew in an unfamiliar context. I found a description of this experience in Edelman 
 (1989):  ‘The world becomes “labelled” as a consequence of behaviour that leads to particular 
 selective  events within such neural structures in  each animal. This process leads to the 
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 formation of relevant perceptual categories and to the association of behaviours with certain 
 constellations of those categories in an adaptive manner’ (Edelman, 1989, p.41). 
 The experience of labelling or naming that which was previously unfamiliar, I 
 understood to be the basis of new perceptual  categorisations  of the musical stimulus as 
 Edelman describes. Accordingly, categorisations arose from the ability to link one’s actions to 
 features in a meaningful way; a process which resulted in synaptic change and the formation 
 of neuronal groups or ‘maps’. At its most basic form, a sensory sheet or mode of the brain 
 registered an experience (i.e., sight or touch) in the world, and this connection between the 
 brain and the external world created an  n -tuple. As  the single-mode  n- tuple connects with 
 other sensory and motor modalities a ‘global mapping’ was produced, which integrates the 
 perception of the moment into ongoing sensory experience and memory structures of past 
 experience (an important part of Edelman’s theory is the inclusion of emotion and valence 
 through additional communication with ‘non-mapped regions such as those of the brain stem, 
 basal ganglia, hippocampus, and parts of the cerebellum’ (1989, p.54) . Thus, perception and 
 cognition, according to Edelman, is never fixed but dynamic, as it continues to sample the 
 environment in real time - a particular kind of semi-autonomous activity called  reentrant 
 connectivity. 
 Relating my experience of naming and labelling to Edelman’s descriptions of 
 categorisation was useful as it gave me insights into certain features of learning: (i) that the 
 formation of ‘global maps’ (i.e., the neural structures of the categorised features) are formed 
 and strengthened through repetition which would more commonly occur as I delimited my 
 improvising to a particular style or language of music; (ii) that categorisations were 
 personalised features of my experience, arising through my exploration of a personal  Umwelt ; 
 therefore they occurred not through predetermined neurological groupings and connections of 
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 the brain, but were stimulated through the behaviour of learning; (iii) that neurological 
 categorisations do not correspond precisely to classical categories (of theoretical knowledge), 
 although clearly there is a strong overlap between perception and theory. For example, I 
 might interpret new categorisations as certain ways of acting upon harmonic, contrapuntal, or 
 other formal elements, yet my experience of categorisation contained something quite 
 different which transcended the theoretical constructs themselves: containing elements of 
 motivation, imaginative structures and emotions. Thus I first became aware of 
 categorisations as mental structures which could serve as the basis for a personal memory for 
 improvisation; not fixed like a computer-like memory, but subject to a process of continuous 
 dynamic change throughout the learning process: ‘under the influence of continually 
 changing contexts, it changes, as the structure and dynamics of the neural populations in the 
 original categorisation also change’ (Edelman, 1992, p.102). 
 4.3.4.2 Awareness of concepts as a basis for mental control 
 My reading into neurological theories of categorisation led me onwards to readings 
 in conceptualisation, a more intricate mental operation performed upon the categories 
 themselves. Edelman (1992) describes concepts thus: ‘An animal capable of concepts 
 identifies a thing or action and on the basis of that identification controls its behaviour in a 
 more or less general way. This recognition must be relational: it must be able to connect one 
 perceptual categorisation to another, apparently unrelated one, even in the absence of the 
 stimuli that triggered those categorisations’ (Edelman, 1992, p.108). Conceptual thinking is 
 often used in musical contexts to describe the elements of musical structure; groupings of 
 notes and features which are understood to perform certain functions, such as ‘cadences’, 
 ‘movements’, ‘tune’ or ‘melody’, ‘accompaniment’ etc. The ability to perceive music in 
 terms of concepts represents therefore a considerable advance upon categorisation, for they 
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 are not tied to ‘outside inputs from sensory modalities’ (Edelman, 1992, p.109). Rather, 
 conceptual formation is a kind of categorisation  of  categorisations, involving memory of past 
 experience. As Edelman (1992) describes ... ‘in forming concepts, the brain constructs maps 
 of its  own  activities, not just of external stimuli,  as in perception’ (p.109). The ability to 
 conceptualise is described as inherent to normal brain activity, which forms both categories 
 and concepts according to experience. 
 Reading these descriptions of concept formation I realised how powerful a conceptual 
 way of constructing and representing the musical stimulus would be to the improviser. 
 Limited as I was to detailed decision making and intricate note-to-note calculations I could 
 only dream of constructing complex musical textures fluently in real time, yet, concepts 
 offered a possible solution as they combined knowledge or cognition of the task with 
 economy of processing, as Vernon (1968) illustrates in his description of a child’s growing 
 conceptual awareness of their environment: 
 ‘Very soon also the number of new and unfamiliar objects which the child encounters, 
 even in his somewhat restricted environment, becomes bewilderingly great. He may 
 not be able to handle and examine each one of them in detail and find out what it does 
 and what he can do with it. But if he can perceive and remember sufficient of its 
 essential qualities to be able to compare it with other similar objects he has perceived 
 previously, then he can class it as being the same type of object. And he can predict 
 that it is likely to behave in the manner characteristic of that type of object, and that 
 he should react to it in a particular and appropriate way’ (p.29). 
 4.3.4.3 Improvising in ‘complexes’ and ‘pseudo concepts’ 
 Unfortunately, at this stage (towards the end of my first year of study) conceptual 
 control over my improvising was not yet possible for me. Although my careful, cautious 
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 improvising allowed me to familiarise myself with features of the task, i.e., to form new 
 categories  1  particular to the improvising experience,  I was unable to create more generalised 
 productions out of these categorisations on which I could base my actions. This meant that I 
 was unable to create coherent musical structures (either at a global level of complete forms, 
 or a more local level of musical paragraphs), and my improvisations tended to ramble on 
 through a series of local, phrase-to-phrase connections and unstable relationships (see 
 Audio_3  for an example). For example, I might construct  a sequence of two or three 
 harmonies; realising this I tried to repeat it, transposing up a level. After a while, tiring of 
 this, I might notice one of the chords as particularly expressive, and make a new sequence out 
 of this chord. These experiments were made without understanding how I had arrived at the 
 chords in question, and without any awareness of how such sequences could contribute to an 
 overall form.  Vygotsky (1986) describes these types of loose connections and associations as 
 complexes  and  pseudo concepts , for example: ‘In a  complex, individual objects are united in 
 the child’s mind not only by his subjective impressions but also by bonds actually existing 
 between these objects’ (p.112). 
 4.4 Themes emerging from Chapter 4 (months 1-12) 
 My situation after a year of self-study I now summarise through the following 
 emergent themes: 
 1.  Unstructured experimentation : novice improvising had  been characterised by an 
 initial period of unstructured trial and error, as I grew accustomed to a novel 
 environment. 
 2.  Categorisation : a more structured approach towards  improvising had occurred 
 through an experience of categorisation, which linked thoughts to actions in a 
 meaningful way. 
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 3.  Negative learning emotions : the novice experience of improvising had been 
 dominated by shame and embarrassment, which I had traced predominantly to effects 
 of cultural conditioning in  Werktreue  ideals (see  below). 
 4.  Unsuitability of knowledge : my experience as an interpretive  performer did not 
 provide me with the insights I needed for improvising. In some ways my existing 
 skills interfered with my ability to improvise. My existing knowledge thus needed to 
 be  interpreted  into a qualitatively new form of knowledge  through the learning 
 process. 
 5.  Werktreue  idealism:  an investigation of my cultural  situatedness indicated 
 widespread cultural beliefs about  how  music was created  and  who  could create it, 
 summarised as an attitude of  Werktreue : in which interpretive  performers developed 
 attitudes of reverence towards the printed score. 
 6.  Lack of agency : when improvising I felt dominated  by the constraints and difficulties 
 of the task. I could not perceive the task in terms of creative musical decisions or 
 opportunities for self-expression. 
 Figure 5 (an expansion of Figure 3) captures my perspective of the task of 
 improvisation at this stage of learning. I drew this figure as a means to record my impressions 
 of each session during this time. The five main features of the experience are: Valence, 
 Agency and Control, Musical Output and Fluency, which are visualised on a continuum from 
 left to right. Although the design of the graphic records my sense of frustration with the 
 musical results of my improvising and the many pauses I made to calculate next steps and 
 avoid errors (I often rated my performance far to the left whereas the ideals that I aimed for 
 were at the very right of the graphic), the fact that I was recording my own impressions of 
 improvisation helped me to gain a more objective awareness of my own learning. The 
 graphic also indicates my motivation to overcome initial frustrations and to gain skills in 
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 fluency and musical expressiveness. 
 Figure 5 . A representation of the main features of  my experience of improvisation during the 
 first year of study. 
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 Chapter 5 
 Developing conceptual perception and control over improvising (months 13-17) 
 5.1 Introduction to Chapter 5 
 Throughout this chapter I focus on two main problems in my improvising: (i) a lack 
 of coherence in form and structure; and (ii) a lack of fluency manifesting itself in continuous 
 pauses. Tackling these two problems through different strategies initiated a new perception of 
 musical structure in terms of underlying concepts or function, a perception which allowed me 
 to establish a basic repertoire (and knowledge base) of patterns and formulae suitable for 
 recreating Baroque organ textures. 
 5.2 Aiming for coherence in form and structure 
 ‘Take a starting point of G minor - this is a very emotionally loaded key with 
 associations to great preludes of the past! I want to rhapsodise freely, but I also want 
 to enter the same world and achieve similar emotional effects to those lovely preludes 
 by J.S.Bach and Max Reger’ (Personal notes, 14th December, 2015). 
 I include this extract from notes written at the beginning of my study to indicate how 
 free and undefined my approach to musical style and form had been: I made no distinction 
 between the musical styles of J.S.Bach and Max Reger, there is little reference to a particular 
 musical structure, and no defining of specific goals or strategies for improvising a Prelude; 
 instead I aimed for unspecified impressions, highlighted features gained from different 
 compositions and composers which together represented a Prelude I might improvise. 
 Perhaps I was more focused on recreating a particular emotional experience through my 
 improvising, similar to that I experienced when listening to these pieces, though again I had 
 little idea how this might have been achieved through improvisation. This situation is echoed 
 by the researcher and organist-improviser Tandberg (2008) when he reflects: ‘in the case of 
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 improvisation … initial stages are sometimes comparable to the process of groping in the 
 dark. ... We can easily feel that we lack an overall idea which can give our work a sense of 
 purpose’ (p.229). 
 Although I had, by the end of my first year, reduced the parameters of my improvising 
 from complex to simple, I still rambled through loose associations of material, and this 
 unstructured rambling was causing me increasing concern. After a series of recordings I made 
 while improvising on a given fugue subject (see  Video_1 )  I wrote in my journal: ‘Following 
 on from the film project ... I realise that I need now to apply a formal structure to the 
 improvisation. .. The film shows an organic process of ‘trial and error’ which incorporates all 
 aspects (harmonic, contrapuntal, formal). Because of this, there are too many variables to 
 progress towards clarity and precision. - I go round in circles’ (Personal notes, 16th January 
 2017). 
 5.2.1 Improvising to a ‘borrowed’ formal plan 
 Turning to written treatises for advice, I found two texts which approached the 
 problem of improvising musical structure through a strict plan of phrase lengths (defined in 
 beats and bars) and key structure. Hennie Schouten (1955), after preliminary exercises in 
 improvising four-bar concluding phrases to a given melody, continues with exercises in 
 Binary Form  which she describes: ‘The simple binary  form consists of two phrases of 8 bars 
 each. During the first phrase, one often modulates to a related key, modulating back to the 
 original main key in the second phrase’ (p.17). In a similar way, Marcel Dupré (1975), 
 constructs  Binary Expositions  through a rigid plan  of eight-bar phrases, defined by the final 
 cadence ... ‘the first phrase is called the “Antecedent” if it ends with a half cadence (that is to 
 say on the dominant) and the second will be called the “Consequent” if it ends with a perfect 
 cadence (that is to say on the tonic)’ (p.14). Deviations from the plan are also considered: ‘If 
 a theme is not answered by a Consequent, but instead by a phrase which is completely 
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 different, this type of phrase is known as the “Commentary”’ (p.20). In this way,  Dupré 
 arrives at a general formal plan for structuring the first part of an improvisation: 
 ‘1. The Theme, 4 measures. 
 2. The first deductive Commentary of 4 measures, connected to: 
 3. A repetition of the Theme, 4 measures. 
 4. The second deductive Commentary, of 4  or 8 measures, which must be different from the 
 1st Commentary, and which must conclude with a perfect cadence’ (Dupré, 1975, p.26). 
 While the clarity and logic of these formal approaches seemed initially appealing, the 
 reality of the exercise was frustrating. As soon as I thought of a melodic idea (the Theme) I 
 also had to think how it would fit to a four-bar phrase, while also constructing a suitable 
 harmonisation. These constraints continued while I worked out whether my improvised music 
 fitted Dupré’s description of a ‘deductive commentary’. Working my way through the 
 exercise in this effortful way I found I could only produce music which seemed incredibly 
 contrived and far removed from the kind of imaginative, creative improvisation I aimed at. To 
 improvise to so many conscious constraints seemed more of an exercise in discipline than a 
 path to inspiration or skill learning; besides which, I never felt sure if the results were good or 
 not, and was continually distracted by asking myself: Was that a good four-bar phrase? Did I 
 link to the ‘deductive commentary’ in the right way? Was the music supposed to sound like 
 this, or should I try something else? 
 Dupré himself offers some guidelines in the execution of his exercises, for example, 
 that ‘it is by patient repetition and by the constant improvement of the same passage that the 
 student progresses most rapidly’ and also that ‘it is necessary to work very slowly, but strictly 
 and methodically, forcing oneself not to stop until one has come to the end of 4 or 8 measures 
 which have been settled in advance’ (p.III), but even after patiently following these 
 suggestions I found the experience unsatisfactory. After several attempts I did indeed become 
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 more fluent, but the musical results still sounded artificial and unexpressive and I couldn’t 
 see a way of developing a more organic, free and expressive style of improvising through this 
 kind of exercise. 
 5.2.2. Constructing musical form through motivic development 
 By contrast with the treatises of Schouten (1955) and Dupré (1975), Whitmer (2012) 
 approaches the problem of formal construction through motivic invention and development: 
 ‘The chief principle underlying an easy and fluent improvisation is the exhaustive study of 
 the melodic, rhythmic and structural aspects and possibilities of a fractional part - such as one 
 or two measures - of the basic melodic theme selected’ (Chap.1, Para.1). I was drawn towards 
 Whitmer’s approach because he explicitly offers advice about harmonisation, encouraging the 
 student to consciously  not  focus on harmony, but to  improvise only through the melodic 
 lines: ‘the harmonic effects must be disregarded until all other generating of effects has been 
 accomplished. In other words, a short rhythmic-melodic entity must become a longer entity 
 through expansion.  This is your problem ’ (Chap.1,  Para.6). To illustrate this principle, 
 Whitmer’s opening exercises and chapters explore all the possibilities of melodic imitation 
 and development using just one short motif, extracted from a hymn tune by Sir Henry 
 Gauntlett (see Figure 6) 
 Figure 6 . Melody proposed by Whitmer (2012) for ‘spinning’  musical form. 
 The student is encouraged then to deconstruct this melody into smaller motivic cells, 
 from which musical sequences (ascending and descending) can be constructed. The exercises 
 are initially unharmonised, allowing the student to focus solely upon the principle of forward 
 motion, or (Whitmer’s term) ‘spinning’ the theme. While the melodic exercises were very 
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 simple to perform, later exercises, which assumed the student’s ability to add counterpoint 
 and harmony and create ‘codas’ and ‘modulations’, were more problematic. There was no 
 explicit guide as to how to construct these additional voices, and I found that working out the 
 texture impeded my melodic inventions producing the usual pauses and haltings for 
 calculation. The fact that Whitmer encourages one  to simply forge ahead regardless of errors 
 ... ‘do not get too fussy about how every part of the “thing” sounds’ ... ‘Instead, strive for a 
 rough go-ahead energy’ (Chap.1, Para.8), was not effective in my case, as I found the 
 experience of ‘forging ahead’ caused too many errors, and I soon stopped through feelings of 
 shame and embarrassment. 
 In summary, my experience learning to improvise coherent forms and structures 
 through written treatises was largely unsuccessful and frustrating. Although each treatise 
 proposed a range of exercises for achieving clear musical structure, the exercises were either 
 too abstracted or theoretical (with numerous constraints); or, in the case of Whitmer (2012) 
 lacked relevant information to serve as an effective guide. Therefore, I didn’t clearly perceive 
 how the exercise was supposed to facilitate my ability to improvise larger musical structures. 
 The writer presumably understood this connection: their own experience as improvisers had 
 guided them to write the exercises, reducing the task to its essential elements, providing a 
 framework for recreating the whole. However, the connection between the ‘rule’ and the 
 whole task was not communicated to me through the exercise; which meant that I learnt only 
 how to harmonise a particular melody, or complete a phrase, without gaining any sense of 
 how to develop this skill. Thus, the salient points of the exercise were presented without 
 meaning, as Endsley (1995a) notes: ‘operators must do more than simply perceive the state of 
 their environment. They must understand the integrated meaning of what they are perceiving’ 
 (p.33). 
 5.2.3 Clarifying my mental representation of musical structure 
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 Turning to cognitive literature for guidance, I noticed that my problems in 
 improvising a coherent form and structure seemed to be described by Pressing’s (1988) 
 description of a mental representation or  referent  : ... ‘an underlying piece-specific guide or 
 scheme used by the musician to facilitate the generation of improvised behaviour’ (Pressing, 
 1988, p.153). Although this text was known to me, I was struck this time by the function of 
 the referent in generating the improvisation. In spite of Pressing’s definition, I realised I had 
 been thinking of the referent as a passive structure, a mere reflection of the improviser’s 
 actions, i.e., that through an improviser’s actions a  referent  mental representation or memory 
 of the improvisation would be created. I now considered these factors in reverse: that an 
 individual’s mental representation (i.e., their anticipation of their actions) which they bring to 
 the task would generate, govern and constrain the musical results of their improvisation. This 
 realisation encouraged me to look again at my original representation of the problem: the 
 improvisation of a free Prelude. Noting once again that my referent was not well defined (for 
 example, I’m not even sure which composer or model of composition I’m following: ... 
 ‘those lovely preludes by J.S.Bach and Max Reger’) it’s not surprising that my improvising 
 was rambling and unfocused. Should I then better define my referent? How could this be 
 done? 
 The answer to this I decided lay in restricting my improvising to particular 
 compositional models. Throughout my first year I had attempted to improvise in many 
 different styles, as the mood took me, and so I often ranged from Medieval styles through to 
 20th century modal and Contemporary atonal idioms. It now occurred to me that, by focusing 
 on a particular compositional model or style, I might gain better insights into constructive 
 techniques; also, if I could become fluent in one style or genre, this fluency might later be 
 transferred to other musical styles. I therefore decided to focus solely upon selected models 
 of Baroque repertoire as a guide for improvising. These models had a clarity of structure 
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 which connected with one of my initial research goals: to exercise explicit control over the 
 task, i.e., to be able to say, ‘I will now improvise a Fugue on this theme in three parts, in D 
 minor’ or ‘I will improvise a Prelude, Fugue and Toccata in a North German style’. I was also 
 drawn to repertoire which encouraged me to improvise in a relatively clear and unadorned 
 language of diatonic tonality, as I had particular difficulties in improvising fluently in this 
 harmonic style. 
 Thus, at the beginning of my second year of study (October, 2016), I began to focus 
 on German organist composers from a period c.1629-1750. These composers with typical 
 compositions are listed in Table 1. 
 Table 1 
 An  overview of compositional models, representative  composers and tasks for improvisation, 
 from the beginning of my second year of study 
 Musical models  Composers  Tasks for improvisation 
 Preludes (free form) 
 J.S.Bach (1685-1750) 
 Dietrich Buxtehude 
 (c,1637-1707) 
 Georg Böhm (1661-1733) 
 · to establish a particular 
 tonality 
 · to modulate to a particular, 
 related key 
 · to allow imagination or 
 fantasy to dictate structure and 
 decision making 
 Fugues and Ricercares 
 J.S.Bach (1685-1750) 
 Dietrich Buxtehude 
 (c,1637-1707) 
 · to transpose fugue subject in 
 the dominant 
 · to invent a counter-subject. 
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 Georg Böhm (1661-1733) 
 Giovanni Gabrieli (1557-1612) 
 · to combine both subject and 
 countersubject up to four parts 
 · to invent linking material 
 between voice entrances and so 
 to construct a Fugal exposition 
 Chorale harmonisation and 
 embellishment  Dietrich Buxtehude 
 (c,1637-1707) 
 J.S.Bach (1685-1750) 
 Johann Pachelbel (1653-1706) 
 · to harmonise a chorale theme 
 in four parts 
 · to decorate and embellish the 
 chorale theme, i.e., by adding 
 passing notes. 
 · to harmonise the theme in all 
 voices of a 4-part texture 
 5.2.4 Describing problems of attention in relation to form 
 Restricting my improvisation to particular forms and models of the Baroque 
 repertoire, and making my strategies more explicit (as described in the Tasks section of Table 
 1), did not initially make my improvising easier. Although I was happier improvising to the 
 style of the Baroque model, I experienced an uncomfortable overcrowding of constraints 
 similar to those I’d experienced improvising to written exercises of Dupré (1975) and 
 Schouten (1955). For example, if I tried to improvise a Fugal exposition according to the four 
 guidelines mentioned in Table 1, then I could only proceed extremely slowly and carefully; 
 and even then I had to keep pausing to think as more voices were introduced and the texture 
 became more complex and difficult to control. In attending to these demands I had to 
 consciously construct each action, working out the relationships between the voices and 
 predicting the intervals that would result in order to avoid unwanted dissonance and errors. 
 Attending so many constraints meant I had little awareness of anything else in the 
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 improvisation except these small steps of construction. To perceive other elements of the 
 musical texture, or even to gain new insights into the task seemed impossible when I was so 
 preoccupied over each step and this worried me, for how could I ever learn new skills or 
 bring these skills towards larger musical structures if I could not see beyond the micro-steps 
 of construction? 
 5.2.5 Creating my own reduced scores as guides for improvisation 
 This frustrating inability to think beyond each step, each separate movement while 
 improvising, motivated me to look more closely at the scores I used as models, to see if I 
 could bring my improvising to work at a different level of musical structure. I decided to 
 make an analysis of different elements (harmonic, tonal, rhythmic, motivic) to see if this 
 provided me with information or insights into the structure which I could then focus on in my 
 improvising. I began by copying out certain chords and harmonic progressions which I liked, 
 noticing how this exercise helped me to perceive the pattern of the progression more clearly 
 without the distraction of figurations and decoration. Discovering this insight into the 
 harmonic element prompted me to also write out different figurations which, by so doing, 
 helped me to notice how a composition might use only one or two figurative ideas which 
 were then used by the composer to construct larger patterns and sequences, these joining the 
 chord progressions. Progressing in this way through the analysis of various different musical 
 elements it soon occurred to me that I might use one of my written analyses as a guide for 
 improvising: the information which I took from the score would then serve as a basis for 
 guiding the other elements which I  improvised. 
 An example of one of these ‘skeleton’ or reduced scores is given in Figure 7 which 
 shows first an extract from the third movement of J.S.Bach’s Trio Sonata in E-flat major, 
 BWV 525, followed by (5a) an analysis in which the musical texture is reduced to chord 
 sequences and harmonic progressions; and (5b) another analysis which reduces the upper two 
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 voices to a rhythmic outline and includes written information of tonal events such as 
 modulations and cadences. 
 To use these scores as a guide was easier and more intuitive than I anticipated. For 
 example, using the harmonic/chord analysis as a guide (see Figure 7a) I found it relatively 
 simple to embellish each harmonic event with semi-quavers, linking each bar to the next. I 
 allowed myself considerable freedom with all the improvised semiquavers, not attempting 
 patterns of imitation, but allowing each hand to execute whatever was easiest, trying however 
 to keep strictly to the harmonic guide. Likewise with the second exercise (7b), although I 
 treated the given information of rhythmic patterns and cadences very strictly, I allowed 
 considerable variation in the motivic patterns, thus allowing me to follow the guide as 
 fluently as possible. 
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 Figure 7 : Extract from the third movement of Trio  Sonata BWV 525 for organ, by J.S.Bach 
 (1685-1750). From,  Sechs Sonaten für zwei Claviere  und Pedal (Band 15, p.10) , Leipzig: 
 Breitkopf und Härtel. 
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 Figure 7a.  A reduced-score of the third movement of  J.S.Bach’s Trio Sonata for organ BWV 
 525, showing the harmonic movement as a template for improvisation. 
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 Figure 7b . A reduced score of the third movement of  Bach’s Trio Sonata for organ BWV 525, 
 showing the rhythmic skeleton as a template for improvisation. 
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 Using these reduced scores as guides or templates for improvisation provided a very 
 different experience to the unstructured improvising I was used to, or the abstracted, 
 theoretical written exercises of the treatises. Knowing the original model very well (I had 
 performed this Trio Sonata in recitals), it was weird to make up my own music which was 
 strangely related to the original but also very different. Although the musical results were 
 rather simple, the feelings of constructing my own music along the guidelines of a ‘real’ 
 composition gave me real pleasure and satisfaction. This was because my reduced scores, for 
 the first time in my experience, gave me access to stylistic musical decision-making in real 
 time: for example, as I improvised the first bar through the harmonic analysis (5a), I made up 
 my figurations and, just at the point where I might say to myself “what chord comes next?”, 
 the question was itself answered by the score which provided the next chord. The removal of 
 this burdensome questioning regarding each step of harmonic construction also allowed me 
 some freedom in my cognitive processing of the task which allowed me to notice new 
 features of the task: I could concentrate on the patterns of decoration, the semi-quavers I 
 improvised, or the sequence of cadences (in 5b) over a longer section of musical structure. 
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 Figure 8.  A reduced score of a Ricercare for organ  by Giralamo Cavazzoni (16  th  century), 
 showing the imitative voice entrances as a template for improvisation. 
 A similarly reduced score of the opening of a Ricercare for organ by Cavazzoni (16  th 
 century) is given in Figure 8 (see  Audio_4  for a realisation).  The Ricercare shares essential 
 features with the Baroque Fugal exposition in that each voice enters imitatively in turn using 
 the same opening motif; however the style is simpler than the Baroque Fugue and easier to 
 manage, for the subject of the Ricercare is short, the pace of the music slower, and the 
 musical textures simpler and less elaborate. One of my principal difficulties in Fugal 
 improvisation was to maintain the polyphonic texture while simultaneously deciding when to 
 bring in more voices; therefore in this exercise I created a score which showed me when to 
 introduce each succeeding voice. Using this as a guide allowed me to focus on constructing 
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 the voice entrances and combining these successively into two, three and four-part 
 polyphonic textures. Thus, by not worrying about the timing or placing of the voice entrances 
 I gained instead insights into other factors of musical construction - the ebb and flow of 
 contrapuntal textures through a Fugal exposition, a sense of timing over the voice entrances 
 and an experience in improvising a whole section of music - a Fugal exposition from the 
 opening voice to a sectional cadence. (a recording Audio_ 4, gives an example realisation of 
 this exercise). 
 5.2.6 Identifying underlying concepts in musical structure 
 The insights I gained from using a reduced score as a template for improvisation 
 began to change my perception of musical structure. This was a gradual process which began 
 with certain analyses: for example, with regard to Bach’s Trio Sonata BWV 525, I studied the 
 harmonic movements and sequences, I studied the timing of events, the use of imitative voice 
 entries to generate structure; I noted the overall key structure, and the way the composer 
 modulates to each new key. Through this experience, a more significant, qualitative change 
 occurred as I realised that the information I was analysing could be thought of in terms of 
 more generalised functions: for example, a sequence of harmonies could be represented as a 
 series of  opening moves  designed to establish the  tonic key. These  opening  moves  might be 
 realised in many ways without destroying their function of establishing the tonic key. 
 Similarly, techniques used to bring in voice entrances at certain times could be thought of in 
 functions which went beyond a particular instance - in terms of  delaying ,  anticipating , 
 breaking ,  joining,  and so on; again, the particular  notes used were not so important as the 
 same function might hold with different notes; or, indeed, a different function might have 
 been chosen altogether. 
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 Thus, there was a loosening of the boundaries in my perception of musical structure; 
 in fact, the possibility of changing a musical structure didn’t appear so threatening anymore. 
 The emerging perception I had of underlying conceptual elements and their relationship to 
 the more superficial patterns through which they were realised, seemed to me to offer a world 
 of possibilities for my improvising. However, although this dawning awareness of conceptual 
 relationships within the musical structure of the score became fundamental to my 
 development of improvisational skills, it is also important to stress that my awareness of 
 concepts at this stage was passive and observant. I noticed the presence of conceptual 
 function in the structure, but I could not yet create my own concepts for generating 
 improvisation or making my own conceptual musical decisions. Thus, I was dependent on my 
 reduced scores for improvising coherent structures. 
 It’s possible to draw a causal link between my dawning perception of music in terms 
 of concepts and the exercises I created, for as Vygotsky (1986) states: ‘To form ... a concept it 
 is also necessary  to abstract, to single out  elements,  and to view the abstracted elements apart 
 from the totality of the concrete experience in which they are embedded’ (p.135). Because I 
 had abstracted various elements of the texture (i.e., the harmonic or rhythmic skeleton) and 
 used these as principles on which to improvise new versions, it follows that I should start to 
 perceive these principles in terms of more generalised concepts. It is therefore important to 
 understand my conceptual perceptions arising through a directed dynamic engagement with 
 the stimulus or task; these actions resulting in valuable new mental representations of musical 
 structure. Therefore, because of this distinction between my previous knowledge and musical 
 understanding, and that which arose through improvising, from this point on in my thesis I 
 label these concepts with the subscript  1  . 
 5.3 Decision making and fluency in diatonic harmony 
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 5.3.1 “What chord comes next?” 
 In parallel to these exercises in form and structure, I also tackled the problem of 
 decision making and fluency within a diatonic, tonal language. This usually took the form of 
 a question - ‘what chord comes next?’ - which emerged continually when I improvised. So, 
 for example, when improvising a free Prelude, I might start with a tonic chord and 
 immediately be confronted with the problem of choosing succeeding chords; similarly, in a 
 longer structure, such as Bach’s Trio Sonata in E-flat major (see Figure 7), I might 
 successfully analyse each chord theoretically, but I could not often understand the criteria on 
 which these particular chords were chosen. Figure 9 illustrates this problem of choice by 
 showing a series of chords, each representing a possible departure from the chord of C major. 
 Figure 9 . Illustration of harmonic choice framed as  ‘What chord comes next?’ 
 Each of the second chords represents a possible direction of the music following the 
 initial statement of root tonality. The necessity of choice always caused me to pause and 
 reflect, and this was for a number of reasons: (i) to work out possible options, (ii) to assess 
 the value of one option over another, (iii) to work out how to construct the chosen option 
 without constructing parallel fifths and octaves between the voices  5  , (iv) to evaluate the 
 consequences of the choice once it had been played. 
 5  The rules governing the movement of independent  parts within a polyphonic texture during the 
 Baroque period are largely inherited from the Renaissance period. These rules are codified by Joseph 
 Fux (1725/1971) in five species of counterpoint exercises which I later discuss in detail (see 
 Para.5.3.5). At this stage, my knowledge of voice-leading principles was dominated by only two 
 concerns: to avoid parallel motion in fifths and octaves. between any two voices. 
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 5.3.2 Using the ‘règle de l’octave’ for generating harmony 
 As I struggled with this problem, I became aware of a system of pedagogy for 
 diatonic harmonisation called the ‘règle de l’octave’ (rule of the octave) in which an 
 exemplar of suitable harmonisations with implicit, voice-leading polyphony was given to an 
 ascending and descending scale. As Christensen (1992) explains: ‘The idea behind the [règle 
 de l’octave] is that each scale degree can be associated with a unique harmony, one which 
 reciprocally defines that scale degree’ (p.91). The assimilation of this system meant that not 
 only was a possible harmonisation at hand, but through recognising the harmonic solution, 
 the improviser was also orientated within a harmonic and tonal schema, defined by the ‘rule’. 
 Thus, the règle de l’octave served as a type of crude musical and technical system by which 
 the improviser could orientate themselves tonally. An example of the règle de l’octave, by the 
 18  th  century theorist François Campion (in Christensen,  1992) is shown below. 
 Figure 10 . The ‘Règle de l’Octave’ of François Campion  (1686-1747) 
 While the theory behind this kind of rule was clear, I found it difficult to put it into 
 practice, i.e., to use this system for organising a free prelude, or even for harmonising a 
 chorale. On the one hand the system felt too limited to serve in the context of free and 
 imaginative improvisation; on the other hand, to use this system for a stricter task such as 
 harmonising a choral theme, would involve all the complexities of transposing the ‘rule’ into 
 the relevant key and simultaneously finding ways of interpreting the chorale theme in terms 
 of the prescribed harmonisations. No doubt it was possible to absorb the règle de l’octave to 
 such an extent that it could be produced effortlessly, but I didn’t feel sufficiently motivated to 
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 try when the musical results were so limited. In conclusion, I felt that such a highly 
 prescribed system of harmonisation would not be suitable for the kind of imaginative, 
 creative improvisation I aimed towards. The pros and cons of using the règle de l’octave are 
 also discussed by  Christensen (1992) when he says: 
 .. ‘of course, the  regle d’octave  was never considered  sufficient by itself as a model 
 for the Free Fantasy [i.e., Baroque Prelude]. Pedagogues recognised that many of the 
 harmonies and bass progressions not included in the paradigmatic formula were 
 necessary for a successful Fantasy, just as they were necessary for the realisation of a 
 figured bass. (Indeed there was something of an aesthetic contradiction in prescribing 
 any kind of normative progression for the Fantasy)’ (p.109) 
 5.3.3 Looking for insights in academic treatises of harmony 
 Another strategy for solving the problem of harmonic decision was to use a formal 
 or academic study in harmony as a guide. After trying several publications, I settled on 
 Tchaikovsky’s (2005, originally, 1900),  Guide to the  Practical Study of Harmony  as the most 
 approachable and authoritative treatise. This was because Tchaikovsky not only brings his 
 considerable achievements as a composer to the task, but also adopts a brevity of explanation 
 which contrasted well with the dense theoretical approach of some other writers. 
 Disappointingly, once I began, I found even Tchaikovsky’s economical approach to harmony 
 produced too many rules to be applicable to the context of improvisation. Beginning with 
 simple triads in root position, exercises are then given using inversions and their usage within 
 the scale or mode is discussed, also their relationship to the tonic key; the aim being (so it 
 seemed to me) to categorise each possibility of harmony according to theoretical rules and 
 terminology. 
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 Such a method, though satisfyingly logical from a theoretical perspective, necessarily 
 means defining ever more complex chords in order to be complete and systematic. For 
 example, regarding the chords of the seventh, Tchaikovsky advises: ‘The chords of the 
 seventh on the 5  th  and 7  th  degrees may also be connected  with the Dominant triad; the seventh 
 must here resolve not into the fundamental tone, but into the fifth of the triad ...’ thus we have 
 a set of rules for applying to the seventh chords, once these have been identified as such; yet, 
 this is not sufficient for simultaneously one must also remember the exceptions that:, ‘As 
 regards the chords of the seventh on the 7  th  degree,  they can be connected with the Dominant 
 triad only in case the latter stands between the second and third inversions of the chord of the 
 seventh, and two voices remain stationary, while the Bass progresses in contrary motion to 
 the third’ (p.46). The impossibility of ever remembering such complex and subtle rules 
 encouraged me to drop this line of study; also, I realised that adding theoretical knowledge to 
 my existing awareness of constraints and rules would not solve my fluency problem. What I 
 lacked at this stage was insights into how to adapt theoretical knowledge to performance (i.e., 
 procedural knowledge or productions), not more theory! 
 5.3.4 Discovering Fux’s (1725/1971) voice-leading rules for Renaissance 
 counterpoint 
 Since the beginning of my PhD I had engaged in a study of Renaissance-style 
 counterpoint. Joseph Fux’s  Gradus ad Parnassum  (first  published in 1725) explicitly rejected 
 contemporary trends in composition  6  , proposing instead  that composers should learn rules of 
 good and effective musical construction through a study of the Renaissance vocal style of 
 writing as epitomised by Palestrina (1525-1594). Fux then organises this study into a series of 
 graded exercises exploring five characteristic types or ‘species’ of counterpoint; and although 
 6  Although Fux records some doubts over the power of his treatise to change compositional trends 
 towards the chromatic and dramatic. In his own words: ‘I do not believe that I can call back 
 composers from the unrestrained insanity of their writing to normal standards’ (p.17) 
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 I studied all of these species, my principal focus was upon the basic intervallic rules of 
 motion underlying the 1st species which are detailed in the introduction (or Dialogue  7  ). Fux 
 begins by dividing the various possible intervals into Consonant (unison, third, fifth, sixth, 
 octave - of which the third and sixth are ‘imperfect’, the remainder ‘perfect’ consonances; 
 and Dissonant (second, fourth, diminished fifth, tritone, seventh). He then illustrates the three 
 possible motions of voices in juxtaposition: 
 Figure 11.  Three rules of intervallic motion. From,  The Study of Counterpoint from Johann 
 Joseph Fux’s Gradus ad Parnassum ” (p.21-22) by A.  Mann, 1971. New York: W. W. Norton. 
 In addition to these illustrations, Fux adds the following ‘fundamental rules’ 
 First rule:  From one perfect consonance to another  perfect consonance one must 
 proceed in contrary or oblique motion. 
 Second rule:  From a perfect consonance to an imperfect  consonance one may proceed 
 in any of the three motions. 
 Third rule:  From an imperfect consonance to a perfect  consonance one must proceed 
 in contrary or oblique motion. 
 Fourth rule:  From one imperfect consonance to another  imperfect consonance one 
 may proceed in any of the three motions’ (Fux, 1725/1971, p.21) 
 7  Fux presents his text as a conversation between the  student Josephus and the master Aloysius 
 (representative of Palestrina himself) 
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 Although Fux’s aim is to make clear the implicit constraints guiding the composers 
 of the Renaissance, much of these motions and rules apply equally well to the construction of 
 Baroque music and, indeed any music which is built on voice-leading principles of resolving 
 dissonance to consonance (Salzer and Schachter, 1989). Fux’s rules thus represent valuable 
 insights into the treatment of consonant and dissonant intervals (and thus, tension and 
 resolution) in the language of diatonic harmony. Using these rules for constructing simple 
 two-part textures, soon helped me to harmonise a melody - as the rules provided a useful 
 criteria for choosing a bass line. Through practice I began to understand the motion between 
 theme and bass in terms of intervals, and from calculating the interval it followed that I could 
 choose an appropriate motion (parallel, oblique, contrary) suitable for the next harmonisation. 
 Extending the rules to construct inner parts and voices resulted in strong, expressive 
 harmonies which rewarded the initial efforts at calculating intervals and motions. 
 It is worth observing at this point that my perception of harmony and harmonisation 
 changed quite radically through Fux’s contrapuntal principles. Previously I had reduced 
 harmonic textures to  chords  as illustrated in Figure  9, which did indeed make the problem of 
 choice overwhelming, as Whitmer (2012, Chap.1, Para.12) warns: ‘The chord plan has a 
 fixity of purpose that is sure to stop one before one is well started’. The composer and music 
 theorist Ernst Toch (1977) therefore makes a distinction between (i) chords which are 
 imagined as ... ‘a fixed unit, or pattern, within the frame of which each voice seeks to take up 
 its appropriate place’ and (ii) chords which capture a moment of harmonic motion: ‘Just as 
 the mists and clouds adopt the most diverse shapes in constant integration, diffusion and 
 re-formation, thus the moving voices in music result in constantly changing harmonies’ (p.5). 
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 It is this latter, contrapuntal motion which I now perceived as  resulting  in chords, and which 
 provided a new and more productive point of focus  8  . 
 5.3.5 Using Fux’s (1725/1971) rules as concepts  1  for constructing four-part 
 harmonisations 
 Towards the end of my second year I recorded myself ( Audio_5 ) applying Fux’s 
 rules of motion to the construction of a bass line to a given chorale melody, as preparation for 
 harmonisation. The recording illustrates that I am able to construct each motion fluently, and 
 this fluency is not only due to practice, but also to an emerging confidence in decision 
 making which is supported through the rules. For, although Fux’s rules allow a number of 
 solutions, each of these solutions is safely incorporated within the rules, so I am able to 
 decide without hesitation and pauses arising from the need to anticipate the consequences  9  of 
 action. In this way, Fux’s rules, for the first time in my learning experience, function as 
 concepts  1  for improvising my own music. The fact that  these concepts are translated from 
 Fux’s rules of motion (rather than rules which result from my own analyses) makes them no 
 less significant, for they show my use of a generalised rule for generating improvisation 
 which is freed from a particular score or one version of events. Each rule functioned 
 conceptually  1  for constructing harmony, not only because  it represented something which was 
 true or general about the intervallic relationships in the Baroque style, but also because Fux 
 himself translates the rules into movements - contrary, parallel and oblique, which informed 
 9  Anderson (1982) explains how difficult it is to allow  oneself to act when the consequences of actions 
 may not be known: ‘Although new productions have to be created sometimes, forming new 
 productions is potentially dangerous. Because new productions have direct control over behaviour, 
 there is the ever-present danger that a new production may wreak great havoc in a system’ (p.380). 
 While it may seem an exaggeration to compare the dangers of a virtual environment (i.e., a wrong 
 harmony in musical improvisation) with the dangers of a physical environment, i.e., crossing a busy 
 road, it is my experience that the same mechanisms of caution and hesitation were automatically 
 triggered in musical learning contexts in which I felt vulnerable to receiving critical feedback. 
 8  I believe  Tillman, Bharucha & Bigand (2000) refer  to a similar type of harmonic perception when 
 they notice how individuals become implicitly sensitive to: ‘the relations between different keys’ and 
 ‘subtle changes in the harmonic function of a target chord’ (p.887). 
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 me how to  act  (thereby successfully translating theoretical knowledge into productions or 
 procedural knowledge for improvisation). By focusing on the concept  1  when I improvised, 
 new material could be generated within the constraints of the style, while at the same time 
 allowing me the freedom to follow my imagination. Once I had sufficient practice in 
 constructing the intervals between the bass line and the chorale melody, I soon found I could 
 construct the inner voices (alto and tenor) of a four-part texture in the same way. Thus, I 
 found a solution to creating four-part harmonisations using Fux’s principles. 
 5.4 Discussion of progress during months 13-17: gaining a conceptual  1  form of cognitive 
 control 
 Throughout this chapter I have described a process of acquiring various rule systems 
 for organising my thoughts and providing a structure to the learning and improvising 
 experience. Like learning a spoken language, I had chosen to improvise within a particular 
 musical system (of diatonic tonality) which was identifiable through numerous stylistic rules 
 functioning at a basic, generic level (i.e., the voice-leading principles of prepared dissonance 
 resolving to consonance) and more specifically through the many different forms and 
 character pieces of the Baroque repertoire. Without any system of rules to my work I realised 
 that everything I did was novel: I was simply ‘wandering inconclusively across a potentially 
 infinite space of possible features’ as Wanner (1986, p.670) describes, unable to form a 
 learning strategy or make an informed musical decision. I had looked for structure and 
 guidance in the ready-made exercises of treatises, but soon rejected these and looked instead 
 for insights through constructing my own reduced scores of compositional models. 
 However, my experience of gaining insights through rules cannot be explained solely 
 through the direction of attentional focus, but also on aspects of agency, imagination and 
 creativity which as demonstrated through my adopting Fux’s (1725/1971) voice-leading 
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 principles. Originally I discovered these rules in their original context (as principles for 
 constructing strict contrapuntal textures in a Renaissance modal style), but, as I was also 
 preoccupied with my harmonisation problems, I also imagined how a bass line could be 
 improvised to a chorale melody in the Baroque style using the same principles. This resulting 
 experience in facilitating new perceptions, conceptual  1  insights and actions for the task of 
 harmonisation can be explored in several ways: (1), that Fux’s rules themselves go some way 
 to translating theoretical knowledge into procedural as he also reduces the rules to directional 
 concepts - direct, parallel, and oblique motion, which could be directly applied to the context 
 of improvisation; (2) that my cognitive demands were reduced through Fux’s rule which only 
 produced appropriate choices for action (i.e., Johnson-Laird’s [2002] neo-Lamarckian 
 algorithm), allowing my imagination freedom to process the task in a new way; (3) that, by 
 creatively applying Fux’s rules to the task I was also able to control the constraints, matching 
 these to my skill level, an important condition of achieving ‘flow states’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 
 1988), thus implying that insights were influenced by agency, control of the stimulus, and 
 positive learning emotions. These three points combine to illustrate how my specifically 
 conceptual  insights might have emerged from a particular  re-creative, imaginative act in 
 which the rule was used as a tool to solve a particular problem (of harmonic construction), 
 corresponding to Vygotsky’s (1986) hypothesis that: ‘concept formation is a creative, not a 
 mechanical passive, process; that a concept emerges and takes shape in the course of a 
 complex operation aimed at the solution of some problem’ (p.99). 
 Learning to become agentic as an improviser can also be seen as an important 
 development in this stage of my learning. Similar to Smilde’s (2008) idea of ‘empowerment’ 
 through significant learning events, or Shevock’s (2018) exploration of expert improvisers’ 
 acquisition of confidence, the events described in this chapter underlie a new approach to 
 learning through a sense of control. Acquiring valuable conceptual  1  perceptions through 
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 being agentic encouraged me to continue in this path. For example, the following extract 
 from my journal illustrates how I now consciously manipulated the task, not only to achieve a 
 particular musical result, but also to perceive new conceptual relationships or features about 
 the task, similar to those I had already observed and assimilated: 
 ‘1. Unable to see connections until the left hand is played on its own. 
 2. Experience offers a completely new perspective to previous mental representation. 
 3. Yet the solution ‘emerges’ through playing left hand alone. It was potentially there 
 all along (implicitly), yet it must be made explicit through a particular process ...’ 
 (Personal notes, 2  nd  January, 2017). 
 The revelation of a ‘solution’ occurred in response to my manipulation of the task as I 
 searched for greater clarity. I was no longer a passive agent reacting as best I could to events 
 as they emerged during the improvisation but was actively searching for information - for a 
 particular way of perceiving relationships in the texture which informed my actions. It is this 
 active searching which now defines my approach to improvising, which Vygotsky (1986) 
 describes as ... the decisive factor in concept formation ... the so-called determining tendency’ 
 (p.99), so that I often aimed at clarifying my thoughts while improvising to match the kind of 
 production system flow of control described by Anderson (1982) so that a harmonisation task 
 might flow in this way: 
 P1 
 IF  the goal is to improvise a bass line to a chorale theme 
 THEN  the subgoal is to calculate the intervals between the notes of the theme 
 and (possible) bass notes 
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 P2 
 IF  the goal is to calculate the intervals between the melody notes and 
 (possible) bass notes 
 THEN  the subgoal is to categorise these intervals in terms of motions - 
 parallel, oblique, contrary 
 P3 
 IF  the goal is to categorise these intervals in terms of motions - parallel, 
 oblique, contrary, And the motion is parallel 
 THEN  the subgoal is to choose a different bass note 
 In this way, through emulating the production system of artificial intelligence models, 
 my improvising became more strategic and I began to acquire a basic vocabulary of patterns 
 and formulas suitable for creating the generic, voice-leading textures of Baroque organ 
 music. 
 5.5 Themes emerging from Chapter 5 (months 13-17) 
 1.  Integration of rules : a period of learning in which  rules were actively sought to 
 organise thoughts and acquire stylistic knowledge. 
 2.  Creative agency and positive emotions : a more agentic  experience through creating 
 rule-based strategies and exercises which consciously manipulated musical elements. 
 With insights emerging from this experience, emotions were more positive and 
 attention more focused on the task. 
 3.  Initial conceptual  1  perceptions of musical structure :  a clear departure from former 
 Werktreue  perceptions of musical structure in which  every element was fixed. 
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 Conceptual  1  impressions emerged only while improvising. Compositional models 
 were now seen in terms of underlying structural and expressive functions. 
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 Chapter 6 
 Generative mental representations and musical form (months 16-30) 
 6.1 Introduction to Chapter 6 
 In this chapter my study took a new direction as I received lessons from an expert 
 Baroque improviser, and participated in a social community of improvisation. These lessons 
 facilitated my development adding new perspectives, techniques and focus to my existing 
 work. The influence of observing other improvisers’ behaviour and improvising myself in 
 public settings helped me to discover a new level of conceptual  1  control over the task 
 allowing me to generate imaginative improvisation within stylistic guidelines. 
 6.1.1 Contextualising my decision to take lessons in Baroque improvisation 
 Up to this point I had wrestled with the learning task in isolation, an approach which I 
 had not questioned as being necessary for the particular kind of focus and conditions I needed 
 as a researcher and adult learner. The question of finding a teacher now arose as I realised I 
 might not acquire all the information I needed in isolation. So far my solitary approach had 
 proved fruitful and I had overcome the worst of my cognitive and emotional difficulties and 
 placed my learning on a more strategy-orientated learning path through my own efforts. 
 However, through my studies I was also becoming more informed about the cultural practice 
 of organ improvisation, its long traditions of performance and pedagogy which (in Germany 
 and France in particular) remained unbroken until this day  10  . My visit to the improvisation 
 10  Tandberg (2008) gives a detailed account of these traditions. In Germany, following a perceived 
 decline in organ improvisation and liturgical playing in the 18th century, teachers such as Johann 
 Georg Herzog (1822-1909) and Josef Rheinberger (1839-1901), revived the old traditions of Chorale 
 harmonisation and variation, also improvising free Fantasias (Preludes) and Fugues. Herzog traced his 
 own musical training through a succession of teachers through to J.S.Bach himself, and expressed this 
 by ‘employing Bach’s forms and compositional techniques for his own music’ (Tandberg, 2008, 
 p.125). This lineage was continued through his own students until the present. 
 The French tradition originates in a cultural resurgence following the devastation to churches, organs 
 and liturgical music at the end of the 18th century (Ochse, 1994). This revival (which runs parallel to 
 the German tradition) flourished through the improvisation, repertoire and composition classes of the 
 Paris Conservatoire (founded in 1795) producing many multi-faceted musicians who counted 
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 festival in the Gedächtniskirche in Berlin (see para.4.3.1) with its opportunities to watch 
 masterclasses and recitals was also an influence as I noticed how professors and students 
 handled the instrument in a different way to myself, and referred to patterns of behaviour and 
 techniques of which I knew nothing. For example, tasks were given such as ‘improvise a 
 Chorale Prelude on the theme …’ and the student would immediately select certain stops and 
 arrange the musical material in ways which seemed to be shared by the professor and the 
 other students. The students were also clearly used to improvising in public, whereas I was 
 still much too frightened to attempt this. If my long term intention was to appear in public as 
 an expert in Baroque improvisation it seemed important to inform myself about such 
 techniques and cultural practices, also to learn how to perform and communicate my skills to 
 listeners. 
 6.1.2 Defining the relationship between the lessons and my self-study 
 I still feel lucky to have met and received lessons from Prof. Jürgen Essl, who was not 
 only an inspirational organist, composer and improviser, but also a sympathetic teacher who 
 responded to my needs as an adult learner. Initially I was nervous about a potential return to 
 the apprentice-master relationships of my youth (which had often been difficult and 
 counter-productive) as I didn’t want to be dominated by the teacher’s personality, or be 
 forced to complete many basic, prescribed exercises through a fixed pedagogic method  11  . 
 11  Apart from my own experience with the prescribed exercises of the improvisation treatises already 
 discussed, I had also heard other people talk of study experiences within institutions being highly 
 regularised. One expert improviser giving a public masterclass described being made to study the 
 endless scale harmonisation exercises of Dupré (1975), while Tandberg (2008) also describes fixed 
 pedagogical methods:such as those received by Heinz Wunderlich (1919-2012) in classes with Karl 
 Hoyer (1891-1936) at the Leipzig Conservatoire: ‘The initial lessons with Hoyer involved playing 
 chorales from written harmonisations. Next was the task of adding ornamentation to the chorale 
 melodies, still using written harmonisations ...These initial exercises employed passing notes to 
 ornament three against one, or quaver triplets against crotchets. So the exercise was repeated with two 
 against one, and afterwards with four against one – in other words quavers and semiquavers against 
 improvisation as one of their skills. Organists such as Louis-James-Alfred Lefébure-Wély 
 (1817-1869), César Franck (1822-1890); later Marcel Dupré (1886-1971) and Olivier Messiaen 
 (1908-1992) developed a grand, symphonic style of improvisation which was supported by the 
 technical innovations and characteristic timbre of the organs designed by Aristide Cavaillé-Coll 
 (1811-1899). For myself, I was more interested in studying the German tradition than the French, 
 hence my focus on German Baroque models and my choice of German institution and Professor. 
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 Fortunately, once the lessons began, I discovered that Jürgen’s approach corresponded, rather 
 than interfered, with my own patterns of learning established throughout the previous year. 
 The schedule of lessons was not overwhelming (I received only ten hours in total spread over 
 a period of fourteen months), which allowed me time and freedom to absorb the information 
 into my own playing; and, in addition, Jürgen respected my previous experience as a 
 performer and was interested in my specific questions regarding improvisation. Rather than 
 use a fixed method, he taught me the skills I wanted to learn, explaining the constructive 
 techniques and performance traditions of the Baroque in terms of techniques suitable for 
 improvisation. 
 In the following paragraphs, wherever relevant, I try to be clear what are the strategies 
 and techniques I learnt from Jürgen and what arose from my own learning experience.  In 
 general  the tuition deepened my understanding of the  relevant characteristics of national 
 styles, forms and genres of the Baroque organ repertoire. Although I was already working 
 with underlying concepts  1  my lessons gave me a new  level of conceptual  1  control as I 
 watched the actions and approach of an expert involved in the task. It is this theme of 
 conceptual  1  control which, under Jürgen’s tuition,  comes to define my new abilities in 
 improvising imaginatively yet also within stylistic guidelines, which dominates this chapter. 
 6.2 Lessons with Jürgen Essl 
 I started lessons with Professor Jürgen Essl in the third month of my second year of 
 study. Needless to say, the first lesson was the most difficult! I had never before improvised 
 in a Baroque style in public, and was very nervous about the results. My first task was to play 
 a free Prelude in Baroque style, and I was so anxious about Jürgen’s feedback that I found it 
 impossible to know what to do. When I started playing it sounded like a well-known Prelude 
 by a French 20th century composer which made me even more confused. Should I try and 
 crotchets’ (p.159-60). Although these exercises are typical of those I devised for myself or studied 
 with Jürgen, the freedom to choose what and when to do these tasks I found invaluable. 
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 change the style, or keep going in this neo-Baroque style? I tried to keep going but in a 
 faltering, incompetent way. My hard won knowledge and techniques acquired in private 
 seemed to fade away as soon as I had to improvise a defined task. Jürgen, however, was very 
 calm and patient (as he remained throughout all my lessons). His first observation was that 
 my approach to improvisation was ‘chaotic’, that I needed to clarify my thoughts and to 
 simplify my goals. Although this was disappointing (for I had been consciously trying to 
 clarify my goals for some time [see Table 1]) I soon learnt to calm down, and draw on my 
 existing knowledge, gradually integrating this with the many new techniques and behaviours 
 I learnt through Jürgen’s tuition. 
 6.2.1 Extending the knowledge base 
 I soon realised that Jürgen’s knowledge of the Baroque organ repertoire greatly 
 exceeded my own. His criticisms and suggestions were accompanied by relevant historical 
 and cultural facts; he knew the biographies and characters of the composers whose models we 
 studied, and he also had a technical knowledge of organ construction. He knew the musical 
 models we were studying inside out, not just from performing and teaching it, but also from 
 studying its compositional and constructive principles on which he improvised. For example, 
 he described typical cadences explaining how these could be used to structure many of the 
 phrases in music of this period; stylistic embellishments and ornaments were written out as he 
 showed me which were used for ascending intervals and which for descending; he also had a 
 way of identifying certain pieces by characteristic features of rhythm, melody or registration 
 which he then used for constructing improvisations in a similar style. For example, in my first 
 lesson he introduced a way of treating dissonance known as  durezze et ligature  which serves 
 as a method  12  for generating a dissonant, expressive  Prelude or Toccata in the Italian style; in 
 12  This term was reserved in Italian keyboard music for particularly harsh and chromatic dissonance. 
 Jürgen’s interpretation of this compositional style was to construct a dissonant harmony on every main 
 beat of a duple time movement, resolving this to a consonant on every (succeeding) weak beat. Thus 
 the music was constructed through dissonance as the main focus of attention. 
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 another lesson he showed me how to recreate the imaginative pauses and unprepared 
 dissonance of the  stylus fantasticus  typical of Dietrich  Buxtehude’s organ Preludes. Whereas 
 I had aimed for an indeterminate or universal Baroque texture, Jürgen spoke of different 
 national styles: the Italian, French or German Baroque style, which could be wonderfully 
 demonstrated in the room where we worked - this room containing various large working 
 organs representative of all of these different nationalities! Thus, through these lessons I 
 considerably increased what Pressing (1998) refers to as the improviser’s  knowledge base , 
 including the ‘musical materials and excerpts, repertoire, sub skills, perceptual strategies, 
 problem-solving routines …’ (p.53) on which more advanced skills can develop. 
 During these first lessons I was especially influenced by the wonderfully grand, 
 statuesque, chromatic and colourful repertoire of the French Baroque composers such as 
 Nicolas de Grigny [1672-1703], Claude Balbastre [1724-1799], and Louis Marchant 
 [1669-1732]); but, these preferences aside, I now began a period of concentrated study of 
 Baroque organ repertoire as I also began practising a series of tasks set me by Jürgen. These 
 tasks I now list in Table 2, which it may be useful to compare with a similar summary of 
 tasks (see Table 1) from several months earlier in my private study. 
 Table 2 
 An overview of models, representative composers and improvisational tasks studied in 
 lessons with Jürgen Essl 
 Musical models  Composers  Representative tasks 
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 German Baroque 
 Preludes and Toccatas  Georg Muffat (1653-1704) 
 Dieterich Buxtehude 
 (c,1637-1707) 
 Georg Böhm (1661-1733) 
 - to modulate first to the dominant, not 
 to the subdominant 
 - to limit figurations used 
 - to identify and learn typical cadences 
 - to restrict texture to not more than four 
 parts 
 - to make use of short, contrasting 
 sections 
 - to sometimes use the  stylus fantasticus 
 Fugues  Georg Muffat (1653-1704) 
 Dieterich Buxtehude 
 (c,1637-1707) 
 Georg Böhm (1661-1733) 
 Johann Pachelbel (1653-1706) 
 -  to construct ‘tonal’ and ‘real’ 
 answers to Fugue subjects 
 -  to introduce thematic entrances in 
 different registers of the keyboard 
 Chorale Variations  Johann Sebastian Bach 
 (1685-1750) 
 Johann Pachelbel (1653-1706) 
 -  to use two different voicings when 
 practising harmonising: (i) with 
 three voices (SAT) in the right 
 hand, and one (B) in the left hand; 
 (ii) with two voices in each hand 
 (SA in the right hand, TB in the left 
 hand) 
 -  to write down a good Chorale 
 harmonisation, and use this for 
 practising the variations. 
 -  to use linear motions between the 
 parts when copying J.S.Bach as a 
 model. 
 -  to study and copy characteristic 
 variations: typical figurations, 
 rhythmic devices, constructive 
 devices, registrations and so on. 
 French Baroque 
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 Preludes (plein jeu; 
 grand jeu) 
 Nicolas de Grigny 
 (1672-1703) 
 Louis Marchand (1669-1732) 
 François Couperin 
 (1668-1733) 
 -  to make use of rich dissonant 
 harmonies (2nd inversion chords, 
 diminished 7th and 9th) 
 -  to continually establish dissonant 
 intervals which either resolve onto 
 consonant intervals, or onto new 
 dissonant intervals 
 -  to use typical registrations. 
 Duos, Trios  Nicolas de Grigny 
 (1672-1703) 
 Louis Marchand (1669-1732) 
 François Couperin 
 (1668-1733) 
 -  to study and use typical 
 ornamentations, figurations and 
 registrations for the different solos 
 involved. 
 Improvised 
 counterpoint over 
 Gregorian cantus 
 firmus 
 Nicolas de Grigny 
 (1672-1703) 
 Louis Marchand (1669-1732) 
 François Couperin 
 (1668-1733) 
 -  to study the main constructive 
 features of the style, the setting of 
 the cantus firmus as semibreves 
 with surrounding accompaniment; 
 the registrations involved. 
 -  to practice the characteristic 
 preparation of dissonance and its 
 resolution. 
 -  to practice constructing harmony 
 around the cantus firmus 
 Italian Baroque 
 Toccatas  Girolamo Frescobaldi 
 (1583-1643) 
 -  to improvise a particular genre of 
 Prelude called  durezze et ligature 
 which continuously establishes new 
 dissonant intervals, within a 
 four-part texture 
 Concertos  Antonio Vivaldi (1678-1741)  -  to alternate tutti with solo sections 
 -  to use distinctive registrations, 
 themes and figurations 
 170 
 6.2.2 Discovering the expressive role of registration 
 During my lessons Jürgen would often introduce a task through the use of a particular 
 registration. For example, when improvising a contrapuntal accompaniment to a Gregorian 
 chant melody, set as a cantus firmus (in the French Baroque style), we began by setting a 
 typical  plein jeux  registration: 16’, 8’, 4’, 2’ with  added mixtures, in the manuals, with a high, 
 bright cornet (4’ or 8’) for the melody of the cantus firmus which was played in the pedals. 
 While, for an opening Prelude (again from a French Baroque Suite), a  grand jeux  could be 
 constructed from powerful reed stops: the Clarion (4’), Prestant (4’), Trompette (8’) or 
 Basson (8’ or 16’). So powerful and distinctive are these registrations that I began to realise 
 how much of an improvisation can be influenced through the choice of stops used. For 
 example, in the case of the  grand jeux , the sheer  weight and complexity of the sound gives a 
 visceral, plastic quality to the sensation of harmonisation; it inspires one to amass dissonance, 
 revelling in the clash of massed harmonics produced by the mixture stops. These 
 registrations, played in a resonant acoustic, also require pauses for the sound to clear, so that 
 dotted rhythms and chromatic leaps typical of the characteristic French  Ouverture  come 
 naturally to one’s hands. 
 Similarly, when improvising a Chorale Partita in the German Baroque style, Jürgen 
 showed me how a choice of figuration or texture was inseparable from the choice of 
 registration used to realise them. Solo stops, such as the Quint 2 ⅔ or Nasat 2 ⅔ having a 
 resonant, expressive colour are used for slower paced variations than the Mixtur 1 ⅓, Tertia 1 
 ⅗ or Sifflöte 1, which, being much brighter and thinner in quality, would be used for 
 fast-paced, nimble figurations. In this way I started to move away from the rather abstracted 
 approach to Baroque improvisation (which characterised my former private study) towards a 
 more informed approach based in my experience of performing the Baroque repertoire on 
 historic instruments. Matching registrations with the musical texture of the models added a 
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 tactile, sensory level of information to the improvising which inspired and guided my work. 
 Rather than calculating harmonic intervals in a purely academic, theoretical fashion, my 
 improvising began to resemble the kind of creative modelling typical of the Baroque period 
 itself, in which composers resorted to the sound and feel of their instruments, blending this 
 with knowledge of existing templates of compositional types to quickly construct  ad hoc 
 musical structures suitable for each occasion. 
 6.2.3 Refining skills in harmonisation 
 It should be recalled (see Para.2.3.6) that I had adopted Fux’s (1725/1971) rules or 
 principles for intervallic motion in order to develop more fluency and control over 
 harmonisation and constructing stylistic Baroque keyboard textures in four parts. One of the 
 first tasks which Jürgen set for me was the harmonisation of a Chorale theme. This I did as 
 best I could, constructing each harmony as I went along and using Fux’s principles. Jürgen 
 made a few stylistic suggestions to improve my harmonisation (for example, he suggested 
 thinking of one tonality for each phrase so that harmonies within the phrase belonged to that 
 tonality, rather than veering off into modulations) and then asked me to repeat the Chorale 
 theme using the same choice of harmonies as before. This however I found impossible as I 
 had no recollection of my former harmonisation! Because I had simply created each harmony 
 in an ad hoc fashion as I went along, proceeding note by note as it were, without a system or 
 meaning behind my choices, I had no understanding, no memory for what I had created. 
 Jürgen now began to teach me how to memorise my harmonisations and to become aware of 
 an overall harmonic plan for the chorale. 
 My first task then was to write out a harmonic solution which could be used as a basis 
 for variations (a Chorale Partita). Although this compositional approach might be thought to 
 reintroduce attitudes of  Werktreue  perfection I had  recently overcome, I found the exercise 
 valuable in defining and refining my choices of harmonic progressions and for understanding 
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 the consequences of different choices in detail (for example, writing out allowed me to study 
 the progressions of inner voices, or to reflect on the relationship between one phrase and the 
 whole Chorale). The opportunity to deliberate and reflect over harmonic decisions in a more 
 systematic way was therefore productive for me at this stage, and I consequently spent much 
 time writing out harmonisations over the following months, also using my hands to test many 
 different possibilities before arriving at a final version. Thus, through mixing exploratory 
 improvising with written work, I gained a great deal of clarity in my Chorale harmonisations. 
 Returning to the organ, my written harmonisations exercises were now elaborated by 
 different physical renditions. Whereas I had previously harmonised a four-part texture (I refer 
 to these parts as Soprano, Alto, Tenor and Bass, abbreviated to SATB) using just the hands, 
 Jürgen asked me first to harmonise playing two parts (SA) with the right hand, one with the 
 left hand (T) and one with the feet (B). Following this I had to play one voice (S) as a solo in 
 the right hand on a different manual, two voices (AT) with the left hand, and one (B) in the 
 pedals as before; following this, the top voice (S) was played in the pedals, the Alto with the 
 right hand, Tenor and Bass in the left hand. These different voicings forced me to work 
 harder at constructing each harmony, in particular the movement of the voices as I progressed 
 from one harmony to another, and so I became increasingly adept in both representing 
 (mentally) a harmonisation and performing it through improvising. (See  Video_2  for two 
 different voicings and harmonisations of the chorale melody ‘Erschienen is der herrlich Tag’) 
 Over time, these exercises changed my perspective of harmonising a Chorale theme. 
 Whereas previously I had harmonised each moment or motion as it appeared, I now saw the 
 chorale in terms of phrases, each phrase signifying a sequence of related harmonies and 
 harmonic decisions. I could plan each cadence or modulation to a related key as a structural 
 point within the whole framework, rather than grabbing any expedient solution; my memory 
 for certain harmonies increased as I perceived them more meaningfully, through their 
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 expressive function within the phrase (which I voiced internally as: ‘to stabilise a phrase, to 
 modulate expressively, to start, finish, or continue a phrase’ etc.). Thus, Jürgen’s strategies for 
 harmonising initiated processes of memory and meaning, which relate to cognitive theories of 
 memory  chunking . Tandberg (2008) explains how these  processes affect the improviser’s 
 perspective of events: … ‘chunking in improvisation refers to the process whereby we look 
 back over the course of events whilst simultaneously looking forwards. Thus the music we 
 are playing, or imagining at a moment, remains a part of what has gone before. What we are 
 in the process of doing takes place in relation to what has just occurred as well as that which 
 is coming later’ (p.235). This process of gradual memory formation, its effect on automaticity 
 and role in an expert’s improvising knowledge, I later discuss in more detail (see Chapter 7). 
 6.2.4 Developments in conceptual  1  control over the  improvisation 
 Jürgen’s style of teaching relied primarily upon demonstrating what was possible in 
 improvising. He described actions in terms of opportunities rather than rules; even when rules 
 were unavoidable, they were discussed more as guides or solutions for making one’s 
 improvising more stylistic or coherent rather than abstract, coercive commands. This 
 non-coercive approach was reflected in the language used: a characteristic “You  could  do this 
 [demonstrating a solution] … or this ...” rather than “you  must  do this”. In spite of his 
 rigorous knowledge of the Baroque idiom he seemed to condense and reduce the theoretical 
 rules to a minimum, introducing these only when it was relevant to the style or genre. Thus 
 his teaching was always aimed at facilitating action, for I found it hard to introduce new rules 
 into my improvising  13  , and one highly relevant rule  which could be both mentally sustained 
 and  translated into action, was worth more than many  abstract, complex and theoretical rules 
 which overburdened my cognitive perception of the task and interfered with my performance. 
 13  My experience of the difficulties of introducing  new rules into my improvising I also saw replicated 
 in other students’ lessons and masterclasses. It recalls Paradis’ (1994) statement in relation to 
 language performance, that: ‘the speaker may  either  use automatic processes  or  controlled processes, 
 but not both at the same time’ (p.404). 
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 It was through this practical, imaginative and facilitating connection of theory to 
 action that I realised I was developing a more conceptual  1  control over my improvising, for 
 with Jürgen it became a routine aspect of the lesson to abstract relevant features from the 
 musical texture, and to apply these features as general rules for steering my actions closer to 
 the model. This relationship between the specific to the general encouraged a specifically 
 conceptual  1  quality to the mental representations  we were using (in that we interpreted a 
 specific feature into a general rule which was then used to improvise similar specific 
 features). In a similar way to my adoption of Fux’s (1725/1971) principles for intervallic 
 motion, I felt liberated in that I could use my imagination while simultaneously following the 
 constraints of the model. The effect was to bring the experience of improvisation closer to the 
 original compositional model, and it  sometimes felt to me as if I was making creative 
 musical decisions in the same way as the composer. 
 For example, improvising a Chorale Partita (a set of variations based on a Chorale) 
 began with the exercises in harmonisation already described, so that I worked on a particular 
 harmonisation until I was satisfied with it. Then taking this harmonisation as a written model, 
 Jürgen demonstrated how different figurations could be introduced without disturbing the 
 harmonic flow. Thus, the harmonisation itself became conceptual  1  providing a basic mental 
 structure on which variation could occur. The individual variations might then be introduced 
 through a particular registration combined with a motivic idea, these features also used 
 conceptually  1  to construct new textures wherever possible  (opportunistically) over and 
 through the basic harmonisation. Complexity of counterpoint, virtuosity, perfection of form 
 were thus reached by degrees, while conscious attention was always directed towards simple, 
 attainable goals. 
 Another example of this simple, conceptual  1  approach  can be seen in Jürgen’s 
 introduction to Fugue improvisation which I had previously experienced as the most complex 
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 of tasks. Taking the Fugue we began with a harmonisation task in which the theme appeared 
 in each part of a four-voice  14  texture. In this way  I established a basic harmonic concept  1 
 (similar to the Chorale variations) which allowed me to construct the other voices around the 
 theme whenever or wherever it was introduced. After this, the Fugue exposition was 
 constructed through a strict scheme in which each voice took the theme, one after another, 
 finishing with a four-part texture. Following the strict rule of opening voice entrances, the 
 Fugue construction was quite free: we avoided introducing the theme in the same way (which 
 would be boring), exploring different registers instead; free, sequential material was used to 
 join up the different voice entrances, and I tried to finish in the same key as I started! Thus, 
 although the Fugue as a genre can be extremely rule-based and challenging, this introductory 
 approach to improvising a Fugue was creative, liberating and manageable in terms of 
 constraints. 
 Of course these simple, effective instructions describe only the conscious, explicit 
 part of the task, in effect the tip of the iceberg. Although I was mostly focused on these 
 conscious rules and stylistic constraints I also realised that there was a more implicit part of 
 the work on which I was less focused. This included skills, productions and knowledge 
 already acquired, which were automatically drawn on while trying to respond to Jürgen’s new 
 suggestions. A great deal of information was also communicated through Jürgen’s 
 demonstrations at the organ. Watching him harmonise a Chorale theme with a particular 
 movement of the fingers or improvise the opening of a Fugue, timing the voice entrances in a 
 certain way; noticing the way he ‘reached’ for a musical idea, articulated a motif, maintained 
 a level of focus, energy and flow while improvising, taught me many things about the task 
 which we never explicitly discussed. Thus, even when constraints were explicit and simple, 
 14  I refer to the origins of the Fugue as found in the imitative vocal writing of the Renaissance. 
 Therefore it is customary to think of Fugue texture in terms of Soprano, Alto, Tenor and Bass voices. 
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 their effectiveness should be understood against a backdrop of rich and complex sources of 
 information, much of which was implicitly communicated through demonstration. 
 6.2.5 Summary of Jürgen’s lessons and their influence on my learning 
 There’s no doubt that my studies in improvisation, which had previously been guided 
 by my own inclinations and insights, now developed greatly over this period of fourteen 
 months in which I received lessons. Although the hours of tuition were not many and the 
 lessons widely spread I received a great deal of relevant and effective information about 
 Baroque musical forms, organ registration, and typical approaches to improvisation (within 
 the Baroque style) which mobilised my existing skills and transformed my approach to the 
 task. I was better able to contextualise my work through comparing my own efforts to the 
 students and teachers I observed; I gained a sense of shared difficulties as I watched others 
 mustering up the courage to experiment in front of their teachers, or wrestle with problems of 
 coordination as they tried to assimilate a new idea into existing productions. The students I 
 spoke to opened up about their experience of learning to improvise: some were enthusiastic 
 about it, hoping to become experts like their teachers, others only improvised because they 
 had to, as it was one of the disciplines of their course on which they would be examined. 
 These conversations (see Appendix D) gave me an impression of different experiences and 
 approaches to improvisation which I was able to contrast and compare with my own. 
 6.2.5.1 Participation in a learning community 
 As a fellow student, a participant in the learning-teaching cycle, I was in a privileged 
 position, giving me ‘direct entry into the performance event’ as Baily (2001, p.96) remarks, 
 for I not only gained access to dialogues of learning and information exchange which were 
 normally hidden, but also, through my own learning experience I found I could contextualise 
 and interpret what I saw. For example, early on in my visits I witnessed an advanced student 
 rehearsing an improvisation of a large-scale sonata form. Although the techniques used and 
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 the romantic style of the improvisation were far in advance of my own skills as an 
 improviser, I perceived that the cognitive processes behind the performance was similar to 
 those which I was beginning to develop in my own playing. I particularly remember an 
 exchange between the student and professor about the opening of the fourth movement 
 which, after a grand opening, introduced a four-voiced fugue subject. The professor made 
 several suggestions for registration, and for the timing of voice entries in the fugue; and each 
 time he made a suggestion the student returned to a certain point and tried the same section 
 again. What impressed me was the conceptual nature of the performance and the 
 understanding between the student and professor: they were able to discuss the structure of 
 the piece, the form, the gestures or registration used, yet every time the student played the 
 notes were different! Each improvisation was clearly created upon a conceptual structure 
 which could, in its underlying features, be shared between the two musicians. 
 6.2.5.2 Witnessing the ‘operational’ knowledge of improvisation 
 In this way, becoming a part of this community, even as a part-time student, added 
 depth to my experience as I witnessed a tradition of improvising which extended back in 
 Germany to the Baroque era. Watching people tackle the various tasks and models of 
 improvisation gave structure and clarity to my growing knowledge base. It was a peculiarly 
 ‘operational’ knowledge which recalled Baily’s (2008) phrase: ‘the structure of the music 
 comes to be apprehended operationally, in terms of what you  do , and by implication, what 
 you have to  know ’ (p.122). Thus, by watching Jürgen  and colleagues approach the organ, 
 select registration and begin improvising a Fugue, or free Prelude or Chorale Vorspiel I saw 
 their cognition in action. Each task, I perceived, could be distinguished by a set of cognitive 
 models and behaviours: for example, a free Prelude meant prioritising learnt productions 
 allowing the fingers ‘to run’, while also focusing on certain opening moves, serving (for 
 example) to establish the tonic key; a Fugue, on the other hand, involved a more studied 
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 approach as it was necessary to understand the harmonic implications of the theme before 
 starting, while the improvisation also needed careful treatment of voice entrances, leading 
 these towards modulatory points and so on. This operational knowledge thus informed me 
 about the flow of energy and cognition: how players divided their attention between their 
 memorised productions and the constraints of a particular task; how they found solutions to 
 problems in the moment and got out of unexpected difficulties; how they stole time to plan 
 their next moves, balanced risks against certainty, and so on. In this way I also gained an 
 impression of the different levels of performance (of students progressing through stages of 
 learning, of the different professors and experts), the expectations of improvisation shared 
 between, and thus how each improvisation that I witnessed related to a communal language 
 of musical style, structure and behaviour. 
 6.2.5.3 Gaining a sense of performance 
 Thus, through the experience of individual lessons and the exposure to a pedagogic 
 culture of historical improvisation, my own improvising gained a new focus and clearer 
 goals. Ultimately it showed me how to bring my improvising to some kind of performance as 
 there was no place in my lessons with Jürgen for the rambling, reflective improvising I had 
 been doing in private. Each task began with some kind of improvised performance, either 
 demonstrated by Jürgen or attempted by myself. However hopeless or confused the attempt 
 might be, Jürgen always encouraged me to continue until the end; I couldn’t just stop in the 
 middle, but must always create a whole structure, i.e., to find my way back to the tonic key 
 and produce a cadence, or continue a variation until the last note of the Chorale theme. Thus 
 the discipline was good for me at this stage as (once I calmed down and found a way of 
 accessing my procedural knowledge) I found I had sufficient experience and knowledge from 
 my private studies to sustain me. Thus, after a year of self-study and practice, I had sufficient 
 ability in my improvising to respond to Jürgen’s suggestions, while my experience in 
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 self-reflection and analysis of my learning (through the methodology of the study) helped me 
 to contextualise and process new advice and criticisms of my performance productively. 
 Although, as an adult learner with considerable experience as a performing musician, it might 
 have been difficult for me to adopt a student’s role, my own preparation along with my 
 respect for Jürgen’s abilities and knowledge (not to mention my own ambition to learn and 
 develop) helped me through these difficulties. 
 6.2.5.4 Acquiring the basis of a generative model for improvising 
 Jürgen and I never spoke explicitly about the cognitive details of my research such as 
 conceptual  1  control, mental representation or learning  emotion, for the simple reason that I 
 was at this time more focused on the practical skills of improvisation and later developed a 
 theoretical explanation for the process of skill acquisition (mainly through the process of 
 writing up the thesis). However I realised, even at this stage, that Jürgen’s way of improvising 
 involved a very particular cognitive model, based on the conceptual  1  discoveries I had 
 already discovered (see Chap.5). This is not surprising at one level because both Jürgen and I 
 were engaged in the same task of improvising on stylistic models, thus our cognitive 
 approach involved the same production model, or ‘operational’ knowledge which Baily 
 (2008) describes. The fact that Jürgen, as my teacher, was more advanced than me, does not 
 alter this connection between us, for I believe we were both passionately interested in the 
 relationship between the compositional model and how this provided a basis for creative 
 improvisation, and also in obtaining clarity about this process, i.e., identifying rules and 
 concepts  1  which served to guide our actions. Jürgen,  so he told me, had been a very careful 
 and diligent student, and I believe this gave him clear insights into the task of reconstructing 
 a style or model which I found enormously effective. In this sense my description of Jürgen’s 
 approach recalls Baily’s (2001) description of his second teacher Amir Jan: ‘[Jan] had learned 
 the music via the theory, and it is probable that these cognitive processes were built up 
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 around it, so that in musical performance he invoked the theory at a cognitive level’ (p.94). 
 Whereas other students described their teachers as brilliant and intuitive improvisers who 
 lacked the ability to articulate their knowledge, I appreciated Jürgen’s ability to organise my 
 cognitive approach to an improvisation around a few principles, clearly emphasising what to 
 do in terms of actions. 
 6.3 Returning to self-study: generating my own concepts  1  for improvisation 
 It might be thought that once my time as a Kontaktstudent was finished at Stuttgart I 
 would have felt bereft of guidance, but this was not the case. On the contrary, having learned 
 so much I was eager to continue my studies in my own way, using the insights I had gained 
 from my lessons with Jürgen to develop my skills towards communicative performance. In 
 the following paragraphs I relate how I returned to my private studies and learnt how to 
 generate my own stylistic improvisations, selecting features from Baroque models through 
 techniques I had learnt in Stuttgart, using my own analyses and practice strategies. 
 6.3.1 Modelling a French-style  Plein jeu 
 Soon after my period of study in Stuttgart I was improvising a French Prelude (called 
 Plein jeu  - meaning full organ) using, as a model,  the opening movement of Louis 
 Marchand’s 1.ere Livre d’órgue (see Figure 12). This type of Prelude was new to me, and I 
 recorded my first impressions: ... ‘static, majestic, chordal, based upon inner workings and 
 strivings by circuitous routes to some triumphant and unexpected conclusion. It is at once 
 mysterious and massively convincing’ (Personal notes, 6th April, 2018). 
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 Figure 12.  Opening bars of a Plein jeu by Louis Marchand  (1669-1732), From Archives des 
 Maîtres de l’Orgue (Vol.3, p.1), by A. Guilmant and A. Pirro, 1901, Paris: A.Durand & Fils.. 
 My problem was that, while I admired the style, I did not understand how the music 
 was constructed, i.e., the creative principles by which Marchand created these effects; and 
 when I tried to improvise my own version I felt the results were not convincing. I therefore 
 made several analyses of the Prelude, and also wrote out several passages by hand which 
 allowed me to study features of the style such as the contours of the bass (pedal) lines, and 
 the contrapuntal relationship between these and  other voices. Regarding the movement of 
 harmony in the Prelude, I noticed that ... ‘the harmony stays around a delimited area, ... So, 
 one doesn’t simply spin off into remote keys. The insistence upon certain chords and the way 
 in which these composers return to I, IV and V is an expressive feature’ (Personal notes, 6th 
 April, 2018). As a preliminary exercise then, I created a reduced score over which I could 
 improvise the remaining material (see  Audio_6 ) 
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 Figure 13 . A reduced score of a Plein Jeu by Louis  Marchand (1669-1732) as a template for 
 improvisation. 
 Yet, this analysis, while allowing me to assimilate many features of the model, did not 
 provide me with the insights I needed into the characteristic harmonic movement, ‘the inner 
 workings and strivings by circuitous routes’ that had originally inspired me. Therefore I made 
 a different analysis of the harmonic movement between each chord which I wrote in closed 
 position (i.e., with all the relevant notes as close together as can be written) on one stave. 
 Figure 14 . Harmonic motion illustrated as closed-position  chords in a Plein Jeu by Louis 
 Marchand (1669-1732). 
 The use of closed-position chords allowed me to perceive and thus achieve a clearer 
 mental representation of the relationships of dissonance to consonance which characterise 
 this opening passage. This mental representation now provided explicit instructions for the 
 improvisation: (i) over a tonic pedal note, play mainly tonic and subdominant chords. From 
 these (ii) create a dissonant harmonic movement which resolves immediately back to the 
 tonic or sub-dominant, or may resolve via another dissonant harmonic movement. The 
 implicit part of these instructions included the usual stylistic constraints (although the 
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 four-part texture of the hands is unusually expanded by two pedal parts in this example), but 
 also distinctive timings (for example, the repeated rhythm of half-note to two quarter-notes in 
 each bar) and linear, chromatic movement of the inner voices which I retained through 
 performing the model reiteratively in between improvisations (see  Audio_7  for an example of 
 this improvisation). 
 6.3.2 Defining the mental representations of generative concepts  1  for 
 improvisation 
 As the previous example shows, an important part of the work at this stage was 
 finding a good and effective way to mentally represent the characteristic features selected 
 from the model. A mental representation needed to be cognitively ‘light’ (so as not to 
 overload my processing of the task) and capture something essential about the model which 
 allowed it to be recreated, organising my procedural knowledge in ways which 
 simultaneously kept my imagination free. This representation was thus not binding towards 
 particular notes, but usually conveyed something in the nature of a relationship, as in the 
 example before it captured the patterns of dissonance within a sequence of harmonies. 
 The role of mental representation is also recognised in skill-learning literature. Gobet (2016), 
 for example, proposes: ‘Good representations offer at least four advantages: (a) they provide 
 access to relevant knowledge while allowing flexibility in its use; (b) they enable the 
 application of efficient search methods; (c) they make it possible to decompose problems into 
 subproblems where specific solving techniques can be applied; finally, (d) they make it 
 possible to coordinate several problem spaces that are a priori unconnected, something that is 
 particularly important with ill-defined problems’ (p.73). 
 As I became more aware of research into mental representations and their role in skill 
 learning, I decided to investigate my own mental representations which I used for 
 improvising. I was not only curious to clarify the kind of representations I used, I also wanted 
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 to better understand the relationship between my representations of the task and my 
 performance. As Anderson (1980) states: ‘if one’s goal is to develop a theory of the 
 connections between stimuli and responses, it helps to have a model of the structures and 
 processes intervening between stimuli and responses (p.1). Capturing the way I thought about 
 improvising was a rewarding but also challenging task. As I set about writing, drawing, 
 describing my conscious impressions I realised that there were insurmountable limitations to 
 the exercise. For example: (i) in a complex task such as musical improvisation, mental 
 representation will be too numerous, rapid and fluid to be contained within one form of 
 representation; (ii) that a great deal of information is represented implicitly and is therefore 
 not available to consciousness particularly as skills become more automated and fluent; (it 
 might have been easier to capture my representations of the task at earlier learning stages 
 when all my actions were consciously and effortfully constructed); and (iv) that the act of 
 describing one’s mental representation tended to affect the representation itself, thus it was 
 difficult to capture a ‘pure’ representation without the feeling that I had contrived it in some 
 way. However, in spite of these reservations, the exercise manages to convey the kinds of 
 images and ideas on which I improvised and thus illustrates something about my perception 
 of certain tasks of improvisation during this time. 
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 Figure 15 . A graphic layout of a Fugue theme (centre)  with improvised counter-subjects, 
 used to develop and organise musical material. 
 6.3.3 Using Anderson’s (1983) three codes of knowledge representation 
 Figure 15 demonstrates the use of a graphic layout in working out a Fugue theme and 
 its counter-subjects. I often worked out the possibilities of a Fugue theme in this way: by 
 placing the theme in alignment with the counter-themes the relationships between the themes 
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 can be more easily visualised, counter-subjects can be worked out in direct reference to the 
 theme, variations of themes more easily calculated, and the intervals of dissonance and 
 consonance more clearly understood. As a result of drawing Fugue themes and their 
 derivative counter-subjects in this way I developed clearer mental representation of important 
 thematic relationships. Anderson (1983), the author of ACT (the Adaptive Control of 
 Thought), includes mental images in his ‘tri-code theory’ of knowledge representation: ‘This 
 theory assumes three codes or representational types: a temporal string, which encodes the 
 order of a set of items, a spatial image, which encodes spatial configuration; and an abstract 
 proposition, which encodes meaning’ (p.45). It is on these three codes that the following 
 discussion is based. 
 6.3.3.1 Images 
 Figure 16 . A graphic representation of the opening  section of an improvised Prelude in G 
 minor. 
 The graphics of Figure 16 captured my initial impression of the opening bars I wanted 
 to improvise: the use of the G minor chord and subsequent elaborations of this chord. 
 However, after drawing the graphic, my improvisation changed: the graphic drew my 
 attention to the function of the opening chord in establishing the tonic harmony, so I 
 improvised more elaborations within the tonic chord before initiating harmonic movements 
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 towards the dominant (see  Audio_8 ). In this way, the image was first used as a generative 
 principle for improvising the opening moves of the Prelude, but then as a tool for elaborating 
 these opening moves into a more formal structure. 
 Figure 17 . An image representing improvised modulations  from C major to closely-related 
 keys G major (above, right) and C minor (below, right). 
 In Figure 17, I drew the essential bits of information I needed to modulate from C 
 major to related keys G major and C minor. To understand this image it’s necessary to explain 
 two parts of the mental representation: (i) is that a key or tonality can be recalled, not by the 
 entire scale, but by salient or distinguishing features: thus C major is represented to me here 
 by the absence of sharps and flats (in this case the image shows two natural signs), G major 
 by the three notes written (which include the F-sharp) and C minor (which includes a 
 distinctive semitone of G and A-flat); (ii) is that, by holding the representative salient features 
 in working memory, I found that I could quite easily modulate to a key. Therefore the image 
 again serves a double purpose of capturing the mental representations I used for a certain task 
 (i.e., of modulation) while also helping me to define these representations through the act of 
 drawing. 
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 6.3.3.2 Temporal Strings 
 To represent the main events of an improvisation using a temporal string is both 
 simple, effective and flexible. The main feature of the temporal code is that it records only 
 the order of events, not their duration. So, I could imagine the opening events of a Prelude as 
 a temporal string in the following way: G minor chord - Elaborations of G minor chord using 
 triplet rhythm - D minor chord - Elaborations of D minor chord in semiquavers - G minor 
 chord, etc. While the order of events is thus fixed by the temporal string, it still allows infinite 
 freedom in terms of timing, so that each event can be elaborated for as long or as short as the 
 improviser wishes. The temporal string can also be graphically represented (see Figure 18) 
 which illustrates the way in which different types of encodings can be combined. 
 Figure 18. A graphic representation of a temporal encoding of events in the opening section 
 of an improvised Prelude. 
 One advantage of the temporal encoding is that other events can be inserted without 
 altering the order of other elements in the string. For example, if I thought that the return to 
 the tonic chord or key was too sudden I could insert other harmonic way points to expand this 
 part of the musical structure. Thus, the temporal string is particularly effective in representing 
 and developing one’s sense of musical structure. 
 6.3.3.3 Abstract propositions 
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 Accompanying these graphic representations of ordinal and spatial events, are abstract 
 propositions: these not only describe the musical events being improvised (i.e., the beginning 
 or ending of a piece, the episode in a Fugue), but also as Anderson (1983) suggests, include 
 meaning: that is, our beliefs and opinions about these events, (i.e., ‘is it easy or difficult to 
 perform’, ‘is it an important part of the musical structure’). Therefore abstract propositions 
 contain information which is extremely influential not only over one’s representation of 
 musical structure, but also one’s self-beliefs, approach to the task, emotions and motivations. 
 Because my methodology included keeping a journal in which I regularly recorded my 
 emotions and beliefs about the tasks I practised, I learned to appreciate the influence of such 
 abstract propositions in organising my knowledge and defining my approach to the task, as 
 Table 3 illustrates. 
 Table 3 lists some statements typical of my own learning experience. In each case I 
 offer an alternative version of the meaning implied in the statement to illustrate the potential 
 effect of the abstract proposition on improvisation. 
 Table 3 
 Propositional statements with alternative meanings relevant to improvising experience 
 Statement A  Statement B 
 I don’t know how to do this  I know how to do this 
 A Prelude should have a logical musical 
 structure 
 I’ll improvise the structure of this Prelude as 
 I go along 
 People will judge my performance  No one here knows as much as I do about 
 improvising 
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 A Fugue should have a set structure of 
 modulations 
 I’ll bring in the voices in whatever key I 
 find myself in, and finish in the tonic 
 It must sound like Bach  I want to express myself 
 6.3.3.4 A kinaesthetic code 
 Although Anderson (1982) limits representational codes to the three forms I have 
 discussed, he also acknowledges the possibility of a fourth, ‘kinaesthetic’ code for 
 representing action and movement. Strongly related to the idea of embodied and situated 
 knowledge (see para.2.3.4), the kinaesthetic code is, I believe, justified by the necessity of 
 goal-directed action in improvisation, which clearly requires a special kind of awareness and 
 sensory information. As Johnson (1987) illustrates in his description of learning to balance: 
 ‘It is crucially important to see that balancing is an activity we learn with our bodies and not 
 by grasping a set of rules or concepts. First and foremost, balancing is something we do. The 
 baby stands, wobbles, and drops to the floor. It tries again, and again, and again, until a new 
 world opens up - the world of the balanced erect posture ... Balancing is a preconceptual 
 bodily activity that cannot be described propositionally by rules’ (p.74). The sensation of 
 action, of organising and distributing our limbs to achieve goals in an environment is thus 
 discreet, sensory in nature, extending beyond theoretical description and not communicable 
 to another. Yet, at the same time, sensory information is not vague, but, in its own way 
 extremely precise, this precision often being represented to the individual in terms of spatial 
 relationships. For example, Stuart (2010) asserts that ‘a basic underpinning of the capacity for 
 such engaged, embodied judgment is the ability … to feel your own body from the inside as it 
 is positioned in relation to those things within your world’ (p.40). Baily (2008), from a 
 performer-researcher’s perspective, also suggests that a spatial representation is useful for 
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 understanding kinaesthetic information: ‘one important conceptual model at the musician’s 
 disposal is a spatial model in which movements are planned and experienced in visual, 
 kinaesthetic, and tactile terms’ (p.125). This awareness of movements connected to musical 
 events, positioned and timed within an interior, imaginary space I also experienced, 
 sometimes with extraordinary clarity, as my notes record: 
 ‘A changing landscape. As I start to routinely practise the variations, my work 
 becomes more ‘mapped’ - I can (as it were) erect scaffolding on a structure, or pause 
 and resume work in various mental locations. This is in contrast to the ‘casting about’ 
 of previous months’  (personal notes, 22nd May, 2017) 
 Or: 
 ‘I suddenly found myself aware of the whole shape - that is, I could see the whole 
 piece before me, like a landscape - and this vision had never before been possible, in 
 spite of many attempts to imagine ... I was aware of my place in the overall scheme of 
 things, while I was improvising. This enabled me to make new judgements as to length 
 of phrase, timing of elements such as new voice entries or modulations ’ (personal 
 notes, 12th July, 2017) 
 But these, highly developed visual ‘maps’ representing my actions over a whole 
 musical structure were rare insights into the task. More common was a growing sense of 
 connection throughout my learning between the actions I performed and the musical results, a 
 linkage which strengthened as I learnt to perceive, understand and later generate music 
 through conceptual  1  principles. Even at a basic level,  as I now demonstrate, kinaesthetic 
 encoding can be seen to take over from theoretical knowledge especially when the 
 action-musical event linkage is clearly understood and habitually performed. 
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 Figure 19. Images of a cadential formula becoming conceptually  1  represented. 
 In Figure 19, images a to d represent the sequence of movements as I construct a 
 cadential formula in C major. Each movement forwards is represented by a straight line 
 linking the relevant notes, while the lines linking the staves represent the need to coordinate 
 the movement forwards between the two hands. After the entire cadence had been 
 constructed, I had a complete mental representation or kinaesthetic impression of the 
 cadential formula (e), and as I repeated the formula I relied increasingly on image (e) rather 
 than the separate images (a) to (d). Through greater familiarity over time, the formula became 
 more generally represented; certain features dropped out as it was no longer necessary to 
 represent them (f) leaving me with a representation only of the distinctive contour of the 
 phrase. From this point onwards, graphical or explicit forms of representation gave way to 
 more embodied or kinaesthetic modes of representation. While such representations were not 
 directly accessible to consciousness, yet they were still subject to a form of cognitive control, 
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 which Stuart (2010) describes as: ‘the result of our capacity to memorise and form fluent, 
 non-cognitive melodic movements’ (p.45). 
 6.4 Discussion of progress during months 16-30: towards a generative, creative and 
 stylistic improvising 
 It was interesting at this stage to compare my experience of learning to generate 
 musical structure with cognitive theories earlier reviewed (see Chapter 2.1). Pressing’s (1988) 
 description of a ‘basic movement vocabulary’ and the ‘fundamental perceptual distinctions 
 needed for the use of feedback’ (p.139) clearly corresponded to the work I achieved before 
 my lessons in Stuttgart, while his mention of: ‘the ability to perceive distinctions is refined 
 considerably, and internal models of action and error correction are developed’ (p.139), links 
 to the knowledge and skills I acquired through Jürgen’s lessons, which brought improvising 
 so much closer to the compositional models. Yet, the reduction of experience to a cognitive 
 theory omits much which was essential to my learning experience: for example, without 
 Jürgen’s influence and expertise I might never have achieved this level of refinement; in 
 addition I needed  to dominate my learning emotions, control critical feedback, develop 
 agency, gain access to social learning and expertise in order to proceed through these events 
 of learning. Thus Pressing only describes certain observable or deducible aspects of learning 
 without offering insights as to the kind of experiences and decisions on which these skill 
 developments depend. 
 Similarly, the development of this theory into a generalised knowledge base of 
 generic patterns and movements, coupled with a referent: ‘a set of cognitive, perceptual, or 
 emotional structures (constraints) that guide and aid in the production of musical materials’ 
 (Pressing, 1998, p.52) can be compared to the mental representations I described for 
 generating specific stylistic improvisations. Clearly, I drew on an existing knowledge base, 
 i.e., a reservoir of existing productions on which to construct models of a particular 
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 improvisation, but the ‘cognitive, perceptual, emotional’ structures I acquired were the result 
 of many analyses of compositional models and the translation of these analyses into 
 procedural knowledge which, as I have described, had to be conceptual  1  in order to function 
 generatively for guiding my imagination within stylistic features and rules. Again, the theory 
 corresponds to the basic developmental path of learning, but is too limited in information to 
 offer insights into the lived experience of this developmental path 
 The kind of improvising I now achieved I described to myself as  generative  in the 
 sense that it corresponded to my original goals for improvising creatively within a rule-based 
 system. Arriving at this level of ability felt like actually  generating  real music in a way which 
 I never had done before; it was a liberating time in my study, a feeling of finding my 
 expressive voice after years of being mute. I have tried to describe in as much detail as 
 possible my sensations, thoughts and ways of constructing this generative style of 
 improvising, focusing in the last paragraphs on conscious mental representations. Using 
 Anderson’s (1983) visual, ordinal, propositional codes helped me to explore various ways in 
 which I consciously constructed the task which could be added to the more implicit 
 kinaesthetic codes. 
 Johnson-Laird’s (2002) cognitive model, which explicitly addresses the problem of 
 overcoming cognitive constraints, is interesting because this aspect of improvising was 
 clearly an important part of the generative improvising I describe. By constantly refining the 
 knowledge I used for specific models of composition and linking the mental representations I 
 used to relevant productions I was able to significantly reduce the amount of calculation I 
 was making during each improvisation, thus reducing cognitive load on working memory as 
 Johnson-Laird describes. Thus, I progressed from a more open approach as a novice where all 
 musical decisions were taken in the moment (corresponding to Johnson-Laird’s first, 
 ‘neo-Darwinian’ algorithm), through a period of conscious, rule application (the second, 
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 ‘neo-Lamarckian’ algorithm) before finding a compromise between rules and creative choice 
 in more generative, conceptual  1  mental representations  (corresponding to the third 
 algorithmic model). It was only this conceptual  1  representation  of selected features which 
 provided a cognitively ‘light’ mental structure from which I could generate many specific 
 musical instances; thus overcoming the constraints of working memory not only through 
 training, or by adopting a more permissive attitude towards choice or errors, but through 
 developing particular perceptions of musical structure which were recreated in performance. 
 The images, ordinal strings and propositions, and kinaesthetic representations I 
 explored (see Chapter 6.3.3) can also be compared to Clarke’s (1988) generative models of (i) 
 heterarchical association of musical material, (ii) associative linking of musical ideas, and 
 (iii) repertoire selection, i.e. improvising through learnt patterns and productions. My 
 interpretation of these different models is that my generative improvising, at this stage in my 
 development, corresponded most closely to the (i) associative approach and (iii) the use of 
 repertoire selection. The conceptual  1  representations  of musical features and structure very 
 rarely provided me with a clear, theoretical ‘map’ of a musical structure (Clarke uses tree 
 diagrams to illustrate how every musical event can be linked to increasingly higher-order 
 events in the hierarchy); only with a starting point from which I generated my own music 
 according to the rules. My improvising, as I have discussed, tended to proceed at a 
 phrase-to-phrase level, where repertoires of learnt productions could be guided by 
 conceptual  1  rules and features occasionally resulting  in a complete improvised form. 
 Lastly, I’d like to recall Callahan’s (2010) depiction of a specifically Baroque musical 
 structure and texture imagined through the different layers of  dispositio, elaboratio,  and 
 decoratio . Callahan proposed an elegant cognitive  model which linked the possibilities of 
 manipulating each level of musical texture (each level absorbed through a combination of 
 theoretical principles, patterns and techniques) to generate different kinds of music. 
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 In this way Callahan added musical context to Clarke’s (1988) models, as each different 
 approach - hierarchical, associative, and repertoire selection was explained not only in 
 cognitive terms but also in terms of musical decisions and consequences. The flexibility of 
 this theory, in that the improviser was free to focus on each tier of musical structure in a 
 generative way, corresponded closely to my description of improvising on different models 
 and genres in the Baroque style. For example, at a fundamental level, I believe the  elaboratio 
 level of voice-leading patterns was corroborated by absorption of these patterns through 
 Fux’s (1725/1971) rules, and can then be seen playing a significant role in constructing a 
 form such as the French-style Prelude or  plein jeu ;  a form in which  dispositio  elements (i.e., a 
 general move to the dominant and return to the tonic), and  decoratio  elements would be less 
 significant. 
 My own discussion of mental representations in terms of images, ordinal strings used 
 for constructing a free Prelude (see chap.6.3.3) also illustrates exactly the kind of balancing 
 which Callahan proposes between the two upper tiers of musical texture ( decoratio  and 
 elaboratio ), as I generated figurations and imitative  patterns linking the underlying 
 voice-leading harmonic events. Thus, I was drawn to Callahan’s particular use of hierarchical 
 representations of musical structure to link the three tiers of musical structure together at the 
 phrase-to-phrase level rather than relating these hierarchical links to the whole structure in a 
 rather over-determined way as Clarke (1988) had done. 
 6.4.1 Emphasising the conceptual  1  nature of generative  improvisation 
 Returning to the experiences described in this chapter, I would summarise my own 
 mental model for generative improvisation at this stage as fundamentally conceptual; 
 meaning that it was established through a particular learning process which resulted in my 
 perception and interpretation of musical texture and structure in terms of underlying 
 conceptual functions, which were then used as mental representations for re-creating my own 
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 versions of the musical style. Although corresponding to the theories outlined above, my 
 experience in constructing effective, generative concepts  1  which linked my patterns and 
 productions of playing to the stylistic features of the models, involved much experimentation 
 at manipulating the musical texture, attempting multiple tasks, developing different 
 approaches towards these tasks and towards improvising in general; returning to further 
 analyses of the score, and searching in an often rather blind way to bring my creative 
 experience closer to the models. Arriving at a ‘good fit’ in this way between my 
 improvisation and the original model signified: 
 1.  An ability to perceive the musical model in terms of expressive functions and 
 characteristic features operating at all three levels of texture ( dispositio, elaboratio 
 and  decoratio ) 
 2.  An ability to mentally represent these functions and features conceptually ‘as the main 
 instrument of thought’ (Vygotsky, 1986, p.139) for generating improvisation 
 3.  A willingness to act agentically, i.e., to make creative, musical decisions without 
 questioning one’s ability or right to generate music 
 As a result of reaching this level of generative improvisation I felt like a different 
 person: I had reached a definitive stage of development; I’d come out of my shell, my private 
 musings and experimentation; I’d braved the challenge of public performance, improvised in 
 front of a recognised expert, traversed the experience of ‘failure’ i.e., of revealing my 
 shortcomings as a learner, found that instead of being humiliated I had in fact learnt a good 
 deal and was now developing exciting new skills in Baroque improvisation. I thus felt more 
 confident about improvising not only because I’d learnt certain techniques which facilitated 
 my improvising (although this contributed a great deal), but also, and perhaps more 
 importantly, because I felt in possession of strategies which gave me the means to acquire 
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 new knowledge. This blend of enjoyment, confidence and cognitive engagement with the task 
 is reflected in Csikszentmihalyi’s (1988) description of flow states: ‘to remain in flow, one 
 must increase the complexity of the activity by developing new skills and taking on new 
 challenges’ (p.30), which allows me to say that I regularly experienced flow states at this 
 stage in my improvising - a big step forwards from the insecurity, negative emotions and 
 critical feedback of earlier stages! 
 Thus, I knew more about studying compositional models, extracting features, building 
 mental representations of musical structure which allowed me to generate all manner of 
 stylistic improvisations. And with these new skills came new horizons, new ambitions: I 
 worked now with an awareness of public performance, what had previously been a dream 
 was now a real possibility. Having watched expert improvisers in Stuttgart I had a more 
 concrete impression of the skills used and the kind of mental and behavioural approach of 
 experts towards the task; I felt my own skills were on a path towards this kind of expertise if I 
 continued developing. I was no longer searching for basic underlying structures, rules such as 
 those of Fux which had been so important in helping to make sense of the environment of 
 improvising in earlier stages of learning. Now I wanted to fine-tune the concepts  1  I used, to 
 gain greater fluency and expressive control over the music through my productions; in 
 particular I wanted to bring my improvising towards the complete forms and structures of 
 public performance, to be able to improvise a whole Prelude and Fugue or Chorale Variations 
 without stopping. These new challenges and directions in my learning form the basis of the 
 following chapters. 
 6.5 Themes emerging from Chapter 6 (months 16-30) 
 1.  Generative, conceptual  1  improvisation : describes an  ability to improvise creatively 
 and imaginatively within stylistic constraints. Stylistic principles and characteristic 
 features are selected and conceptually  1  represented. 
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 2.  Learning within a community of practice : involving socially-transmitted codes of 
 behaviour and knowledge about improvisation; also participation within living 
 traditions of learning and performing. 
 3.  Learning with an expert improviser : a pedagogical  theme involving the 
 communication of expert knowledge to the student, strategies used to develop skills, 
 knowledge, creative agency and artistic independence. 
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 Chapter 7 
 Explicit and implicit learning processes: a reflection on learning during months 16-30 
 7.1 Introduction to Chapter 7 
 In this chapter I go back in time to reflect on the development of skills and strategies 
 over a period of 18 months. Looking at this development reveals how previous difficulties in 
 establishing conscious control over the task had become more resolved as my strategies 
 incorporated intuitive response and reflex actions which I had formerly experienced as 
 interference. Realising this increasing acceptance of intuitive responses in my work 
 motivated me to investigate the research of implicit, unconscious learning processes and 
 knowledge formation. I discuss the effect of implicit learning on my conscious awareness of 
 improvisation, and reflect on how this relationship was then optimised to develop my skills 
 towards automaticity and performance. 
 7.2 A growing awareness of implicit, intuitive learning processes 
 As the lessons with Jürgen drew to a close and I returned to my own private learning I 
 had the opportunity to reflect and take stock of my learning so far. I was now used to 
 practicing a limited number of tasks and models for several hours daily, and because the tasks 
 I attempted were more circumscribed, they became more familiar: for example, I might spend 
 several days working with just one Chorale melody, trying many different harmonisations and 
 simple variations; tiring of this I might focus on Fugal techniques, trying to construct 
 exposition structures out of two or three different themes. This considerably deepened my 
 knowledge of certain techniques and of the musical structures I worked on, as the following 
 journal extracts illustrate: 
 1.  ‘Make fugal subject + answer of theme. Question of real or tonal answer.. 
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 2.  Link these to prepare for the theme. Question of timing.. 
 3.  Theme itself - should be ornamented? Augmented? Question of ending of the 
 phrase.. 
 These questions cannot be solved by theoretic knowledge alone. A great deal of trial 
 and error is undertaken within the loose limits (guidelines or shortcuts) of ‘rules’. It’s 
 necessary to practice certain transformations, i.e., the conversion of themes into 
 fugue subjects and answers. But at the same time, I need to develop a sense of what is 
 appropriate - how do I move, plan my attention, to gain a feel for the task’ (Personal 
 notes, 18th June, 2018) 
 The extract indicated a considerably more advanced and detailed awareness of fugal 
 structure than formerly, as could be seen when I compared notes with a similar practice 
 session over a year earlier: ‘Improvising on Martini fugue subject. Difficulties: the usual! 
 constructing voices; remembering the fugue theme transitions [between each voice entrance] 
 are difficult’ (Personal notes, 2nd February, 2017). My knowledge of structure was now 
 much more detailed, making the task better defined: whereas before I tried to match the task 
 with my theoretical knowledge of a fugal exposition, bringing in the theme in four voices 
 sequentially, I now noted whether the theme was ‘tonal’ or ‘real’ (a factor influencing the 
 construction of the answer) and focused on the relationship  between  the voices, creating the 
 music which links one voice to another throughout the exposition. This more detailed 
 perception of the task might not be so surprising however given the many hours of study I’d 
 spent on Fugal improvisation during that year. What I think is more interesting is to note the 
 reference to more intuitive, imaginative skills: … ‘going beyond theoretical knowledge’ to 
 ‘develop a sense of what is appropriate’. It is these implicit, unconscious learning processes 
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 which I want to discuss in this chapter, and the increasing role that they played in my learning 
 experience. 
 Another extract indicates a similar situation in which the improvisation was taken 
 over (one might also say hijacked to recall Goleman’s [1997] description of ‘neural 
 hijacking’) by intuitive, imaginative processes, guiding my actions towards a different 
 improvising experience to that I had planned: 
 ‘Is this a passing phase? In some ways I expect so, as everything seems to pass to 
 some extent. A couple of days ago I went into a ‘playing fast’ phase - like I found my 
 fingers for the first time. Jürgen had already mentioned the importance of ‘keeping 
 going’ when improvising a fugue, but I’d never been able to do this until recently. 
 Strange, that after all those months of reticence and hesitation, suddenly I felt the 
 need to move regardless of the consequences. 
 With the need to move, I had to place the burden of work on the fingers. I think I 
 discovered the use of unconscious processes, the letting go, which research records. 
 But these descriptions were merely by-products of the experience: for me, the 
 important conscious self-instruction was to go with the fingers - let them decide 
 rather than me. A strange split-sensation of divided control’ (Personal notes, 29th 
 June, 2017) 
 In this instance I experienced a sudden urge to play fluently, automatically, without 
 trying to consciously construct or control the improvising. As a result I had a different 
 sensation of improvising: of going ‘with the fingers’ as if the brains behind the improvisation 
 were now in my hands. This raised the issue in my mind of ‘divided control’ as it felt as if, by 
 going with the fingers, I was not in control anymore over the direction of the improvising. 
 Rather, I had a ‘strange split-sensation of divided control’: I knew that it was my fingers 
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 which operated through my will, my body, yet the rush of events which I had instigated by 
 improvising fluently, i.e., without conscious control, created a dichotomous situation. It was 
 my improvising yet it was my fingers, not me which executed it! Like the young wizard in 
 ‘The Sorcerer’s Apprentice’ I was aware of unleashing forces over which I had no direct 
 control. What did this mean? To clarify this question I want to return to an earlier perspective 
 of learning in which implicit learning processes were experienced simply as a choice between 
 two approaches to improvising: controlled or automatic. 
 7.3 Controlled vs. implicit learning 
 Since the start of my study I had experienced limitations to the control I had over the 
 task. This had been a source of conflict and frustration at first as nothing ever seemed to go 
 exactly as I planned. I made a strategy for a practice session, or a plan for an improvisation, 
 but found, as soon as I started playing, that other forces seemed to take over. My fingers 
 reacted in ways I couldn’t directly control, steering the music in unexpected directions; my 
 understanding and impressions of the task were so different to those I had anticipated that my 
 careful strategies and plans had to be put away while I tried to make sense of the novel 
 experience (see Chap.4.1). The only solution to this dilemma seemed to be either to go very 
 slowly (controlling and planning each note), or let my fingers wander around producing 
 music through kinaesthetic sensation, as I noted on 2nd January, 2016:: ... ‘ a sense of choice 
 between two directions, two strategies. These two different approaches produced very 
 different improvising experiences. Knowing which direction to choose was often difficult’ . 
 As I progressed in my learning this choice of strategy between kinaesthetic (flowing, 
 not pausing) or controlled presented itself on a daily basis. Partly because of my training and 
 experience in interpretive performance (perhaps also because of my analytic interest as 
 researcher) I tended to prioritise conscious learning as it allowed me to be accurate in my 
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 performance and be more aware of what I was doing. As Schneider & Fisk (1982) assert: 
 ‘Controlled processes develop automatic processes, maintain enabling conditions, maintain 
 critical time decaying information, and are used in problem solving’ (p.16). Thus, to better 
 integrate rules and study connections between my thoughts and actions I used a controlled 
 approach; occasionally, though I would break out into less restrained, fluent improvising 
 which, as I have described, produced a very different improvising experience. My habitual 
 prioritisation of conscious construction and the fact that fluency provided such a different 
 experience often disturbed me however. What if I was not learning sufficiently through my 
 conscious approach? Interestingly, this problem was reflected rather than resolved by the 
 treatises of improvisation I studied, for while Dupré (1975) suggests ‘it is necessary to work 
 very slowly … strictly and methodically’ (p.iii), learning through accuracy and observation, 
 Whitmer (2012) urges the student to ‘strive for a rough go-ahead energy’ learning instead 
 through a sense of forward motion which ignores errors. 
 Clearly, the two different approaches produced two kinds of knowledge, but which 
 was the most important? Did each approach lead one by a different route to the same goal? 
 Or was it possible that I would forever be limited to only one level of insights? My 
 inclination was towards the latter belief as I doubted that the conscious, careful approach 
 would automatically lead to performance as Dupré suggested: at some point I suspected I 
 would have to leave my comfort zone and ‘let go’ in order to learn how to mobilise what I 
 had learnt. This belief was supported by my awareness of research into language learning 
 (i.e., Sharwood-Smith, 1994; Paradis, 1994) which clearly proposed two different 
 environments (the classroom in which rules could be conscious studied and absorbed, and 
 real-life settings for communicative performance) in order to produce a complete pedagogy, 
 also the skill learning research of Schneider & Fisk (1982) which specifically described the 
 necessity of letting go of conscious control and the difficulties some individuals have in 
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 doing this: ‘performers must learn to allow automatic productions to be executed without 
 direct control … on a number of occasions we have found subjects who were not willing to 
 let go of their attentional resources’ (p.11). I have already described my own difficulties in 
 letting go as I tackled the exercises of Whitmer (2012 (see Chap.5.2.2) and felt overwhelmed 
 by the experience of performing so many errors. 
 7.4 Integrating implicit learning with conscious awareness 
 My lessons with Jürgen had helped me to overcome a tendency to caution and 
 hesitation. As I had hoped, the discipline of the lessons in which I was constantly required to 
 perform whole structures ‘warts and all’ had accustomed me to the process of leaving my 
 comfort zone and I felt able to use both conscious and kinaesthetic approaches in my practice 
 sessions. However, looking back through my improvising journal I noticed other factors 
 which contributed to a growing use of automaticity in my improvising: this was mainly in the 
 clarity and relevance of the rules I used for conscious construction which, under Jürgen’s 
 guidance had resulted in the  generative  stylistic  improvisation described in the previous 
 chapter. My mental representations of improvisation now represented these rules in ways 
 which allowed me to improvise imaginatively without hesitation; I was more sure of myself 
 and thus more willing to let go. In this way - through clarifying the rules and linking them 
 conceptually  1  to the underlying features and characteristics  of the models - I found I was 
 gaining more experience of forward movement in my improvising and taking more 
 opportunities to play without stopping and calculating. Thus, almost without realising, the 
 dichotomy between controlled and automatic approaches had softened and resolved as the 
 following extract from my journal illustrates: 
 ‘A constraint should be manageable in the sense that one can obey the rule without 
 losing all fluency. Sometimes one needs to relax the constraint and take an 
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 ‘opportunistic’ approach ... This means that one simply follows the fingers, and looks 
 for opportunities to introduce the rule whenever possible’ (Personal notes, 3rd July 
 2017) 
 As this extract shows, there was both conscious control through the presence of a rule 
 or rules, yet these were only calculated from time to time in a way which did not disturb the 
 flow of the improvising. Around the rules (which served as a loose guide to keep the 
 improvisation within stylistic boundaries) I allowed more fluent productions to flow so that I 
 ‘followed my fingers’ and was guided by kinaesthetic sensations. This brings me back to the 
 same point I made earlier (para.7.2) in which I noticed that my practice - through a strategic 
 blend of controlled and automatic productions - invoked implicit knowledge over which I had 
 no direct or conscious control. That is, while I might use a declarative rule (as a reference to 
 the style), I could also let go and allow more free, sensed actions to guide my actions in an 
 unplanned way. This process of letting go also stimulated my musical imagination so that, by 
 running with the fingers I allowed ideas to emerge in my awareness of the task: ideas which I 
 perceived as pathways through the texture, possibilities of action and directions to go on 
 which I could intuitively decide in the moment. Thus I divided my control over the 
 improvisation between a few conscious rules and semi-autonomous sensations of movement 
 and musical imagination which emerged in the moment-to-moment experience of 
 improvisation. 
 7.5 Practice strategies which integrated explicit and implicit learning 
 7.5.1 Speaking aloud 
 The following paragraphs describe an example of this type of conscious strategy for 
 invoking my unconscious or implicit knowledge. In March, 2018 (month 25 of my study), 
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 while improvising around a given melody as a cantus firmus  15  I had the idea to speak aloud 
 the degrees of the scale - that is, to name the notes of the cantus firmus by the degree of the 
 scale that they represent - while simultaneously improvising the surrounding harmony. This 
 action had a startling effect of  cueing  a sense of  harmonic context as this extract describes: 
 ‘... I notice that it [speaking aloud the degrees of the scale] orientated me to the tonic 
 (obviously as one names the relationship directly to the tonic). This also cued other 
 associations and progressions. For example, if one names the 4th degree then one 
 automatically recalls functions in which the subdominant plays a part, for example 
 IV-V-I cadence. But in addition, the choices of chords related to the 4th degree are 
 somehow known. The knowledge was stored in my mind, so this is a good way in 
 capitalising and releasing/expressing this knowledge’ (personal notes, 16th March, 
 2018) 
 Thus the effect of speaking the relationship of the note to the tonic triggered and made 
 available implicit knowledge which connected each note of the cantus firmus to its harmonic 
 context. The effect of this kind of knowledge was to produce a cognitive ‘map of the terrain’. 
 I sensed or knew which chord(s) would be appropriate, and I had an impression of where to 
 go to perform the harmony with my fingers: it linked my actions to the chords as objects 
 within an internal space. Clearly this was a very different kind of experience to consciously 
 working out a harmonisation or blindly experimenting with different chords. My (conscious) 
 strategy of speaking had therefore triggered a particular knowledge which I needed to 
 perform more fluently; a strange concept in which one activates knowledge which belongs to 
 oneself yet seemingly emerges outside of one’s direct control! 
 15  The use of a given melody as a cantus firmus relates to the musical models of the Renaissance era 
 and, in my particular study, to the exercises in strict counterpoint of Joseph Fux. The melody is 
 written out in semibreves and an accompaniment improvised in various rhythmic patterns around the 
 melody. 
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 I now applied the mapping-through-speaking technique to my harmonisation of 
 Fugue subjects, specifically those of Dietrich Buxtehude (1637-1707), which circle around 
 the tonic and dominant, often requiring subtle harmonisations which are difficult to perceive. 
 This strategy is illustrated in Figures 20 and 20(a): 
 Figure 20 . Annotated Fugue subject (BuxWV156) of Buxtehude  (1637-1707) in F major: 
 thus F = 1, G = 2, A = 3, etc. Where the answer modulates to the dominant, C = 1, D = 2 etc. 
 Figure 20a . Annotated Fugue subject (BuxWV166) in  C major. C = 1, D = 2; when the 
 answer modulates to the dominant, G = 1, A = 2, etc. 
 Again, the effect of speaking aloud the relationship of each note of the Fugue theme 
 towards the tonic was to cue relevant harmonic information. I immediately ‘knew’ which 
 chords or harmonies I could go to as they were now presented before me in an imaginary 
 internal space. My perception of the themes changed with this new harmonic context; I no 
 longer saw the subject and answer as detached objects, melodic lines needing 
 accompaniment, but as harmonically-rich phrases which flowed between the two poles of 
 tonic and dominant. In this way I mobilised implicit knowledge which informed my actions 
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 and encouraged me to improvise more fluently, because I felt able to direct my actions 
 towards the harmonies presented in the imaginary space without hesitation. 
 7.5.2 Allowing knowledge to emerge 
 The previous paragraphs illustrate how, by following  a sudden intuition (to speak 
 aloud the notes of a Fugue subject in relation to the degrees of a scale) I both triggered 
 insights and then used these insights to develop my skills in harmonising a Fugue subject. 
 Not all my insights were so dramatic however, and on another, earlier occasion, I recorded a 
 more gradual impression of emerging knowledge: 
 ‘It [the task] changes from something unknown to something known (when I know 
 something it takes a recognisable shape in my mind - the shape itself is not important(?), it’s 
 the recognition which is the important element), from something not felt- an idea or a theory 
 in words or a diagram - to something felt, which is more kinaesthetic, more ‘in the fingers’. 
 As I progress, more solutions - related to larger structures emerge’ (personal notes 21st May, 
 2017). 
 What happened in this event was that I became objectively aware of knowledge 
 emerging in my consciousness as I was improvising. I was trying to construct an 
 accompaniment over a theme in the bass, and the accompaniment was supposed to be a chain 
 of suspensions (dissonant intervals resolving to consonant). I began the session with only a 
 theoretical knowledge of the task, meaning that I knew the kinds of dissonant-consonant 
 intervals I would have to construct, but, when I started improvising I wasn’t sure what moves 
 to make to realise my theoretical knowledge as a musical passage. However, after some 
 experimenting with different kinds of musical material, different tempi and figurations, a 
 solution emerged which I ‘recognised’ as the procedural knowledge I needed, this knowledge 
 taking a kinaesthetic form in my imagination. The event was significant because, from this 
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 point onwards, I had a different perspective of my daily practice as a learning process. 
 Although I often sat down at the organ without knowing what I should do, I realised that 
 through practising I usually arrived at the knowledge I required. I thus became more patient 
 and respectful towards the  process  of practising,  and less inclined to assess my abilities as 
 ‘not knowing’ but rather as ‘emerging knowing’ through my practising strategies. 
 7.5.3 Triggering implicit knowledge 
 Similarly, on 7th August 2017, I recorded an incident where, through a particular 
 practice strategy of repetition over a limited amount of musical material, I triggered insights 
 into the task; these insights provided new focal points for my attention and information on 
 which I could further develop the task. 
 ‘My altered strategies were then: 
 1. To stay with these models until new insights emerge. 
 2. To repeat fluently smaller sections until the contrapuntal relationships had been 
 understood and practiced correctly. 
 Through the exercise of these strategies I began to perceive new musical elements in 
 the models: how the music moved from harmonic point to point. These harmonies, which 
 proceeded in the form of a slow procession through the piece, provided the stability of a 
 structure from which all the figurations could momentarily depart and decorate. 
 My awareness of harmonic ‘points’ informed my improvising, which now focused on 
 driving to the next point, and establishing such a point in my fingers and perception’ 
 (personal notes, 7th August, 2017). 
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 In this incident I received new impressions of the underlying harmonic structure of a 
 free Prelude. It is interesting that, as I started the session I had tried to impose a more fluent 
 way of practising, avoiding pausing for conscious calculation or error correction (for 
 example, as Whitmer [2012] advocates), yet by simply forcing myself to go forwards without 
 correction I had obscured my perception of events and simply improvised without direction 
 or control: as my emotions worsened I became convinced of the futility of the strategy. 
 However, through slightly altering the constraints and limiting the material to a few phrases, I 
 had managed to benefit from the fluency which now allowed me to perceive harmonic 
 movements extending over larger sections of the structure. In this way, I was learning not 
 only to manipulate my conscious control over my improvising to also permit kinaesthetic, 
 fluent productions to be integrated; but this blend of conscious-automatic improvising was 
 also supported and integrated with processes of implicit learning which ran parallel to the 
 more conscious experience, emerging from time to time as insightful events. 
 7.5.4 Summary of practice strategies: meta-cognitive learning 
 One way of understanding my growing integration of implicit learning processes into 
 my practice is through the idea of  meta-cognitive  learning . As Brown & DeLoache (1988) 
 describe: ‘the basic skills of metacognition include  predicting  the consequences of an action 
 or event,  checking  the results of one’s own actions  (did it work?),  monitoring  one’s ongoing 
 activity (how am I doing?),  reality testing  (does  this make sense?), and a variety of other 
 behaviours for  coordinating  and  controlling  deliberate  attempts to learn and solve problems.’ 
 (p.282). The foregoing extracts from my journal give examples of these meta-learning skills 
 and illustrate how far I had travelled from the simple perception-reaction learning of earlier 
 stages; though, earlier stages in achieving this level of objectivity can also be seen in Chapter 
 2 (when I had overcome the barriers of negative emotions and was better able to  monitor  and 
 212 
 check  my improvising) and in Chapter 3 (the acquisition of  generative principles  which 
 allowed me to  coordinate  and  control  problems of stylistic  improvisation. What was 
 occurring now in my practice was that I became more consciously aware of my intuitions (an 
 idea to do a certain task or follow a particular strategy such as using figured bass notation, or 
 speaking aloud), following these to see where they lead, noticing the emergence of new 
 perspectives, insights as information on which to develop further strategies. In addition I 
 engaged in  reality testing  as I realised my practice  skills and strategies went beyond my 
 conscious experience in controlling the musical texture and tried to understand what was 
 going on through a different framework - that of implicit learning. Of course I was 
 considerably helped by the discipline of the research methodology: such fleeting, momentary 
 impressions might have been forgotten had I not written them out in my journal and thus 
 reflected on their source; and by so doing, my interest in my learning extended from a study 
 of the practice strategies themselves (which incorporated implicitly learnt information into 
 my improvising) to the source of implicit ideas themselves. What stimulated my implicit 
 knowledge, how was it formed, what role did it play in my development as an improviser? 
 7.6 Reflection and discussion of implicit learning 
 7.6.1 Perspectives from literature 
 It was my position as researcher which now led me to investigate literature into 
 implicit learning as I sought to understand the nature of this hidden stream of information I 
 was learning to control and accept into my improvising; and which continually manifested 
 itself in new perceptions, intuitions (to act or adopt strategies) and insights into the task. 
 7.6.1.1 Are we governed by implicit processes of learning? 
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 Schachter (1992) noted the ability of patients with various memory disorders and 
 brain dysfunctions to acquire knowledge about stimuli of which they had no conscious 
 recollection. For example, in the condition known as ‘blindsight’, patients with lesions in the 
 visual (striate) cortex were able to respond to stimuli of which they have no conscious 
 knowledge; in another instance, amnesic patients were able to learn ‘an artificial grammar 
 and a complex spatio-temporal sequence’ (p.11,114) again without any conscious memory of 
 the experience. Such instances of non-conscious (implicit) learning are, according to 
 Schachter, ‘characteristic of normal cognitive function and ... not some sort of exotic 
 curiosity that occurs only in pathological conditions’ (1992, p.11,115); they illustrate how 
 humans regularly acquire information without conscious awareness of the learning process, 
 or of its influence on their behaviour. Reber (1993) makes the common observation that 
 children learn a great deal about their ‘physical, social, cultural and linguistic environments’ 
 without conscious awareness, but then extends the concept of implicit learning to assert that 
 our general behaviour and everyday decision making is influenced more by implicit factors 
 than by conscious, rational judgement: 
 ‘people appear to be, generally speaking,  arational .  ... The important insight was that, 
 when people were observed making choices and solving problems of interesting 
 complexity, the rational and the logical elements were often missing. It was not so 
 much that decisions were being made that were irrational, it was rather that decisions 
 were being made on the basis of processes that simply failed to take into consideration 
 rational elements. ... people often did not seem to know what they knew nor what 
 information it was that they had based their problem solving or decision making on’ 
 (p.13). 
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 The conclusions of this research were that, while different kinds of learning (i.e., 
 explicit and implicit) could be understood to occur in parallel, each producing a different kind 
 of knowledge, there were more limitations to one’s conscious contribution towards 
 knowledge acquisition than was generally assumed, and there was much of the learning 
 experience over which I could not have direct control. I have several times reported on the 
 conflict between my conscious aims for improvisation and the reality of the actual 
 improvising experience; I now found a description of this conflict in Schachter (1992) who 
 remarks that ‘‘implicit knowledge is often expressed unintentionally and tapped indirectly’ 
 (p.1113). According to such studies, information could not only be acquired without 
 conscious awareness, but could also influence behaviour in ways that individuals were 
 themselves hardly aware of. This lesser role of consciousness in the learning process leads 
 Reber (1993) to suggest that, although conscious awareness is a powerful component of the 
 human experience, we should question our ability to understand the complete processes of 
 learning and perception purely through our conscious knowledge: 
 ‘Consciousness, in my view, should be treated as a kind of biological metaphor, a 
 "psychological" abstraction for an underlying complex of physiological and 
 neurological actions, not unlike the way in which we have long treated similar 
 abstractions like  mind, image , or even  ego.  The question  of whether it makes sense to 
 construct theories based on the presumed "reality" of mental events or whether this 
 exercise is simply "something to do till the physiologists get here" is really a question 
 of pragmatics’ (p.86). 
 7.6.1.2 Biological theories of (un)consciousness 
 In addition to the literature of implicit learning, I also explored the writings of 
 Gerald Edelman (i.e., 1989, 1992). Centred around his Theory of Neuronal Group Selection 
 215 
 (TNGS), Edelman describes neurobiological processes underlying perception and learning in 
 terms of ‘reentrant signalling’, a type of semi-autonomous communication occurring in real 
 time between multiple sensory, emotional and motor brain regions: 
 … ‘reentry is a process of temporally ongoing parallel signalling between separate 
 maps [established synaptic pathways] along ordered anatomical connections. 
 Generally, such connections are reciprocal and more or less in register. But triangle 
 reentry can occur among three maps or more, and connections between any pair of 
 these maps can be divergent or convergent. Reentry can be continuous or phasic and 
 can behave recursively. It is not simply feedback however, because in any chunk of 
 time, it involves parallel sampling from a geometric range of spatially extended maps 
 made up of neuronal groups. (Edelman, 1989, p.65) 
 From Edelman’s writings I came to understand that unconscious, implicit learning processes 
 reflected neural activity which continually and semi-autonomously organised and integrated 
 experience - a ‘bootstrapping’ process of gradual synaptic strengthening and selection in 
 response to conscious goals; and an automatic integration of new experience within existing 
 knowledge structures and memory. That, although it was a naturally-occurring property of the 
 brain to identify and categorise features and objects within a stimulus, the definitions of the 
 categories themselves were not pre-programmed, but formed through goal-directed actions of 
 ‘a moving organism actively sampling its environment’ (1989, p.54). In this way, Edelman 
 united conscious and non-conscious learning within an adaptive, ecological framework which 
 he terms ‘Neural Darwinism’: ‘[which] explains in neural terms the processes of perceptual 
 categorisation, generalisation, and memory, and it shows how their interactions can mediate 
 the continually changing relations between experience and novelty that lead to learning’ 
 (1989, p.43) 
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 So what of consciousness and the role of conscious awareness in this seemingly 
 implicitly-dominated learning theory? Interestingly, Edelman (1989) does not marginalise the 
 role of consciousness in learning and experience as much as other authors. Recognising the 
 late arrival of brain structures such as frontal, parietal, temporal lobes (on which 
 consciousness depends) in the evolutionary time frame, and the fact that these structures are 
 built on and around older, implicit brain structures responsible for primary consciousness, 
 Edelman is able to define qualities of consciousness which give insights into the conscious 
 experience of learning. Thus, it is only through conscious awareness that we can be free from 
 the present - ‘the external drive of current behaviour’ (1989, p.186) to develop a long-term 
 memory with a sense of the past and a notion of oneself which is time independent. However, 
 the very sophistication of higher-order consciousness which is able to perceive and interpret 
 present events according to these more stable reference points (the self and the past) means 
 that consciousness is necessarily a model of experience: ‘consciousness shows intentionality: 
 it is of or about things or events. It is also to some extent bound up with volition. ... But it is 
 not  a simple copy of experience (a "mirror of reality"),  nor is it necessary for a good deal of 
 behaviour’ (1989, p.112). 
 Because of this complex interaction between multiple brain areas giving rise to 
 conscious awareness, Edelman (1989), in a similar way to Schacter (1992) is able to describe 
 many diseases of consciousness leading to severe discrepancies between individual’s 
 conscious awareness, memory and processing of events. Yet this should not lead us to 
 underestimate the role of conscious awareness in learning. Although consciousness might be 
 a powerful symbolic interpreter of experience, the freedom from the present sense stream and 
 a highly-developed sense of self, independent of time, allows the individual to develop 
 memory structures such as goals, aims and ambitions which remain stable, i.e., also 
 independent from the present sense stream. This is particularly important for learning as, 
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 through attention, we can select (from a multiplicity of potential) actions in relation to our 
 goals. As Edelman (1989) describes: ‘attention has come to be regarded as the outcome of a 
 group of mechanisms needed to cope with a variety of selection problems in the control of 
 action. Such views are concerned with how skills can be related to output systems and with 
 how particular constraints are exercised in determining any action that ensues in the light of a 
 goal taken prior’ (p.198). 
 Through these writings I now gained a picture of the role of consciousness, through 
 attentional mechanisms, effectively leading or guiding (remotely or symbolically rather than 
 directly) implicit, non-conscious processes of knowledge formation, perception and learning. 
 While my conscious perception of events could be understood as an interpretation of these 
 background processes, i.e., ‘ not  a simple copy of  experience’ as Edelman (1989, p.112) 
 asserts, nonetheless, there could be perceived a close partnership between the two, linked 
 most strongly through conscious goals, in my case, the musical and personal goals which had 
 motivated the study and initiated the learning process. 
 7.6.2 Conscious experience of implicit learning: cognitive ‘events’ and ‘Aha!’ 
 moments 
 These descriptions of the relationship between conscious and unconscious, explicit 
 and implicit were challenging to my preconceptions of learning, and motivated me to reflect 
 more deeply on my experience of learning so far. Going back through my written notes of 
 improvising sessions, I noticed that many of the entries described seemingly unexpected 
 events; moments of sudden insights, meaningful cognitive events or “Aha!” moments during 
 which I suddenly understood something new about the task, or about the possibilities of 
 action. All of these ‘cognitive events’ I transferred into a table copying my text verbatim into 
 218 
 one column, my interpretation of the ‘event’ in another, and a description of the significance 
 and effect of the event on my learning progress (see Appendix C) 
 7.6.2.1 The role of attentional focus in implicit learning 
 Looking at this table of events, I noticed that it was rare indeed for any of my 
 improvising sessions to occur in a way which I had anticipated. What I reported was 
 inherently unexpected; afterwards I wrote down what had happened, tried to understand it, 
 describe it, process it, but these were conscious reactions to an implicitly-guided experience. 
 As predicted by the findings of research outlined above, all of these events could be 
 interpreted in terms of attentional focus: moments when separate elements of the stimuli 
 suddenly seemed connected or reorganised in a new way; or when one element became 
 distinct from surrounding features, claiming my focus of attention for a short period of time. 
 For example, on 13th February 2016 I suddenly became aware of the sound characteristics of 
 different organ registrations, realising that: ‘it’s possible to change one’s attentional focus, for 
 example, to concentrate on sound/timbre rather than structure’; on 19th January 2017 I 
 experienced a new feeling of control over 4-part textures, as I suddenly ‘saw’ each voice in a 
 different way - as a separate element over which I could exercise control. As these 
 unexpected events brought new features of the task more distinctly into my perception, so I 
 responded by using this new attentional focus to generate the music and to gain insights from 
 a novel perspective of events. 
 It’s interesting then to note Edelman’s (1989) comments regarding ‘systems of 
 attention … how they vary before and after the acquisition of motor or cognitive skills’ 
 (p.201). What I experienced was a sequence of events in which (i) certain elements suddenly 
 emerged in my perception in such a distinct way; this (ii) motivated me to focus on different 
 aspects of the task in turn, controlling and manipulating them to gain a different kind of 
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 improvising experience. For a while, these elements were the main focus of my work, 
 defining the task and leading my development; then (iii) after a brief period (usually one or 
 two days) they once again became part of the background texture as my attention was 
 claimed by new features. Yet, although the salience of such features subsided, my perception 
 of the musical texture was never the same, but always remained informed by this sequence of 
 events and the new information I had generated. Thus, my learning path as illuminated 
 through these cognitive events can be seen to be a succession of many different attentional 
 perspectives, allowing me to understand the interior workings of a complex musical stimulus 
 in a kind of linear sequence. From this sequential understanding of separate musical 
 elements, actions could be organised and ultimately connected to form more general, 
 conceptual  1  and fluent productions. 
 7.6.2.2 Emerging, new perspectives of the task 
 Therefore, as a result of these ‘cognitive events’, I found I afterwards understood 
 something new about improvisation and about the learning process. For example, on 22  nd 
 May 2017 I noticed that I could hold a clear representation of musical structure in my mind, 
 working on aspects of this improvisation without losing my sense of place: 
 ‘a changing landscape. As I start to routinely practise the [Chorale] variations, my 
 work becomes more ‘mapped’ - I can (as it were) erect scaffolding on a structure, or 
 pause and resume work in various mental locations. 
 A similar development of perspective of musical structure occurred on 12th July 2017 when I 
 suddenly received  a sensation of locating musical ‘objects’ within an imaginary space: 
 ‘I suddenly found myself aware of the whole shape - that is, I could see the whole 
 piece before me, like a landscape - and this vision had never before been possible, in 
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 spite of many attempts to imagine it. Note, that the landscape image had no details, 
 and contained no information as to what I might play. The image was simply 
 available as a focus of attention, so that I might be aware of the narrative, or Form of 
 what I was improvising; instead of stringing together, or constructing material 
 according to various ideas held in my head, I was aware of my place in the overall 
 scheme of things, while I was improvising.’ 
 Other events were seemingly related to my research studies as I investigated and 
 reflected on the literature and culture of improvisation. Thus, as I read theories of emotion I 
 became more objectively aware of my own emotions while improvising and the effect of 
 critical feedback on the learning process: ‘I wince away from errors as if burnt. Thinking is 
 restricted’ (29  th  February, 2016); while Goehr’s (1994)  description of the  Werktreue  ethic and 
 its effect on classical musicians’ perception of musical structure is (I believe) reflected in a 
 new acceptance of many possible variants of a musical idea: ‘I don’t seek  the  solution, but  a 
 solution (24  th  March 2017). In this sense the events  related to literature reveal a slightly 
 different relationship between explicit and implicit knowledge to the more unexpected 
 insights I had of mental representations of the task. Whereas the events of mental 
 representation - the sudden ‘seeing’ of musical structure as a landscape for example, might be 
 understood as self-willed, I could never have imagined such an insight: it emerged in my 
 experience as entirely novel and unexpected as a gift! Events related to literature on the other 
 hand seemed to capture moments of transference, when theoretical knowledge became 
 procedural, integrated into the lived experience or environment of improvisation, influencing 
 my decision making and cognitive processing of the task. 
 7.6.2.3 Awareness of developing skills 
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 Lastly, there were many events which, though unexpected in themselves, reflected 
 long-term developments of skills of which I was continuously (and consciously) preoccupied. 
 For example there are many entries relating to harmonising and the construction of 
 contrapuntal, voice-leading textures. Thus, on 2  nd  January 2017, I noted that ‘each separate 
 element can be executed discreetly - a process by which one ‘sees’ a solution’, referring to an 
 event in which I perceived a way of directing my attention between the two lines of an 
 Invention; this in a way which allowed me to ‘see’ the relationship between the two parts 
 more clearly. Later that month (19th January, 2017) this sensation is extended to the 
 four-parts of a harmonisation task; this time I’m able not only to ‘see’ the relationship 
 between the parts but construct each line independently. Emotions and feelings are also 
 involved in these skill-learning events  16  as on 11th  March 2017 when I realised: 
 It is possible to enjoy - know - understand chordal motion. The reason I don’t is a 
 question of attention: If I am looking elsewhere, I cannot stop, enjoy/savour the richness, the 
 rich experience of the chord I am playing 
 Thus, attention, emotions and skills can be seen to be equal partners in these 
 conscious experiences of learning development. Again, on 7th August 2017, it is harmony 
 that provided the subject of an event in which I perceived the underlying structure of the 
 improvisation in terms of harmonic ‘points’: 
 16  It’s interesting that, although I experienced a great deal of frustration and negative learning 
 emotions as a novice, I often recorded more positive feelings of agency, pleasure and satisfaction in 
 my journal. Even when I recorded negative feelings (29  th  February 2016) these events, through the act 
 of being recorded, provide an opportunity for reflection and objectivity. Feelings of enjoyment (11  th 
 March 2017), control (19  th  January 2017) and agency  (28  th  February 2018) were proudly recorded in 
 my journal; and, as it is natural to enjoy more positive emotions as skills develop and one experiences 
 more rewarding musical results, I notice that often positive feelings often emerged as a result of a 
 successful strategy which allowed me to ‘see’ the solution to a problem or experience greater control 
 over certain elements of the task. 
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 My awareness of harmonic ‘points’ informed my improvising, which now focused on 
 driving to the next point, and establishing such a point in my fingers and perception. 
 As I increasingly perceived the harmonic ‘points’  of one model, I also began to 
 perceive the harmonic relationships in another, more contrapuntal model. It does not 
 seem to matter whether it is two voices, three voices or four voices, they never depart 
 from this harmonic framework, jumping only from point to point and 
 describing/constructing the harmonies which characterise this style. While I already 
 knew this to be the case, I now saw it with different eyes, and also felt it in a new way, 
 as if it emerged in 3D like a holograph, from the texture of the score. 
 My representation of harmonic and contrapuntal events thus developed considerably 
 in subtlety and complexity as my skills increased. So, as I practiced the exercises of figured 
 bass and Partimenti scores, absorbed Fux’s (1725/1971) rules for contrapuntal motion, and 
 reflected upon Toch’s (1977) distinction between (theoretical) chords and expressive, 
 harmonic flow, events occured which integrated these techniques with expressive agency. 
 7.7 Conclusions for a better understanding of explicit and implicit learning mechanisms 
 while improvising 
 By studying the literature of implicit learning and also the neurological processes 
 underlying this type of knowledge formation, I gained important insights into my improvising 
 experience. At the outset of my learning I had tended to view the relationship between 
 conscious and unconscious learning as a conflict: I could not get my improvising to align 
 with my conscious expectations and strategies and experienced reflexive actions as 
 interference. Thus I tended to prioritise conscious learning throughout the earlier part of my 
 study as I struggled to bring my improvisation under control. This produced mixed results in 
 my performance: on the one hand I developed clearer conscious mental representations of 
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 musical structure and of the task, ultimately leading to the generative structures used for 
 stylistic improvisation (see Chapter 6), on the other hand I was slow to develop a sense of 
 performance and of larger sections of musical structure, as I realised when I started lessons 
 with Jürgen Essl. Later however, as my skills increased I realised that in spite of the 
 conscious focus in my work, I was steadily incorporating more fluent productions into my 
 practice; and accompanying this fluency were strategies which helped me to let go of my 
 habitual conscious construction. These strategies involved responding more to intuitions and 
 emerging insights which focused my attention in new ways upon the task and helped me to 
 develop skills. Realising that a seemingly autonomous flow of information and knowledge 
 formation was emerging into my conscious awareness in this way I made a table of the 
 principal cognitive ‘events’ and ‘Aha!’ moments in my learning (see Appendix C). 
 Studying these events helped me to understand more clearly the connection between 
 my conscious experience of learning and the background, implicit processes of knowledge 
 formation. However unexpected the ‘Aha!’ moments of intuitions and insights into the task, 
 they were clearly not random or wholly autonomous. Rather they were closely connected to 
 aspects of the task which intrigued, or perplexed me such as the skills of harmony and 
 counterpoint I practiced, or the dichotomy between conscious calculation or automatic 
 fluency as a learning approach. Clearly then there was a strong connection between my 
 conscious awareness, and the background, implicit processes of knowledge formation; 
 through these momentary cognitive events, I perceived a meeting point of the two different 
 types of learning. My interpretation of the intuitions and insights I experienced while 
 improvising was supported by the literature I encountered. Writers such as Reber (1993) and 
 Schachter (1992) emphasised the dissociation between explicit and implicit learning, which 
 supported earlier, novice impressions of learning - that consciousness did not reflect a whole 
 or true picture of the sense stream. On the other hand, Polanyi (1959) describes a similar 
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 process of emerging perceptions as one first focuses on individual elements of the task, and 
 only perceives a more meaningful relationship with the whole task: ‘we cannot comprehend a 
 whole without seeing its parts, but we can see the parts without comprehending the whole. 
 Thus we may advance from a knowledge of the parts to the understanding of the whole … the 
 focus of our attention is shifted from the hitherto uncomprehended particulars to the 
 understanding of their joint meaning’ (p.29) 
 In addition, Edelman’s (1989) description of attentional focus as a feature of 
 consciousness, but also as an emerging property of implicit mechanisms, provided a lynchpin 
 or interface between the two disparate forms of learning: on the one hand I was consciously 
 aware of (and could manipulate) my focus of attention towards certain features of the task, on 
 the other hand, this conscious focus could be said to activate implicit learning mechanisms 
 through which I acquired knowledge outside of (in parallel to) conscious awareness. 
 Naturally I paid attention to those features of the task in which I was most interested at any 
 one time (i.e. harmonic and contrapuntal construction, learning emotions, and so on), 
 therefore both my conscious attention and implicit learning mechanisms could be said to be 
 connected to short- and long-term goals of learning the skills of improvisation within a 
 particular musical style. It is this connection between goals and different forms of awareness 
 of improvising that I now explore in the following paragraphs. 
 7.7.1 A framework for understanding implicit learning and conscious awareness 
 in relation to goals 
 By introducing aspects of implicit and non-conscious learning, the picture of the 
 learning experience became considerably more rich and complex, for I understood that my 
 perceptions while improvising extended far beyond the extent of conscious awareness and 
 control. In effect my thesis now introduces the full ‘intentionality of sensations, perceptions, 
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 acts and representations’, as Imberty (2000, p.130) describes, which made up the phenomenal 
 experience; a complexity I had so far avoided in previous chapters through my prioritisation 
 of conscious construction. However, as I have tried to demonstrate throughout this chapter, 
 nonconscious and background processes of learning and response could be understood not as 
 chaotic or interfering with more conscious, calculated responses, but connected, as different 
 types of response to the same environment. One way of organising this rich and multi-faceted 
 improvising experience is by adopting a goal framework in which the behaviour of the 
 individual is classified through different levels of awareness, as Moskowitz (2012) explains: 
 ‘One can enact (a) conscious response to address conscious goals, (b) implicit responses to 
 address conscious goals, (c) conscious responses to address implicitly triggered goals, and (d) 
 implicit responses that are in the service of implicitly primed goals’ (p.29). Applied to the 
 context of improvisation, these different types of conscious and implicit response are 
 explored in Table 4 
 Table 4 
 An interpretation of conscious and implicit behaviour during improvisation in relation to 
 goals, using Moskowitz’s (2012) theoretical framework 
 Type of goal and type 
 of awareness 
 Examples of this type of experience while learning to improvise. 
 Conscious response to 
 conscious goals 
 All conscious and explicit elements of the learning experience. Includes 
 theoretical, declarative knowledge, conscious strategies in relation to 
 known goals. 
 For example: 
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 · a deliberate and strategic use of theoretical rules and methods, such as 
 Fux’s (1725/1971) voice-leading rules, the  règle de  l’octave  etc., the 
 analysis of compositional models and use of reduced scores 
 · consciously focusing attention to selected features in the task 
 · adopting a certain attitude or emotional stance while improvising 
 Implicit response to 
 conscious goals 
 Intuitive or automatic adjustments in behaviour, emotions, cognitive 
 processing of the task while improvising. 
 For example: 
 · automatically slowing down or trying to consciously control the flow 
 of events to avoid errors in performance 
 · evoking of imaginary, critical peers (as discussed through Beck’s 
 [1991] ‘automatic thoughts’), (see para.4.1.5) 
 · intuitive use of strategies, musical decision making 
 · physiological reactions (quickened pulse, sweating) 
 Conscious response to 
 implicit goals 
 Explicit thoughts and feelings emerging through implicit processes of 
 perception and learning. 
 For example: 
 · Unexpected emotions, and moods, i.e., a feeling of agency, or 
 conversely of timidity. of which one is aware. In this sense the implicit 
 goal might be to avoid embarrassment or humiliation. 
 · Unexpected cognitive approaches and attitudes towards the task, i.e., 
 musical decisions or strategies emerging during improvisation which 
 seem to be in response to long-term (implicit) rather than short-term 
 (conscious) goals. 
 · Unexpected mental representations and new perspectives of the task; 
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 ‘Aha!’ moments when unconscious (implicit) knowledge becomes 
 available to consciousness (see Table 4) 
 · Emerging skills such as audiation (the ability to ‘hear’ music in the 
 imagination before playing), or awareness of ‘pathways’ through the 
 stimulus (i.e. Sudnow, 2001). 
 Implicit response to 
 implicit goals 
 The most difficult to describe, these types of responses might never be 
 identified, or only at later stages of learning when their influence 
 became more explicit. 
 For example: 
 Habitual emotional and cognitive processing of the task, i.e., 
 perceptions of musical structure, beliefs about musical creativity and 
 self-beliefs/roles absorbed through training in interpretive performance 
 which shape behaviour without the individual being fully aware. It is 
 also through implicit responses to implicit goals that we might 
 understand an individual’s failure to learn, for example by consistently 
 thinking about the task in ways which block their perception of relevant 
 features or their ability to act without conscious calculation (see Ellis 
 [2006] in relation to second language learning). 
 · Background, unconscious processes of perception and learning such as 
 memory chunking or the formation of procedural knowledge which 
 results in fluency and automaticity 
 Table 4 offers a framework for understanding the complex relationship between my 
 conscious awareness of learning and the background, implicit formation of knowledge which 
 ran, in a sense, parallel to this awareness. Through this framework I understood that my 
 experience of learning encompassed many gradations of conscious awareness, sometimes 
 dramatic as in a revelatory or “Aha” moment, at other times more implicit and intuitive, 
 involving habitual responses, feelings and attitudes which I only recognised later through 
 reflection. Of course there were moments when my awareness of improvising seemed at odds 
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 with one’s implicit learning processes, particularly in situations when I wanted to control 
 every note and felt reluctant to ‘let go’ and allow automatic productions to flow. However, as 
 my learning developed I was acquiring ever more subtle and strategic uses of attentional 
 focus, which allowed me to combine background processes of knowledge formation, intuitive 
 responses to learning situations and automatic productions with my conscious awareness of 
 improvising. This meant that, even when attempting to consciously follow a strictly 
 delineated strategy of learning or performance, I no longer tried to consciously control either 
 the flow of the improvisation or the learning experience; rather, I tried to guide the course of 
 events more loosely, opportunistically; allowing a rule to be introduced here and there as I 
 also permitted automatic and semi-autonomous actions to flow forwards. This open-ended 
 approach to improvising and learning is reflected by Huang & Bargh’s (2014): ‘even when a 
 person consciously engages in goal pursuit, one is not necessarily controlling (or even aware 
 of) how that goal has transformed one’s experience of the world’ ( p.123); and ultimately this 
 was my position, for I was now more aware of the limits to conscious control, more willing to 
 let go and trust implicit processes to take me (perhaps by unknown paths) to my eventual 
 musical and performance goals. These paths I now trace in the following chapter as I 
 progressed through automatic productions to a new,  semantic  form of control over my 
 improvising which allowed me to perceive whole musical forms and structures. 
 7.8 Themes emerging from Chapter 7 (months 16-30) 
 1.  Implicit learning : unconscious, background processes  of knowledge formation and 
 skill acquisition during learning. Conscious awareness of these processes while 
 improvising 
 2.  Increasing intuition : an advanced stage of skill learning  characterised by increased 
 use of intuitive decision making and strategies (Gobet, 2016). 
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 Chapter 8 
 Emerging expertise: fluency, schemas and semantic control (months 24-36) 
 8.1 Introduction to Chapter 8 
 This chapter charts the final stage in my practical study. I describe increasing fluency 
 and emerging skills in my improvising, a ‘letting go’ of conscious control to perform more 
 automatically, and (accompanying these changes in performance) different perceptions and 
 processing of the task. Whereas formerly I had constructed the music step-by-step, I now 
 started to plan and control larger sections through increasingly embodied sensations which 
 were less available to consciousness. I therefore looked to literature which helped me to 
 understand the formation of long-term memory structures suitable for expert performance, 
 and my use of these in performance as a form of  semantic  (meaningful) control. The chapter 
 concludes with my preparation and performance of three Baroque-style improvisations for a 
 public recital, which signified the final goal for my learning development as an improviser 
 within this self-study. 
 8.2 Introducing schemas  1  as representing complete  musical structures 
 The more I improvised using the generative techniques I’d learnt with Jürgen (and 
 now developed in my daily practice), the more familiar I became with certain aspects of the 
 task. Features such as figurations, typical harmonic sequences, opening and closing moves, 
 the constructions of inner voices and so on, became more automatised. As it was no longer 
 necessary to think about every aspect of construction, my memories and representations of 
 these events thus lost finer details and became increasingly grouped or chunked in the way 
 that Snyder (2000) explains: 
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 ‘Chunking is the consolidation of small groups of associated memory elements. Just 
 as a single number is a unit that is distinguished from all others by its unique visual 
 features, the individual items in a chunk become its features. It is as though chunking 
 helps memories to “coagulate” or “solidify”. This is especially true with repeated 
 exposure to a particular experience’ (p.54) 
 Through the process of encoding or ‘chunking’ performance productions into 
 long-term memory, my attention became freed from detailed constructions of the musical 
 texture and I began to perceive instead larger sections and new relationships of musical form. 
 This then brings my thesis to the point of (emerging) expertise where I can discuss the use of 
 mental  schemas : that is, imaginative representations  of complete musical structures and form. 
 The term  schema  is a rather ubiquitous term in cognitive  psychology, used to describe 
 all kinds of mental representations of action and behaviour. Within the context of musical 
 improvisation, the  schema  is identified by Berkowitz  (2010) both as ... ‘an underlying 
 architecture with various possible surface realisations’ (p.105), yet within this overall shape 
 or architecture, smaller patterns and formulae are also described as schemas: ... ‘musical 
 schemata, the archetypal patterns which define a style’ (p.28). This seems confusing as the 
 schema  might equally apply to any type of mental representation,  yet there is one aspect 
 which is common to both definitions: and that is the  conceptual  nature of the schema. As a 
 conceptual structure,  schemas  represent an abstraction  of certain important relationships 
 between features, these relationships then being used to form a new mental structure for 
 guiding behaviour. It is the conceptual, non-literal and embodied construction of a  schema 
 which the philosopher Kant (1781/1998) stressed when he discusses the ability to recognise 
 all three-sided shapes as triangles: ‘In fact it is not images of objects but schemata that 
 ground our pure sensible concepts. No image of a triangle would ever be adequate to the 
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 concept of it. For it would not attain the generality of the concept, which makes this valid for 
 all triangles ...’(p.273). 
 8.2.1 Disambiguation of concepts  1  categories  1  and  schemas  1 
 The preceding paragraph illustrates some of the wide usage of terms such as 
 schemas , and  concepts  throughout psychological literature .  Throughout my thesis, however, I 
 reserved the terms  categories, concepts  and  schema  for very specific types of mental 
 representations of musical structure which emerged at different stages of my learning 
 experience. As a general principle to distinguish mental representations which are created 
 through the experience of improvisation, I use the subscript  1  . Thus, Categories  1  signifies 
 certain individual elements and features of the task becoming more recognisable, familiar and 
 meaningful. The term Concepts  1  , however, describes  a more advanced and imaginative 
 cognitive engagement with the task: namely, the perception of important underlying 
 relationships in musical textures which provided insights into musical construction and 
 decision making. Again, although the act of categorisation or conceptualisation involves 
 musical ‘objects’ such as cadences, chords and so on, it is important not to confuse these 
 things with their theoretical meanings. Before I began to improvise I was aware of cadences 
 and their usage for completing sections of music; yet this theoretical knowledge did not 
 prepare me for constructing my own cadences within the context of improvisation. The 
 concept  1  I developed for certain cadences arose out  of many actions of improvising musical 
 sections; formulae which I later categorised  1  and  recognised as ‘my old friend’ the cadence. 
 The introduction of Kant’s (1781/1998)  schema , in which he reflects on the lived 
 experience of  perceiving many and various three-sided shapes as triangles, is relevant to my 
 thesis at this time, because it corresponds to my growing awareness of larger forms of 
 musical structure. Kant describes a kind of implicit knowledge of the triangle, which is not 
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 passive, being imaginatively constructed by the individual; conceptual in nature and usage, 
 but also embodied in sensation. This captures so well my emergent sense of musical 
 architecture, that I prefer to reserve the term  schema  1  (with the subscript  1  ) for the perception 
 of complete representations and awareness of musical structure. 
 Thus there is a sequence to my terminology which corresponds to the different 
 perceptions I had of the task at different stages of skill learning. These are now summarised: 
 Table 5 
 Disambiguation of terms: categories  1  , concepts  1  , generative  mental representations of 
 musical structure and features, and schemas  1  . 
 Term 
 The subscript  1  links the 
 perception procedurally 
 to the experience of 
 improvisation 
 Cognitive actions involved 
 Categories  1  A meaningful perception of individual features in the stimulus, 
 associated with a feeling of familiarity. The result of naming or 
 recognising features. 
 Concepts  1  The perception of meaningful relationships between musical features. 
 An act of imaginative construction in which the improviser perceives 
 the environment through the concept  1  . 
 Generative mental 
 representation of musical 
 style, features, and 
 structure 
 A grouping together of concepts  1  relevant to stylistic  rules or generic 
 features. A generative mental representation of improvisation is 
 therefore also conceptual  1  , allowing the improviser  to generate whole 
 phrases and sections of imaginative improvisation within stylistic 
 boundaries. 
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 Schemas  1  A more implicit mental representation of larger-scale or complete 
 musical structures serving to guide the use of concepts  1  and other 
 generative mental representations of the improvisation 
 8.3 The path towards schemas  1 
 In the following paragraphs I completed the final months of my practical and artistic 
 study. During this time I prepared three improvisations for a public recital and therefore 
 brought my work to a new level in which whole, coherent musical forms were improvised 
 without stopping. Not surprisingly, the act of improvising whole forms rather than short 
 passages and excerpts changed my perception of events. I had to acquire new skills in 
 controlling events within a longer time frame, and the exercise of these skills resulted in new 
 perceptions and  mental representations for which I reserve the term schema  1  . My use and 
 experience of schemas  1  in accessing long-term memory  and organising actions in relation to 
 whole musical forms is now described. 
 8.3.1 Chunking of memory and actions 
 As already mentioned, through consistent daily practice of a limited number of 
 musical tasks, and a more stable (conceptual  1  ) representation  of musical structure and salient 
 features, my cognitive processing of these tasks was changing rapidly, becoming more 
 streamlined and fluent. Constructing a four-part, voice-leading cadence, or harmonic 
 sequence, even the opening sections of selected Fugue subjects were tasks which before had 
 been complex and effortful, yet now could be performed fluently without thinking about 
 details, such as each line in the texture or the spacing of each chord (a common feature of the 
 skill learning experience, illustrated in the way one ties a shoelace, or rides a bicycle in a 
 series of increasingly coordinated movements.) As certain features became increasingly 
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 superfluous or redundant to my construction of the task, so did my mental representation of 
 events become more grouped or chunked; and this was reflected in my cognitive approach: I 
 no longer planned each movement in a passage but recalled a whole sequence of movements 
 through one salient property or feature, a type of memory access described by Anderson 
 (1982) when he states that ‘a partial pattern specification can be matched more rapidly than 
 the full specification’ (p.53). 
 This new, fluent approach necessarily altered the focus of my attention while 
 improvising: rather than imagining a single phrase of music or sequence of harmonic 
 movements, I now aimed for several phrases - paragraphs and short sections, performing 
 these without stopping to reflect. Sometimes I even improvised a complete structure such as a 
 short Prelude, a Fugal exposition or Chorale Variation without pausing. Yet this new fluency, 
 welcome though it was, was also accompanied by anxiety, for it often felt that my hands ran 
 away from me. Novel skills had emerged so suddenly that they seemed disconnected from 
 my previous improvising, as the experience of automised productions was very different to 
 the conscious strategies I had habitually used. This stage in my development thus felt like a 
 leap forward as much of my knowledge became more fluent and autonomous. 
 8.3.2 The problem of control over automatic productions 
 Cues, in whatever form of encoding or mental representation used by the improviser, 
 retrieve or access procedural knowledge, i.e., ways of acting upon the stimulus, and thus, they 
 are highly connected to the problem of next steps, or decision making in real time. This is due 
 to the nature of procedural knowledge, which is primarily linear, as Hiebert & Lefevre (1986) 
 state: ‘A key feature of procedures is that they are executed in a predetermined linear 
 sequence. It is the clearly sequential nature of procedures that probably sets them apart from 
 other forms of knowledge’ (p.6). Yet, this connection between the cue and procedural 
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 knowledge, though theoretically simple, is more complex from the learner’s perspective: for, 
 throughout the various stages of learning (illustrated through the phenomenon of chunking), 
 there occurs a constant regrouping of the stimulus or task. New perception-action couplings 
 are absorbed into new concepts  1  , and these generalise  upon many of the old concepts  1  which 
 are now hidden from view. Another way of understanding this reordering of knowledge for 
 performance is that productions can be hierarchically associated or embedded, so that, once 
 one element of the hierarchy is triggered, other linked productions are automatically 
 performed in sequence. Hiebert & Lefevre (1986) clarify this structure in terms of 
 sub-procedures and super-procedures: 
 ‘An important feature of the procedural system is that it is structured. 
 Procedures are hierarchically arranged so that some procedures are embedded in 
 others as sub-procedures. An entire sequence of step-by-step prescriptions or 
 sub-procedures can be characterised as a super-procedure. The advantage of creating 
 super-procedures is that all subprocedures in a sequence can be accessed by retrieving 
 a single super-procedure … The subprocedures are accessed as a sequential string 
 once the super-procedure is identified’ (p.7). 
 Understanding the hierarchical structure of production knowledge helps to understand 
 (i) how a great deal of information can be encoded within action sequences, and (ii) how 
 these action sequences can then be performed fluently and automatically. Codes of 
 representation such as images, strings and propositions which previously were useful in 
 defining the separate elements involved are now bypassed; and it was this bypassing of 
 familiar cues and information that I found initially disorientating. I needed new information, 
 new mental representations of awareness and control more suited to the fast cueing of 
 automatic productions in which knowledge which I only implicitly sensed; and to the 
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 organisation of larger sections of musical structure which I was now beginning to perceive 
 when I improvised. 
 8.3.3 Metaphoric, embodied representation of automatic productions 
 Looking to research for guidance I discovered an eloquent and perceptive 
 explanation of less conscious control over action through the idea of  metaphoric 
 representation , a particular kind of embodied experience  as described by Johnson (1987): 
 ‘... let us consider a very simple, but pervasive, metaphorical understanding: MORE 
 IS UP. The propositional expression “more is up” is a somewhat misleading shorthand 
 way of naming a complex experiential web of connections that is not itself primarily 
 propositional. It is no accident that we understand QUANTITY in terms of the 
 VERTICALITY schema mentioned above in exactly the way we do. Examples such 
 as  Prices keep going up; The number of books published  each year keeps rising; His 
 gross earnings fell; Turn down the heat , and many  others, suggest that we understand 
 MORE (increase) as being oriented UP (involving the VERTICALITY schema). 
 There is a good reason why this metaphorical projection from UP to MORE is natural, 
 and why MORE is not oriented DOWN. The explanation has to do with our most 
 common everyday bodily experiences and the image schemata they involve. If you 
 add more liquid to a container, the level goes up. If you add more objects to a pile, the 
 level goes up. MORE and UP are therefore correlated in our experience in a way that 
 provides a  physical  basis for our  abstract  understanding  of quantity’ (Johnson, 1987, 
 pxv). 
 This quotation offers an example of a non-literal form of mental representation and 
 control over a stimulus which I found particularly relevant while improvising. From 
 Johnson’s thesis I gained several insights: (i), that a one-word cue, functioning conceptually 
 237 
 or schematically, could directly access and organise a great deal of encoded information; (ii) 
 that concepts such as UP, MORE and so on can be imposed upon other concepts such as 
 QUANTITY and VERTICALITY, adding not only new properties of organisation, but also 
 adding a more finely-tuned control to existing productions; (iii) that the use of metaphor as 
 described by Johnson was particularly suitable to my development of procedural knowledge 
 in which I needed orientation to direct my actions with regard to space (the organ) and time 
 (the length of the whole improvisation). In this way, Johnson’s description of metaphor 
 corresponds to my growing sense of kinaesthetic (movement-based) awareness, offering an 
 explanation for the construction of meaning which accompanied this awareness. It is this 
 sense of meaningfulness that I now discuss, for as I learnt to ascribe meaning to my 
 perceptions and actions, so did I gain an effective, more responsive and flexible control over 
 increasingly automated actions. 
 8.3.4 Semantic control and the construction of meaning 
 Johnson’s (1987) description of metaphoric  mental representation is valuable 
 because it captures some quality in a mental representation which is both non-literal (i.e., not 
 explicitly but implicitly available to consciousness), yet also a powerful cognitive tool for 
 controlling and directing actions. The control itself emanates from the meaningfulness of the 
 cue, for it is the knowledge and experience invested in a metaphor such as MORE, UP, LESS, 
 THICKER, AROUND etc., which can then be unpacked and expressed through actions 
 within the environment. Another way of describing the acquisition of meaningfulness is 
 through the construction of  semantic  memories, as  Snyder (2000) explains: ‘semantic 
 memory is the primary type of memory involved in  recognition .  Semantic memories are often 
 used implicitly, without our even being conscious of them. Much of our abstract categorical 
 knowledge about the world is employed in the selection of sensory input, a recognition 
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 process that usually takes place outside conscious awareness. This process is based on 
 identifying  the things around us by processing them  through the appropriate semantic 
 memory categories’ (p.78). Clearly this relates to my former description of ‘naming’ or 
 categorising  1  events and features as I learnt to organise  the novel environment of 
 improvisation (see para.4.3.4.1); yet, I interpreted this same process to relate now to a new 
 categorisation  1  of the actions themselves, as these  actions become linked to increasingly 
 conceptual  1  control over longer sections of musical  structure. Indeed it is this complex and 
 layered encoding of experience, in which conceptual  1  understanding and action-event 
 couplings are implicitly organised through continuing practice and learning strategies, that 
 leads me to describe this new level of development in terms of  semantic  meaning and 
 representation. This is because the term  semantic  captures both the depth of encoding, and the 
 simplicity of the sensation; it links the ability I had at this stage of performing complex 
 sequences of actions automatically while, at the same time, representing these sequences 
 non-theoretically in a novel, discreet and embodied way which was rich in meaning. 
 8.3.4.1 Case study: semantic ‘naming’ of harmonic movements 
 The reader may recall from previous chapters that the complexity of constructing 
 harmonic movement within a diatonic, tonal language was one of my biggest challenges 
 while learning to improvise. At first I proceeded through my theoretical knowledge which 
 meant the task was also rather abstract: my decisions were not personally expressive, they 
 were primarily correct responses to the rules I was using. Later, as I learnt to apply a clearer, 
 more systematic rule system through Fux’s (1725/1971) voice-leading principles, I was able 
 to generate patterns of movement for constructing textures which became increasingly 
 associated with a repertoire of harmonic moves. Constructing these formulae through 
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 repetition naturally increased their familiarity; as I performed them more automatically, 
 harmonic sequences and patterns became grouped or chunked in my perception. 
 At the same time I began to perceive and link these sequences of harmonic 
 movements to musical-expressive functions at a particular moment in the musical structure. 
 An example of a musical-expressive function might be: to aim towards a certain place in the 
 musical form, i.e. ‘before the theme comes back’, or ‘my last statement of the theme’; or 
 alternatively it might be an expressive decision to increase tension through adding 
 chromaticism or quickening harmonic change. These musical-expressive functions were often 
 named  in my imagination while improvising - a moment  of recognising or defining a certain 
 move forwards: “Ah, it’s you!”, the ‘you’ being a defined structure or mental representation 
 of the event as I then encountered it. If I had to reduce this structure or  name  to a word it 
 would be something like AROUND or THROUGH (serving metaphorically, as Johnson 
 [1987] proposes); and later, as I reflected on these words, I realised that they signified ways 
 of moving which are often in relation to a sense of tonal centre, as it might be towards 
 security, or away from security. Yet, at the same time, such is the subtlety of these types of 
 kinaesthetic or embodied representations of harmonic movements (Stuart’s [2010, p.45] 
 description of ‘fluent, non-cognitive melodic movements’ is particularly apt), that the  naming 
 process captures many expressive characteristics which cannot be reduced to theory or words. 
 Rather, the  naming  process is a feeling of personal  identification with the stimulus, of 
 perceiving one’s actions not in terms of theory but in terms of personal meaning. 
 8.3.5 Increasing skills on the basis of semantic control 
 Semantic associations and labelling of the stimulus spread throughout my 
 improvising as automaticity increased. As I developed a more meaningful relationship with 
 my actions I experienced an increase of skills and insights in all of my regular musical tasks, 
 240 
 similar to the surge in abilities I had formerly experienced through my development of 
 concepts  1  culminating in generative mental representations  (see Chapter 6). In both cases, I 
 profited from increased clarity and certainty in my work, provided by the peculiar stability of 
 conceptual  1  knowledge. These qualities I came to consider  a crucial factor contributing to my 
 fluency as an improviser, reflecting the fact that cognising the entirely unknown was costly in 
 terms of processing. Therefore, while I accepted that an element of the unknown was 
 unavoidable (and also desirable in terms of creative interest) I aimed at this stage to gain as 
 much clarity and certainty in my  knowledge of the task as possible, while simultaneously 
 training my technical resources and productions to steer me through passages of unknown or 
 unexpected occurrences. 
 8.3.5.1 Stability in cognitive processing of the task 
 It is useful to recall that, as a novice improviser, I experienced considerable instability, 
 as I acted mostly in an unknown environment and had to calculate each action in relation to 
 novel features. Later I learnt to categorise  1  these  features, but categorisation lacked the 
 stability of conceptual connections, mainly because I had to encounter the categorised 
 features in the same way for me to recognise it. For example, I might form a  category  1  for a 
 chord or sequence of chords, but if I changed the figuration of the passage then these chords 
 lost their identity, in which case I might categorise  1  them in a fresh way as they reappeared in 
 their new texture. Thus, as Barsalou (in Schank, Collins and Hunter, 1986) propose: ... 
 ‘cueing conditions and accessibility constantly change [and] the temporary constructs that 
 represent a category are rarely if ever the same’ (p.652); and this development led on to the 
 beginnings of conceptual development through unstable  complexes  and  pseudo concepts  (see 
 para.4.3.4.3). One advantage then of continuing this development to the formation of true 
 concepts  1  for improvisation (which guide the improviser  towards recreating the characteristic 
 241 
 features of a style or model) is that concepts  1  are also stable: they represent an interpretation 
 of features on which behaviour can be controlled ‘in a more or less general way’ (Edelman, 
 1989, p.141); also corresponding to the principle of  degeneracy  in that many different actions 
 or variations in the stimulus can be brought under one concept  1  allowing one to interpret the 
 environment and select appropriate behaviour more efficiently. 
 8.3.5.2 A sense of flow and creative involvement 
 The emergence of semantic association thus represents a similar increase in stability, 
 as Snyder (2000) states: ‘Semantic memories seem to be related [by] conceptual hierarchies 
 of various types, and seem not to be vulnerable to the same types of transformation or 
 distortions that episodic memories are’ (p.264). As a result, my improvising environment was 
 becoming increasingly familiar, labelled in a way that meant, within my regular tasks and 
 musical models, I rarely encountered entirely novel features; rather, I recognised new 
 versions or arrangements of features which were already known. In this way, while I might 
 not have the exact response or production I needed, I could quickly adjust another production 
 to make it sufficiently suitable. Feeling that I possessed sufficient resources to act in response 
 to the challenges of the situation had a profound effect on my mood and absorption in the 
 task: I often felt creatively involved in creating a meaningful and expressive musical structure 
 and spent less time in doubt over what to do next, or in calculating an action before 
 performing it. This description of my enjoyment of improvising may recall an earlier 
 discussion concerning flow states (see para 2.2.4), in which ‘a person should perceive that 
 there is something for him or her to do, and that he or she is capable of doing it’ 
 (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, p.30), and certainly it is worth mentioning that now in my private 
 improvising, I regularly enjoyed a sense of flow. 
 8.3.5.3 Anticipation and ‘sculpting’ the stimulus 
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 However, this sense of flow can also be described in more cognitive terms: that, 
 through my sense of familiarity with the environment of improvisation, I was more able to 
 predict  what was coming. With prediction I gained  cognitive breathing space, and time to 
 respond with a greater sense of control and creative choice over my actions, for at least as far 
 as I could ‘see’ ahead. This brought me to the idea I had found in literature of an actively 
 constructed reality, as Neisser (2014) explains: ‘The cognitive approach to memory and 
 thought emphasises that recall and problem-solving are constructive acts, based on 
 information remaining from earlier acts. That information, in turn, is organised according to 
 the structure of those earlier acts, though its utilisation depends also on present circumstances 
 and present constructive skills’ (p.277). At this stage in my development I was clearly able to 
 bring many hours of practice and experience to the task; and, as I began to prepare for a 
 public performance and therefore to limit the number of tasks I worked on (the models, styles 
 and genres of improvisation), so I gained an increasing sense of meeting the stimulus 
 half-way. (This became more relevant as I actively planned the events of each individual 
 improvisation nearer to the concert.) Prediction of events thus became possible through 
 actions which controlled the environment itself, moulding the stimulus towards the 
 presentation of familiar events, as Clark (2013) describes: ‘perception, cognition, and action 
 ... work closely together to minimise sensory prediction errors by selectively sampling, and 
 actively sculpting, the stimulus array’ (p.186). 
 The idea of the individual actively sculpting the outcome of events is appealing, 
 because it offers insights into the anticipation of events involved in schema-driven 
 performance. Endsley (1995a) explores this perceptual phenomenon through graded steps 
 within a theoretical framework known as ‘Situational Awareness’ (SA), a phrase originally 
 used to define fighter pilots' ability to perform under stress. A basic summary of the theory is 
 that, in the first stage the individual learns ... ‘to perceive the status, attributes, and dynamics 
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 of relevant elements in the environment. All the data that pertains to the task’ (p.36); in the 
 second step, they learn to synthesise these elements within meaningful relationships: ‘Level 2 
 SA goes beyond simply being aware of the elements that are present to include an 
 understanding of the significance of those elements in light of pertinent operator goals ... 
 particularly when put together to form patterns with the other elements (gestalt), the decision 
 maker forms a holistic picture of the environment, comprehending the significance of objects 
 and events’ (p.37); while, in the third and final stage of learning, the individual acquires the 
 ability ... ‘to project the future actions of the elements in the environment - at least in the very 
 near term ... This is achieved through knowledge of the status and dynamics of the elements 
 and comprehension of the situation’ (p.37). 
 Endsley’s model is interesting because it mirrors the sequence of events in my own 
 learning. The first stage corresponds to my sense of categorising features and events, what 
 Endsley refers to as ‘relevant elements in the environment’. The second stage can be 
 compared to the formation of meaningful conceptual  1  relationships in which I perceived 
 underlying structural principles of the musical style. Endsley describes this as 
 ‘comprehending the significance of objects and events’. Lastly the individual achieves a 
 knowledge of how events will unfold, a complex sequence of recognition (of salient features) 
 and linking this recognition with memories of past events; and while it might seem 
 presumptuous to associate my performance as an improviser with those of USA fighter pilots, 
 I believe that Endsley’s descriptions match my emerging sense of  schematic  awareness of 
 overall form and musical structure at this stage of development! 
 8.4 Preparing for a public performance 
 Towards the end of my third year of study I began preparing for a public recital. I had 
 been looking for a suitable opportunity which would allow me to improvise without feeling 
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 too much pressure, and this seemed to arise when I was invited to give a solo recital in a local 
 monastery. The monastery had been closed to the public for many years and was now 
 reopening after a refurbishment. This meant that the organ recital was not the principal focus 
 for the public, but a means of attracting them into the monastery and to enjoy the 
 refurbishment. The organ itself was quite simple although large in scale; it was an original 
 18th century Baroque organ in the Iberian style with two manuals and no pedals, so I only 
 needed to improvise with my hands. I decided to integrate my improvisations within a more 
 standard programme of composed repertoire. Each was spaced at regular intervals throughout 
 the recital which I hoped would give me a chance to recover from the intensity of the 
 improvisation experience. In total I planned three short improvisations, each based on a 
 different Baroque model so I had a variety of keys, textures, characteristics and forms to 
 work with. I began a careful preparation on paper, noting down registrations, distinctive 
 features, and making a key plan of modulations  17  . 
 8.4.1 Creating generative mental representations 
 The plans I used for practicing helped me to construct generative mental 
 representations of selected features which I needed to guide my imagination within the 
 stylistic constraints of each model, also as a guide for constructing the whole shape of the 
 piece. My improvisation journal gives an example of working with one of these plans: ‘It’s 
 possible to move in 4-part harmony from key to key [and maintain a stylistic texture]. This 
 corresponds to the performance goal, and maintains balance of constraints vs. freedom, i.e. I 
 must  go to the stated key, but I can use  whatever  path I choose’ (personal notes, 12th 
 September, 2018). These notes show that I kept a certain degree of looseness and freedom 
 within my written plans as I didn’t want to feel constrained by a rigid or formal plan; instead, 
 I hoped to deepen my awareness of the whole shape of the improvisation as a schema  1  ,  while 
 17  An example of a plan for an improvisation is given in Appendix E. 
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 simultaneously allowing for various versions and adaptations of the same conceptual 
 structure. 
 The three improvisations were: 
 1. A Two-part Invention in G minor (in the style of J.S. Bach, 1685-1750), using the 
 soft flute registrations. 
 2. A Toccata or Tiento in the Dorian mode (in the style of Francisco de Arauxo, 
 1575-1654), suitable for the registrations and voicing of the Iberian Baroque organ  18  . 
 3. A Prelude, Fugue and Toccata in the North-German baroque style (after Buxtehude, 
 1637-1707), using various full-organ registrations. 
 8.4.2 Reducing critical feedback 
 As the recital approached, I realised I needed to change the way I perceived and 
 processed my improvising during the moment of performance. In a practice environment one 
 is focused on improving one’s performance, therefore critical feedback (so long as it is 
 constructive and accompanied by good strategies) is an integral part of one’s work. In a 
 performance environment however, it would be more important to keep going, to remain 
 motivated and focused on the whole structure rather than reflecting and evaluating each small 
 step. I therefore practised ‘switching off’ my critical feedback and tried to accept all of my 
 improvising actions without correcting anything; simply continuing whatever happened until 
 I got to the end of the whole improvisation. This created a different kind of improvising 
 18  It might interest the reader to know that the Iberian Baroque model of organ is quite different in 
 design from the modern instrument, using a split- or divided-keyboard system. This means that all the 
 registration on the right-hand side of the organ is used for the right-hand part of the keyboard (above 
 middle C); and all the left-hand registration for the left part of the keyboard. In effect, one has two 
 manuals in one, so long as one stays within the boundaries of the keyboard: solos can be accompanied 
 on the same manual; also rich, contrapuntal effects created through performing two independent 
 voices in each hand using contrasting registrations on each side of the manuals. 
 246 
 experience, in which I was less conscious of the construction of the musical structure: my 
 conscious, reflective decisions seemed to be no longer involved as there was no time to 
 engage in this type of thinking. Decisions were made more in the moment ‘on the hoof’, a 
 musical structure was somehow created and I began to have a sense of thinking through my 
 fingers, i.e., through the actions themselves. I should say too that this way of acting without 
 reflection - this plunging onwards through the improvisation was not a comfortable sensation 
 for me, and seemed to go against my instincts for safety and control over my performance. I 
 was constantly reminded of Anderson’s (1982) description of productions having ‘direct 
 control over behaviour’ which means there is ‘the ever-present danger that a new production 
 may wreak great havoc in a system’ (p.380). Certainly it felt as if I was handing over control 
 to systems I barely knew or understood, and the thought of doing this in a moment of public 
 performance was often quite terrifying! 
 At the same time as I struggled with the idea of letting go of my conscious control, 
 my perception of my improvising was changing through the effect of reducing critical 
 feedback. Whereas before, in my normal practising context, I had constructed a gap between 
 my performance and what I aimed at - an ideal, imaginary improvisation, which I tried to 
 attain through the strategies of the practice itself; this gap was now reduced. By turning off 
 critical reflection and keeping going until the end I had the sensation that what I performed 
 was  the actual improvisation; I had to accept entirely  the product of my improvising (at least 
 during the moment of performance) and so, for the first time in my experience, my perception 
 of my role as the creator of that product was changed and I became that which I aimed for: 
 the performing improviser. Of course, this doesn’t mean that I stopped being critical of my 
 improvising; on the contrary, the transition to automatic productions was not easy and 
 resulted in a lot of improvising which I didn’t like. However, I stopped being critical during 
 the moment of improvising, letting events unfold until the end; and this created a unifying 
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 effect on my work, bringing all my productions to a single point - the improvisation itself, 
 which I have tried to capture in the graphic of Figure 21. 
 Figure 21.  A comparison between novice perception  (left side of Figure) where the 
 ‘desirable’ is separated from the ‘possible’, and schema  1  -guided performance (right-side) 
 where the both elements are combined. 
 8.4.3 Aiming towards schemas  1 
 The improvising experience induced through my preparation for performance brought 
 me closer to my awareness of the whole musical structure or schema  1  ,  and reminded me of 
 literature in which different learning strategies were proposed to acquire specific kinds of 
 knowledge. Sweller (1988), for example, writing about problem-solving skills, described how 
 novice students tended to work backwards from the information presented to them in the 
 problem - a technique described as ‘means-end analysis’, whereas experts drew on the more 
 extensive knowledge of their previous experience to understand information as ‘belonging to 
 a particular category of problem states that require particular moves’ (p.261). In this way, 
 experts were able to gain immediate impressions of the whole sequence of actions involved in 
 solving the problem, an awareness which Sweller describes as ‘the schema-driven approach’. 
 As he states: ‘a schema encodes a series of problem states and their associated moves. All 
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 states encountered have schemas associated with them indicating appropriate forward moves’ 
 (Sweller, 1988, p.262). Recalling Sweller’s description of experts’ approach to problem 
 solving, I tried to emulate this in my improvising. Starting from my generative mental 
 representations of characteristic stylistic features, I planned to add a plan of principal 
 structural events which I could use as a map for orienting my progress through the whole 
 form; events such as principal modulations (away from and return to) to the tonic, sectional 
 changes of texture, or a scheme of voice entrances, depending on the type and genre of the 
 improvisation. For example, as preparation for the Two-part Invention I notated some suitable 
 themes and motifs, also a tonal plan of the modulations (G minor - D minor - C minor - G 
 minor) and practised steering my improvising towards each of these keys in turn. While, for 
 the opening section of the Prelude, Fugue and Toccata, I wrote down the following events: 
 (i) ‘opening flourishes in the tonic key’ 
 (ii) ‘rising scales in the right hand embellishing chords’ 
 (iii) ‘modulate to the dominant, as a preparation for the Fugue’. 
 Repeatedly improvising over these sequences of events, I was able to develop a better 
 impression of how to adapt my actions in relation to the whole structure. The plans I made to 
 orient my improvising were notated as an ordinal string (see Chapter 6.3.3.2)  which meant 
 that there was a looseness to the constraints allowing me to intersperse other events in 
 between those notated. For example, within the modulation sequence of the Two-part 
 Invention (G -D - C - G) I could also modulate to the relative major: G minor - D minor - B 
 flat major - C minor - G minor. Thus, there was a conceptual  1  feel to the maps I used; they 
 served as general guidelines rather than rigid constraints and allowed me to respond 
 expressively to momentary inspirations and follow my imagination in new directions without 
 losing track of the whole shape. In this way, adapting my performance productions of short 
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 musical sequences towards structural waypoints I began to build a sense of the overall form 
 of the music  while I was improvising . I had an implicit  feeling for how to act in relation to 
 that overall shape; a sense of right or wrong guiding me towards good pathways and away 
 from bad pathways, without being able to say clearly (in that moment) on what basis I made 
 these decisions. 
 It is this sense of appropriateness guiding my decision making during improvisation 
 which I define as a schema  1  experience. For, it’s  important to stress that, even as I practised 
 over certain fixed elements, or even wrote down a Fugue theme, this process of preparation 
 never constrained the actual musical material I was improvising, or produced a finished 
 composition to be memorised. On the contrary, the methods of preparation I have described 
 always allowed me considerable variety in terms of musical material and actions, so that, as I 
 approached the recital I did not know what notes I would play, nor how I would start the 
 Prelude, or by what means I might reach the dominant key. All these features and elements 
 were left to the moment of the recital. What I prepared were the mental representations of 
 features and texture, the actions which constructed these features as music, and the pathways 
 leading from one event to another through the whole structure. It was these preparations 
 which I hoped would serve as a basis for constructing the improvisation in public, yet it was 
 also my hope that I might achieve some kind of awareness of the whole musical structure, as 
 an embodied schema  1  which could be used for guiding  my actions in a more coherent and 
 expressive way. 
 8.5 The performance experience 
 As the recital approached, I felt extremely anxious and questioned whether I could 
 really go through with improvising in public. The whole task suddenly felt very new and 
 unfamiliar; my skills seemed fragile and prone to failure. I wondered how the public might 
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 react to Baroque-style improvising in which the forms and structure were so clear. Would I 
 start something I couldn’t possibly continue; that, just as I established something clear for the 
 public to follow, I would falter, stammer, lose my way … These nightmare visions compelled 
 me to practice hard, using the strategies I have described and trying all the different 
 possibilities of realising my written (informal, tonal) plans. However, a few days before the 
 actual concert I found that practising didn’t feel productive any more; it felt like I was trying 
 to control things too much. So, in response to these intuitions, I decided to stop practising. 
 This was a hard decision to make, particularly because I kept running the improvisation in my 
 imagination; and each time this happened I found myself faltering, going wrong, my mind 
 going blank… 
 8.5.1 Improvisation I - dominated by emotions 
 The first improvisation, the Two-part Invention, didn’t go well. As soon as it started I 
 felt very nervous and conscious of every note I played. There was a sense of unreality about 
 the experience, a kind of ‘what on earth are you doing?’ which produced feelings of panic as 
 I realised I was unable to form a clear mental representation of the musical structure. It was 
 just as I had feared: I felt unable to control the flow of the music or think imaginatively. I 
 watched as if from a distance as my hands tried to perform some patterns and sequences, but I 
 was miserably unsatisfied with the results which seemed fragmented and full of errors! As 
 this experience unfolded I realised at the same time that I was trying hard to consciously 
 control the improvisation; my preparation and training ‘kicked in’ at last, and I had a coherent 
 thought - that I needed to overcome this instinct and ‘let go’. This I managed to do only 
 towards the end of the piece, as, with a big effort, I finally brought my emotions under 
 control. Letting go of conscious control produced an instant improvement: my fingers played 
 some fluent productions, more expressive music resulted and my mind cleared. I managed to 
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 finish the piece coherently, bringing the music to the tonic key and finishing with a good final 
 cadence. This gave me a new boost, for I had a sense of achievement: I had actually 
 improvised something tonal and coherent (even expressive) in front of the public. From the 
 jaws of failure I’d snatched a little taste of victory and also learnt an important lesson - not to 
 try and control events too tightly. Using the following repertoire pieces to recover from this 
 rather intense experience, I resolved to apply this sensation of ‘letting go’ to the second 
 improvisation. 
 8.5.2 Improvisation II - emerging cognitive control 
 The Tiento  19  in the Baroque Spanish style proceeded  with a much stronger feeling of 
 expressive agency and control over the material. Although I constructed the overall structure 
 of the improvisation sticking more closely to my written plan than I would have liked (ideally 
 I hoped to depart from this written plan and explore new and unexpected directions), the 
 contrapuntal lines of the musical texture and harmonies within these waypoints were 
 expressive and stylistic. I felt able to construct and use the relevant generative mental 
 representations of musical features to balance my imagination within constraints as I was 
 used to doing in my practice, and this had a calming effect on the way I processed the 
 experience. As a result, rather than worry about the public or my own sense of anxiety, I 
 focused more productively on the task itself. I could organise my attention in the same way as 
 when I practised, allowing my hands to perform while simultaneously ‘looking ahead’ and 
 preparing pathways through the structure. As my attention became better organised I had a 
 wonderful sense of communicating directly through my music with the listeners; for was I not 
 literally creating the music I wanted to create as people listened to the results. 
 19  Tiento translated literally as ‘touch’ is a free Prelude-type of form combining flourishes and 
 scale-like figurations with more vocal, imitative sections. The model of Tientos which I took from 
 Iohannis Cabanilles (!644-1712) are additionally characterised by a modal tonality, a four-part texture 
 which might be fugal in style, use of split-keyboard registration and ideally suited to the Iberian 
 registrations of the organ I was performing on for this recital. 
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 8.5.3 Improvisation III - led by schemas  1 
 Feeling greatly encouraged, I launched into the final improvisation - a Prelude, Fugue 
 and Toccata in the North-German style - with a great deal of energy (see  Video_3 ), and this 
 time I experienced a sense of the overall schema  1  .  From the opening flourish and sequences, I 
 realised that I wasn’t using my informal tonal plan in a detailed way; nor did I want to, for I 
 felt more grounded in the moment, and I was enjoying the sensation of making musical 
 decisions in the moment. I had an image of the three individual sections of the piece in my 
 mind but little else; and perhaps I was also helped by the registrations chosen for this piece 
 which were strong and carrying. I knew I had to prepare the Fugue section by finishing on the 
 dominant chord of G minor, but this occurred without incident and when I started the Fugue I 
 heard my theme ring out throughout the monastery building. Joining other voices in sequence 
 to this theme felt logical and within my capability. I created some sequences (an episode 
 section of the Fugue structure) and brought the voices in again. Before I could go too far or 
 lose my way I brought the Fugue to a close and began the Toccata. Again, starting this 
 section of the piece felt organic, I wanted to play the racing figures of the Toccata and 
 unleash the energy stored through the discipline of the Fugue. I felt carried along by the 
 improvisation itself, strongly guided by the inner schema  1  ; that, so long as this mental 
 representation held good and true, my actions were right and appropriate to the overall 
 structure. This blend of cool cognitive awareness mixed with unforeseen, creative 
 improvising was an exciting performing experience which more than repaid the work I had 
 invested in the process of learning, and matched the hopes and expectations I had had for my 
 improvising with which I had started on this study. 
 8.6 Discussion and reflection on schemas  1  in relation  to musical form 
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 This chapter centres around a number of techniques for mentally representing the task 
 as performance became more fluent and automatic. These techniques culminated in the use of 
 a schema  1  for guiding improvisation, which corresponded  in my experience to a sense of 
 rightness or appropriateness in my decision making as I constructed a musical form. In 
 contrast to the  generative  concepts  1  for improvising  within stylistic constraints, the schema  1 
 for overall musical structure could not be explicitly defined (for example, the use of an 
 informal tonal plan as preparation for schema  1  -guided  performance was quite different to the 
 analysis and selection of musical features used to construct a generative concepts  1  ). This does 
 not mean that my experience of the schema  1  was vague  or- ill-defined (just as in Kant’s 
 [1781/1998] original description of a schema there is no doubt about the perception of a 
 triangle); rather, that the schema  1  had a very embodied  mental representation which evaded 
 explicit description. On the other hand, as with any of the conceptual  1  structures I have 
 described, there was a small part which corresponded to theoretical or declarative structures, 
 which means that it is always possible to describe schemas  1  in relation to musical theory - 
 modulations, changes of tempo and meter, and so on; particularly those features in music 
 which segregate boundaries and help listeners to process musical form. This might seem as 
 though one could construct a schema  1  for improvisation  in a literal, theoretical way (as in the 
 exercises of written treatises, see Chapter 5.2.1) but this I found was not the case. The 
 schema  1  in my experience emerged as the last of a  sequence of learning states characterised 
 by the acquisition of conceptual  1  mental representations  and perspectives of the task. 
 Categorisations  1  and generative concepts  1  thus preceded  the schema  1  , and each representation 
 was created through directed, imaginative cognitive interaction with the task; these 
 interactions continually reconstructing features until meaningful relationships occurred which 
 could be classified or named in terms of categorisations  1  ,  concepts  1  , and schemas  1  . 
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 Therefore, I would strongly distinguish the idea of musical form as a purely 
 theoretical structure from the mental representation of a schema  1  used for improvisation, in 
 the same way as Toch (1977) contrasts form with ‘FORM’: 
 ‘Whatever FORM may be, let us not confuse it with  forms , namely, the forms used in 
 classical music. These forms generally constitute what is taught and studied under the 
 heading of “form”, frequently augmented by “analysis”, thought the “analysis” also 
 means nothing else than the analysis of these forms … A piece may be written in any 
 one of the classified forms to its minutest detail and still may exhibit a pitifully poor 
 FORM … And a piece may reveal not the slightest affiliation to any of the traditional 
 forms, and yet may be a prodigious masterpiece of FORM … ‘How would you 
 describe the form of a fugue? Among the wealth of Bach’s fugues no two show the 
 same structure. Yet each of them displays a masterly FORM (original emphasis), be it 
 macrocosmically majestic or microcosmically graceful and dainty’ (p.154). 
 Taking Toch’s (1977) distinction of FORM as true to the schema  1  as I experienced it, 
 it’s important then to understand the levels of freedom involved. It indicates that my approach 
 to improvised musical structure was now a long way from the  Werktreue  ideals of form with 
 which I had started the study: in which the whole musical structure depended on fixed 
 relationships at every level of texture. My approach was now looser, more organic and 
 cognitively lighter; an approach which I found was precisely described in Ledbetter’s (1990) 
 introduction to the Baroque composer and organist G.F. Handel’s (1685-1759) exercises in 
 Fugue: ‘Handel’s exercises relate to another tradition, that of the improvised fugue. Here the 
 fugue hardly has a set texture, still less a fixed form, but is more an effect. It's only 
 distinguishing feature is that there should be a principal subject, which enters successively at 
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 different pitch levels. Integrity of parts is not necessarily maintained, and connecting material 
 is made up from what are essentially elaborations of basic continuo formulas’ (p.2). 
 Interestingly then, it was through an attitude of creative freedom towards musical 
 structure that I achieved formal coherence in improvisation. At a cognitive level this makes 
 sense as, in the moment of performance, conscious control is unsuited to processing the 
 complexity of the task in a flexible, responsive way. In terms of musical form or FORM, I 
 can report my own experience which attempted both types of control during the same recital: 
 certainly, by letting go and using more automatic processes, triggered more through semantic 
 association than conscious  control , I had a sensation  of monitoring the sequence of events. 
 When this occurred (in the third improvisation) I also had a sense of genuinely creative 
 improvising - the musical structure had a natural, inner logic which was appropriate to the 
 moment and unpremeditated; while my other two improvisations, in which I tried more 
 consciously to construct the musical form, I would describe as less imaginative and less 
 satisfying from a formal point of view.. Thus, it was only by letting go of conscious control 
 that I attained a sense of schema  1  or organic FORM  (as Toch [1977] describes, and maybe 
 something in this contrast in approach to musical structure is captured by Leahey (2004) 
 when he makes a distinction between  rule-following  and  rule-governed  behaviour: 
 ‘The earth revolves around the sun in an elliptical path governed by Newton’s 
 laws of gravity. However, the earth does not follow these laws in the sense that it 
 computes them and adjusts its course to comply with them … the motions of natural 
 objects are governed by physical laws without following them by internal processing’ 
 (Leahey, 2004, p.440). 
 8.7 Themes emerging from Chapter 8 (months 24-36) 
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 1.  Semantic memory and embodied representation:  as productions gain fluency and 
 automaticity, conscious awareness of improvisation is altered to monitor and control 
 larger sections of musical structure from a more distal perspective. 
 2.  Performance techniques:  particular cognitive and emotional  strategies are employed 
 to meet the conditions of improvised public performance. 
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 Chapter 9 
 Findings and Conclusions in relation to the initial research questions 
 In this chapter I reflect on the main themes and features arising from this study. 
 Returning to initial research questions formulated at the beginning of the study (which also 
 allows me to regain a novice perspective of the task), I answer these questions in turn, 
 comparing and contrasting the knowledge I have gained with other perspectives found in 
 literature, interviews and personal conversation with improvisers. Thus, in this chapter I offer 
 more generalised conclusions concerning classical musicians’ experience of improvisation, 
 including: (i) the qualitative differences in knowledge between the interpretive performer and 
 the improviser; (ii), the effects of personality and emotions on learning to improvise; (iii) the 
 various ways in which improvisation is consciously represented at different stages of 
 learning; and (iv) the effect of cultural and social context on individuals’ learning and 
 performance of improvisation. I also summarise and try to define the salient features of a 
 conceptual  1  knowledge for improvisation, which allows  for generative, expressive and fluent 
 musical creation in real time. I finish by describing the wider implications of my study (and 
 this discussion) for pedagogic methods in teaching classically-trained musicians to improvise, 
 and for further research investigation into improvisation. 
 9.1 Research question 1: Why couldn’t I improvise? I was an experienced musician with 
 an extensive knowledge of musical structure and instrumental technique. What was 
 wrong or inappropriate about my existing knowledge? 
 9.1.1 The imperative of procedural knowledge 
 I began the study with a great deal of skills and experience as an interpretive 
 performer of classical music, yet, like many classically-trained musicians, this knowledge did 
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 not allow me to improvise. The idea that one can possess extensive musical knowledge, but 
 not know how to improvise, implies the necessity of specialised knowledge for a particular 
 domain. Anderson (1982), whose insights into the cognition of performance I have drawn on 
 extensively throughout the study, refers to this specialised knowledge - resulting only from 
 active engagement in a task - as  procedural  knowledge,  thus: ‘the distinction between 
 procedural and declarative knowledge is fundamental  20  .  Procedural knowledge is represented 
 as sequential productions, whereas declarative knowledge [theoretical, non-experiential 
 knowledge] is represented as a propositional network’ (p.370)  1  . If we understand declarative 
 knowledge to be purely theoretical - knowing  about  something without direct experience of 
 doing , then the process of learning to improvise can  be seen as a normal skill learning activity 
 described by Anderson (1982). However, my study (Chapter 4) indicates a more problematic 
 process of transition of knowledge involving negative emotions, interference of learnt 
 actions, cognitive confusion, and so on; aspects of learning which are likewise reflected in 
 many studies (i.e. Dolan, 2005; Woosley, 2012; Chyu, 2004) which describe the specific 
 challenges of introducing classical musicians to improvisation. Why then should the 
 acquisition of procedural knowledge in improvisation be so problematic for 
 classically-trained musicians? 
 I believe Goldman (2016) touches on this problem, when he states that: ‘different 
 musicians may know about similar musical structures in different ways; different ways of 
 knowing facilitate different kinds of perception and cognition that underlie different 
 performance behaviours. Some of these ways of knowing can facilitate improvisatory 
 20  The distinction between these two types of knowledge has been variously described. Scheffler 
 (1965), for example talks of “knowing that'' and “knowing how to”, while Berkowitz (2010) talks in 
 terms of (linguistic)  competence  versus  performance :  ‘perceptual competence allows for the 
 comprehension of the speech … of others using this knowledge base, while productive competence 
 provides for the generation of communicative utterances based upon this knowledge’ (p.97). In a 
 similar way, Hiebert & Lefevre (1986) distinguish between  conceptual  versus  procedural  knowledge, 
 while Anderson (1983) uses the terms  declarative  vs.  procedural 
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 performance practices’ (abstract). Goldman’s description of ‘different kinds of perception and 
 cognition’ extends the discussion beyond a straightforward acquisition of procedural 
 knowledge. It brings us back to my opening statement that classically-trained musicians (such 
 as myself) frequently possess considerable expertise, involving technical instrumental skills, 
 an extensive knowledge of repertoire and musical style, historically-informed performance 
 practices, a deep knowledge of musical structure, and so on. It is this complex and distinctive 
 ‘way of knowing’ that the classically-trained novice improviser must transfer from one 
 domain of expertise (interpretive performance) to another (improvisation), and to achieve this 
 transition, as I have demonstrated in my study, requires a significant qualitative change on 
 behalf of the student in their perception of musical structure 
 9.1.2 A conflict between two ways of knowing about music 
 The notion that the two areas of expertise conflict with each other, rather than connect 
 or compliment, underlies comments such as Woosley’s (2012) when he describes classical 
 musicians as being ‘taught to perform notated works in a specific manner … this can lead to 
 the notion that all music must be practised in the exact manner in which it will be performed’ 
 (p.9), or Schuiling (2016) when he complains that: ‘performers are caught up in a paradigm 
 of “reproduction” … in this paradigm, the demand to play “just the notes” or to stick to the 
 composer’s intentions is not just an ethical obligation but an ontological necessity’ (p.42). In 
 both cases the authors are taking the interpretive performer’s musical approach as a starting 
 point for discussing alternative, improvised approaches to music. Whereas the interpreter 
 understands music through the written score, in which every element is predetermined, the 
 improviser, as Woosley (2012) goes on to say: ‘has total freedom. Musical boundaries can be 
 created or ignored ... Improvisation helps us to remember the importance of freedom in the 
 “spirit of performance” that we, as musicians, need to have’ (p.15). Confronting this freedom, 
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 as I discovered, is one of the principal difficulties of learning to improvise, coming from a 
 score-based training and experience. 
 Considering the particular way in which the interpretive performer views the score as 
 a completed work, how can they possibly perceive the same score as a model for 
 improvisation? Which elements can be altered without destroying the integrity of the whole 
 musical structure? Looking to cognitive theories for guidance produces only an array of 
 options: a  referent  structure should be constructed,  but how? Different connections between 
 musical elements - hierarchic or associative - can be used to  generate  structure, but in what 
 order? This situation of doubt and uncertainty over how to act, how to select, how to act 
 agentically and make creative decisions, is characteristic of novice improvisation in classical 
 contexts. It is a problem which extends beyond emotions to involve deeper belief structures 
 about how music is created. To overcome these beliefs, as I argue below, classical musicians 
 may be forced not only to question habitual modes of thinking and processing music, but also 
 to critically examine the cultural values and ideals in which they are situated  21  . It is also, I 
 believe, only through a more explicit recognition of the conceptual  1  nature of the improviser’s 
 knowledge that I will illustrate how classical musicians can be sufficiently guided towards a 
 qualitatively different way of perceiving and processing musical structure. 
 9.2 Research question 2: Was improvising skill dependent on personality or emotions? 
 Was I the wrong type of personality? 
 As this question arose from the belief that I might be innately unsuited for 
 improvisation, I will link my notion to widespread cultural perceptions of the concert 
 21  A friend and colleague Nicholas McNair who teaches  improvisation to classical musicians at 
 secondary level adopts exactly this strategy, as he recently explained to me: ‘from the beginning of 
 my improvisation teaching I have sought to deconstruct the dominant mode of seeing classical music 
 with its composers and scores. Through reading Lydia Goehr’s book ‘The Imaginary Museum of 
 Musical Works’ I was alerted to some of the mechanisms whereby people are held in thrall to the 
 dominant mode’ (N. McNair, personal communication, 11th July, 2021). 
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 improviser as a ‘wizard’-style entertainer, possessing innate gifts and a distinctive outgoing 
 type of personality. Comparing this stereotype to similarly generalised perceptions of the 
 classical musician’s character and personality (as interpretive performer), it is possible to 
 understand how such a perception can dominate novice improvisers’ perception of the task 
 and of their own abilities. Lastly, investigating the influence of personality on learning 
 contexts enables me to challenge the conception that improvisation is dependent on 
 personality, proposing instead a construction of improvising skill based on the acquisition of 
 strategies and positive learning emotions. 
 9.2.1 Attributes of the professional improviser’s personality, as commonly 
 perceived 
 A common cultural construction of the classical improviser, particularly those of the 
 concert organists I observed, is what I term ‘the wizard’. It is a perception which thrives on 
 ignorance of the skills underlying improvisation (the idea that improvisation skills can be 
 learnt and studied), a notion that creativity is reserved only for those with innate creative 
 gifts, and the rarity of improvised performance. The wizard type of improviser demonstrates 
 extraordinary skills with fluency, agency and control over the task. This type of classical 
 improviser accepts themes from the audience as ‘proof’ of their ability to create music 
 without planning  22  . Comparisons with composed music  are naturally made when improvisers 
 use titles such as Suite, Fugue, Symphony, etc., yet as Rzewski (2006) describes, there is an 
 22  The practice of taking themes from the audience is highly popular within the French symphonic 
 tradition of improvisation. Artists such as Jean Langlais (1907-1991) and this teacher Marcel Dupré 
 (1886-1971), regularly improvised Organ Symphonies - multiple movement works on a grand scale, 
 based on two or more given themes, and featuring contrapuntal devices such as Fugues. Langlais 
 himself discusses this style of improvisation in Bailey (1992). The popularity of this style of ‘instant 
 composing’ approach to improvisation came to its peak with the figure of Pierre Cochereau 
 (1924-1984) who, in addition to world tours of over two thousand concerts, improvised in the 
 cathedral of Notre-Dame in Paris to thousands of listeners every Christmas Eve on given themes.The 
 link between improvisation and composition is emphasised by other improvisers such as David Briggs 
 who transcribed and recorded improvisations by Cochereau in a CD entitled ‘The Illusionist’s Art’. 
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 element of illusion about the improviser’s ability to instantly compose: ‘The art of the 
 improviser can be compared to that of the magician. The improviser does in time what the 
 magician does in space. The magician does something with the right hand which distracts the 
 attention of the spectator from the action of the left hand. The improviser follows an 
 unintended action (a) with a purposeful action (b), whose function is to make (a) appear 
 purposeful also’ (p.492). 
 However, if perceptions of ‘the wizard’s’ skill seem confusing in terms of 
 musical-structural approach and integrity, the idea that they are free to follow the dictates of 
 their imagination in the moment is a more rooted conviction. Stemming from 19th century 
 ideas that improvisation was ‘inspirational and gave musicians immediate access to the world 
 of transcendent truth’ (Goehr, 1994, p.233), the improviser’s performance is often 
 characterised by ‘much-heralded uncertainty’, a ‘risk-taking agenda’ and ‘edgy virtuosity’ 
 (Peters, 2012, p.6). Elements of this approach can be seen in the language used by 
 improvisers to discuss their craft: “Improvisation is ... the only art in which a human being 
 can and must become the music he or she is making. It is the art of constant, attentive and 
 dangerous living in every moment. It is the art of stepping outside of time, disappearing in it, 
 becoming it” (Curran, 2006, p.483). Thus, I would align my original idea of the professional 
 improviser’s personality with the following common beliefs: 
 ●  The improviser is able to dominate their instrument and the performance 
 situation, to demonstrate extraordinary technical and musical skills. 
 ●  The improviser immerses themselves totally in a creative-communicative 
 relationship with their audience, creating in response to inspiration received in 
 the moment. 
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 9.2.2 Attributes of the interpretive performer’s personality, as commonly 
 perceived 
 The implications, in spite of the uncertainty regarding what improvisers actually  do  is 
 a certainty that they do it with flair and extroversion, and this might appear daunting for some 
 classical musicians who believe that ‘a musician’s personality should never distract from the 
 music’ (Rea, 2015, p.200). Whether it is through training (i.e., learnt behaviour, or through 
 natural inclination is not clear) but Lehmann, Sloboda & Woody, (2007) assert: ‘research has 
 identified several personality traits that are common in the [classical music] profession and 
 often associated with anxiety. One such characteristic is  introversion . Introverts have an 
 inward-looking personality … [they] prefer to be cautious and plan ahead’ (p.152), qualities 
 which would fit badly with the (seemingly) unplanned and spontaneous activities of 
 professional improvisers accepting themes at the last second and are demonstrative 
 (outward-looking) in the way they communicate with audiences. Similarly, Kemp (1982), 
 who researched student classical musicians, characterised their personalities through 
 ‘introversion, pathemia and intelligence’ attributes which he says ‘reflect something about the 
 nature of being a musician in terms of his life-style, cognitive style and work habits’ (p.12). 
 Rea (2015) supports the close association between the nature of the task (interpretive 
 performance) in encouraging  ‘introversion and a suppression of personality’, noting also that 
 with the focus being on technical skills and accuracy, ‘there is limited consideration for the 
 relationship with the audience, an aspect that is widely neglected in the training’ (p.199). 
 Therefore, I believe my perspective of character and personality is representative of 
 an interpretive performer situated in a cultural context of classical music and trained in 
 interpretive performance. On the one hand I perceived my musical personality as introverted, 
 i.e., trained to look inward (to my knowledge of the musical score) rather than outward to 
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 audience expectations; and to subvert my personality to serve the score. On the other hand, I 
 perceived professional improvisers - which I aimed to become through my study - as 
 outgoing, confident, capable of direct communication with a highly expectant audience, 
 capable of delivering instant composition (either through illusion or through genuine 
 creativity, I couldn’t say). Thus, there was a dichotomy between the two personality types 
 which I associated at the outset of the study (see Chapter 4.1.2) with Ben-Zur, Breznitz & 
 Hashmonay’s (1993) Type A (neurotic, frustrated) or Type B (calm, satisfied) personality 
 types. Whether this portrayal or use of literature is accurate I doubt (with hindsight), nor is it 
 really important as it really only reflects the sense of innate inappropriateness for the task that 
 I imagine many classical musicians might sense as they compare their own knowledge and 
 experience of music (interpreted as personality or innate gifts) with their impression of 
 professional improvisers - the ‘wizards’. 
 9.2.3 Personality attributes in learning contexts of improvisation 
 For many classical musicians then, there may be a sense of one’s personality being a 
 barrier to improvising; a sense of lingering doubt about one’s innate fitness to improvise. This 
 is particularly so as one begins study and feels unequal to the challenge of improvising one’s 
 own music, as Woosley (2012) indicates: ‘Improvisation involves allowing the personality of 
 the pianist to be expressed through music. It is exposing’ (p.11). Others, such as Kristiina 
 Ilmonen (in Hill, 2017) are more positive: ‘We believe that [improvisation] is a very good 
 way of finding elements in yourself as a musician that you would not otherwise find. So, 
 through improvisation, you can find your personality as a musician’ (p.230). However, these 
 positive predictions of personal change and development through learning to improvise may 
 not be universal: in conversations which I had with students (in Stuttgart HMDK) they 
 revealed rooted beliefs that they would never achieve the expertise demonstrated by their 
 265 
 teacher  23  ; and this belief, surprisingly, was often voiced by those who I considered to be 
 advanced in their skills. This emphasises the fact that individuals will respond in different 
 ways to the challenges and strategies of learning contexts: some being willing to change 
 fundamental perspectives and self-beliefs as they acquire skills in improvisation; while 
 others, even while acquiring skills, cling to habitual self-perceptions of themselves as 
 innately unsuited for improvisation. 
 9.2.3 Questioning the construct of improvising skill in terms of personality 
 What then of the improviser’s personality? As I acquired the skills of improvisation I 
 rejected the idea of the ‘wizard’ personality as too limiting for the range of musical skills and 
 approaches I discovered possible through improvisation. Can one, in spite of this range of 
 skills, still propose certain personality attributes as essential for improvisation? Gobet (2016), 
 for example, talks of typical traits of  creative expertise  as ‘dominant, confident, and able to 
 face the competition. They are independent and introverted. .. they are willing to take risks 
 and accept the consequences of failure’ (p.128). But are all creative experts like this? Or is 
 this a type of behaviour which experts characteristically demonstrate within their chosen field 
 of expertise? Are these not also relative constructs of personality traits dependent on social 
 norms of behaviour which define attributes such as confidence, dominance, introversion in 
 different ways. Thus, any attempt to define the personality of an improviser seems to raise 
 more questions than it answers, and a closer acquaintance with many diverse improvising 
 personalities supports the rejection of specific personality traits for improvisation. For 
 example, Anton Bruckner (1824-1896), one of the most creative and celebrated organ 
 improvisers of the 19th century (Tandberg, 2008) was notably shy, unassertive and 
 unconfident, as Watson (2020) describes: ‘He never lost his simplicity of character ... or his 
 23  This response was common amongst students whose teachers characteristically demonstrated their 
 skills as a teaching strategy. The demotivating effect of fluent demonstration on students is noted by 
 Woosley (2012). 
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 unquestioning deference to authority. Although his intellectual powers cannot be doubted in 
 the light of his achievement, he remained inwardly insecure and constantly sought 
 testimonials and certificates as to his ability’ (p.1)  24  .  How, might one ask, could one 
 improvise with such a character? The answer, I believe, is in the knowledge gained from the 
 task itself, when that knowledge allows the individual to act with agency and control over the 
 stimulus. Patterns of behaviour can also be learnt for particular contexts and situations, as I 
 discovered through participation in a practising community of improvisation; ways of 
 approaching the instrument, choosing registration, etc., which inspire confidence in the 
 improviser, and also in the audience. This would reflect Bandura’s (1997) words that: ‘there 
 are two kinds of self-confidence - one a trait of personality, and another that comes from 
 knowledge of a subject’ (p.65). 
 Perhaps then, it is more helpful to think of improvisation less in terms of global 
 personality types and more in terms of learning emotions and pedagogical strategies? For 
 example, when Sietze de Vries (2018) asserts: ‘ there  are professional organists who can’t 
 even play a melody back to you and yet you can teach any child of six or seven years old to 
 harmonise a melody with three chords’, does  this observation  reflect personality types? Or 
 age differences? The effect of training and experience, or learning emotions? Lehmann, 
 Sloboda, Woody, 2007) attribute an ‘inordinate concern about minor mistakes and 
 inconsistencies and a tendency to notice what is wrong instead of what is right’, to 
 ‘perfectionism’ - a ‘disposition’ or ‘personality trait’ which is common among classical 
 performers, but add that these traits  ‘may not be set firmly beyond a person’s control’ 
 24  A similar range of character portraits of celebrated improvisers can be found in Ochse’s (2000) 
 study of French and Belgian organists. From these we understand, for example, that César Franck 
 (1822-1890) avoided virtuosity and ‘any of the feats of skill customary among the acrobats desirous 
 of dazzling the gallery’ (p.58), while Camille Saint-Saëns (1835-1921) ‘emphasised clarity and 
 brilliance’ (p.58); both performers being ‘classed as “severe” performers by their contemporaries’ 
 (p.59). 
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 (p.153). Thus, what is originally perceived as a personality trait can be influenced by learning 
 strategies through which an individual acquires new skills, new ways of behaving and acting 
 as a musician and improviser which redefine his personality. This kind of development 
 marked my own learning as I noticed how people began to describe my improvised 
 performance in terms of innate abilities: “you have a gift for improvising”, which also 
 influenced my own perception of self, so that I began to think of myself, my personality and 
 character as suitable for improvisation. 
 In summary then, despite the obvious variety of characters and personality types, each 
 with their own disposition to learning and performance, it is likely that very few personality 
 traits could be considered as barriers to improvising. The ‘wizard’ personality type, though 
 currently dominant as a concert improviser in classical circles, is by no means the only valid 
 role model for improvisation. My own teacher Jürgen Essl, for example, was never overly 
 demonstrative when improvising, yet he enjoys an international career, and is relaxed and 
 communicative in front of an audience. Although there might seem at first to be a bad ‘fit’ 
 between the skills of improvisation and reported tendencies towards shyness and sensitivity 
 to errors amongst classically-trained musicians (Kemp, 1982; Lehmann, Sloboda, Woody, 
 2007), these impressions frequently disappear as individuals engage in successful learning 
 paths and develop their own style and approach towards improvising. In the following 
 paragraphs I will investigate positive emotions during learning experiences, and the 
 acquisition of cognitive strategies which build self-confidence, creative agency and control 
 over the task, these being more influential factors over the improviser’s path towards 
 expertise than personality traits and innate qualities. 
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 9.3 Research question 3: Could I learn to improvise purely by conquering my emotions 
 and critical feedback? Or by becoming less inhibited, more confident about 
 improvising? 
 As this question arose through a perception that negative emotions experienced as a 
 novice served as a barrier to acquiring the skills of improvisation  25  I now link my own 
 experience of learning emotions to similar reports in research. The following discussion 
 covers these three points: 
 1.  Negative emotions experienced by novice improvisers (trained in  Werktreue 
 ideals of interpretive performance) can be traced to a sense of alienation from 
 creative practice. Strategies for overcoming this are discussed 
 2.  Emotions continue to play an important role throughout the learning process 
 even at the level of expert performance. 
 3.  The role of emotions in improvisation can be better understood through 
 autoethnographic techniques of documenting one’s own experience, which 
 encourage objectivity and reflection. 
 9.3.1 Is the novice experience of improvisation dominated by emotions? 
 Negative learning emotions as I experienced them (see Chapter 4) are clearly 
 replicated in other accounts of novice improvising amongst classically-trained musicians. 
 Most researchers explicitly mention  fear : of ‘‘not  knowing what to do’, ‘getting stuck’, 
 ‘making a fool of myself’, and ‘losing control’ (Dolan, 2005, p.111); Hill (2017) mentions 
 students who are ‘scared of making decisions’ (p.228), ‘fear of making mistakes, failing or 
 embarrassing oneself’ (p.229), while Woosley (2012) asserts that ‘fear drives many from ever 
 25  Again, the question captures a naive perspective reflecting common perceptions of improvisation, 
 not as a skill to be learnt, but something accessed through attitudes of ‘freedom and spontaneity and 
 originality’ (Goldmann, 2016) which are discussed in the previous section. 
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 attempting to improvise’ (p.20). In all cases, the authors make a similar connection from 
 negative emotions to underlying beliefs and learnt habits acquired through previous training. 
 Thus, Hill (2017) mentions prevailing ‘attitudes emphasizing a single correct model of 
 performance and interpretation can inhibit creativity and increase performance anxiety’ 
 (p.229), ‘overly critical and perfectionist attitudes towards the score’ (p.226), and ‘an 
 underlying attitude that the creative potential of performers is somehow inferior’ (p.223); 
 Dolan (2005): of ‘fear, originating from the contemporary culture of ‘perfect performance’’ 
 (p.111), and Woosley (2012), that ‘when a classical pianist attempts improvisation, there can 
 be a tendency to immediately compare the improvised music to works of the standard 
 repertoire’ (p.10). 
 It is not surprising that individuals, having been trained to learn music in one method, 
 should resort to habitual modes of emotional and cognitive processing as they attempt to 
 improvise. Anxiety over errors could therefore be interpreted as a process of evaluative 
 conditioning ‘whereby an emotion is induced by a piece of music simply because this 
 stimulus has been paired repeatedly with other positive or negative stimuli’ (Juslin & 
 Västfjäll, 2008, p.564). In this way, one’s attempts to improvise in a certain style such as 
 Bach, or Mozart, would naturally trigger former associations with this repertoire, thus leading 
 to fear of errors, and so on. However, given the fact of these negative emotions in many 
 learning contexts, it’s also important to note their effect on individuals’ sense of judgement 
 while improvising: Pekrun (2014), for example, notes that ‘emotions control the students’ 
 attention, influence their motivation to learn, modify the choice of learning strategies, and 
 affect their self-regulation of learning’ (p.6). Therefore, we can imagine situations in which, 
 because of their emotions, individuals are unable to respond to learning strategies, to notice 
 improvements in their improvisation, or feel positive or relaxed when improvising. 
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 A couple of examples serve to illustrate this point: for example, Després et al. (2016) 
 noticed that ‘immigrant’ improvisers (those who came to improvisation from a background in 
 interpretive performance) use less words associated with pleasure and fun than ‘native’ 
 improvisers (who had improvised from an early age). Likewise I noticed a tendency to feel 
 anxiety whenever I improvised, as I compared my improvising to the compositional models, 
 an emotional approach to the task which persisted even after I was quite advanced in my 
 skills. Another example is students’ reactions to game-like exercises as proposed by 
 pedagogues (i.e. Dolan, 2005; Hill 2017). My own teacher Jurgen Essl also used this method 
 of disassociating the improvisation task from classical repertoire. Yet, although this method 
 works well with many students, there were also occasions when the student simply refused to 
 play ‘games’ involving ‘wrong notes’. In these situations, the student’s negative emotions (of 
 shame, fear, and embarrassment) seemed so strong that they interpreted the exercise as a 
 humiliation rather than a learning strategy. 
 In a similar way, if we accept that classically-trained musicians often believe that 
 ‘their creative potential … is somehow inferior’ (Hill, 2017, p.223) then it also helps to 
 understand how such beliefs can be reinforced by emotions. Goleman (1997) claims that ‘the 
 emotional mind [carries] a particularly strong sense of certainty, a by-product of a 
 streamlined, simplified way of looking at things that can be absolutely bewildering to the 
 rational mind’ (p.291), thus, students’ emotions can convince them that their improvising is 
 worthless or pointless, no matter what the musical results are. This inability to value one’s 
 own creativity can become a dominating feature of the novice improviser’s experience, and 
 arises particularly (I discovered) during first attempts to improvise on a compositional model. 
 In effect, as soon as one plays something which is not written in the score, there is a strong 
 feeling of uncertainty, of going ‘off-grid’, even of committing an ‘artistic crime’ (Bailey, 
 1993). Thus I propose that the classically-trained novice is in a unique position of  alienation 
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 from creative practice as they attempt to improvise; a position created and reinforced through 
 a combination of learning emotions, beliefs about creative practice ( how  music is created and 
 who  can create it) and self-beliefs about their inability  to improvise. 
 For this reason, I propose the following model which places the classical musician’s 
 sense of alienation at the centre of associated emotional and cognitive problems arising as 
 they begin to improvise 
 Figure 22.  The classically-trained musician’s emotions  as a novice are traced to a sense of 
 alienation from creativity. 
 9.3.2 Emotions throughout the learning cycle 
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 Regarding the role of emotions throughout the learning cycle, I have already 
 emphasised (above) the importance for each individual (no matter what their personality 
 traits) to access positive emotions while improvising and also acquire a sense of creative 
 agency and empowerment through learning. In this section I want to explore the ways in 
 which these emotions can shape and influence the experience of improvisation itself during 
 learning. When Woosley (2012) mentions that ‘many students may at first be hesitant or even 
 fearful of allowing their creativity to shine through their improvisation’ (p.15) he doesn’t 
 only describe an emotion (fear), but also a reluctance to act (hesitation)  because  of the 
 emotion of fear. This is what Aragão (2011) observed in students of language when he 
 proposed that ‘ emotions  imply movement ... emotions  here are defined as bodily dispositions 
 for situated action’ (p.302). For example, a reluctance to ‘let go’ and allow automated 
 productions to take over performance (widely reported in skill-learning literature, and also in 
 this study) can also result in deficiencies in learning as individuals lack access to valuable 
 experience acquired only by more fluent movement. In a similar way, Overskeid (2000) links 
 sadness (negative emotion) to self-doubt within the context of problem solving: ‘sadness 
 makes one experience situations as unpleasant more easily. In problem solving, one such 
 unpleasant state is doubt. Because sad people should be expected to doubt their solutions 
 more easily than others, they will also have a motive for more thorough checking of 
 solutions’ (p.297). This is an interesting connection because there are clearly situations in 
 learning where an analytical problem-solving attitude is useful, for example, when integrating 
 rules into my improvising (Chapter 5.4), and this work may be motivated by a feeling of 
 doubt, causing one to check one’s actions and remove the cause of doubt. On the other hand, 
 more pleasant, positive emotions are clearly associated with a willingness to experiment 
 (Borgo, 2007), and an ability to access ‘flow states’ (Dolan, 2005) with a contrasting 
 cognitive style of processing, as Pekrun (2014) describes: ‘When enjoying learning … 
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 making it possible that one’s attention is fully focused on the task. Enjoyment can promote 
 students’ flow experiences during learning, such as deep involvement and complete 
 immersion in the activity’ (p.12). 
 Thus, in a general way, one can associate positive emotions with a willingness to act 
 and acquire knowledge through experience, whereas negative emotions tend to halt 
 movement, promoting checking and careful constructions of the task. Positive emotions, 
 arising from increasing self-confidence and agency over the task, can also be linked to more 
 advanced stages of skill learning in which individuals increasingly rely on intuitive decision 
 making, as Gobet (2016) describes: ‘decisions are still based on analytical thinking, but 
 intuition starts to play an important role: problem situations are organised and intuitively’ 
 (p.99). This emergence of more intuitive learning strategies is something I described in detail 
 (see Chapter 7), including the positive emotions I experienced as I explored and integrated 
 more intuitive decision making as an improviser. In the following extract, the expert 
 improviser Malcolm Bilson gives an example of his emotionally-guided, intuitive 
 decision-making approach to learning: ‘you like what you’re doing, or you don’t like what 
 you’re doing: you develop your taste, “yes I like this … no I don’t like that” … and at some 
 point you don’t have to say that, you just know where you’re going …’ (p.89). 
 9.3.3 Achieving a better understanding of emotions through autoethnographic 
 techniques of data collection 
 One of the benefits of an autoethnographic study is the opportunity to gain insights 
 into one’s musical practice (Bartleet, 2009). Recording my emotions in a journal during and 
 after practising gave me the opportunity to reflect on my emotional responses to 
 improvisation. For example, I discovered the influence of ‘automatic thoughts’ (Beck, 1991) 
 - imaginative scenarios in which critical figures reported their feedback on my improvising 
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 (see Chapter 4.1.5); I also gained a better awareness of positive emotions which I recorded in 
 my journal, but tended to suppress during the actual playing experience. These advantages of 
 methodology are echoed by other researchers; for example, Aragão (2011): ‘Reflection on 
 beliefs is one of the major aspects that create optimal conditions for change in the process of 
 language learning, with the emergence of alternative ways of thinking’ (p.310), while Roels 
 (2013) in a similar creative self-study, reports that: ‘making memos or field notes was used to 
 become fully aware of the changes that this research has wrought on my practice and vice 
 versa’ (p.5). Therefore, I propose the autoethnographic methods for achieving greater 
 self-awareness of one’s emotions while improvising because, as I suggested earlier, certain 
 emotional responses can be difficult to overcome and extraordinarily influential over 
 students’ self-beliefs and experience of the learning process. Pekrun (2014) warns us that, in 
 many situations: ‘students may regard their emotional experiences as a private affair that they 
 do not want to share’ (p.9) and also ‘ that teachers’ judgements of students’ emotions can be 
 very different from students’ self-view’ (p.9). Therefore, creating opportunities for students 
 to reflect and understand their  own  emotions while  improvising could be a valuable tool for 
 pedagogy, empowering individuals to access a more positive and productive improvising 
 experience. 
 9.4 Research question 4: Why could I improvise in free, atonal styles but not using 
 historical, tonal languages and genres? 
 This question refers to a former experience in improvisation (see Chapter 3.2.2) in 
 which I improvised fluently using a non-tonal system of harmony. Improvising using tonal, 
 diatonic harmony however was too difficult and required this study to attain the skills. I 
 therefore investigate this question from the perspective of experience gained in both styles of 
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 improvisation which I compare with general approaches and attitudes towards different styles 
 of improvising. 
 9.4.1 What are the skills involved in different harmonic systems and historic 
 styles of improvisation, and how do these compare? 
 This study began with the goal of acquiring skills  in tonal improvisation, as I found 
 this musical language particularly difficult to control. The complexities of coordinating 
 contrapuntal, voice-leading lines within a harmonic framework, and the necessity of 
 resolving dissonant to consonant intervals on which this style depends was for me, 
 overwhelming; the only approach possible in this style was an extremely slow, effortful 
 construction, in which I experienced no sense of expressive or imaginative freedom. Atonal 
 languages, on the other hand, offered a domain of comparative freedom as I dismissed the 
 problem of harmonic language and focused instead on other elements of the texture, such as 
 the interrelationships of rhythmic cells. Does this mean that improvisation in tonal languages 
 of harmony are more difficult to master? Certainly, general trends amongst concert 
 improvisers indicate that tonal improvisation in historical styles is rare,  26  as de Vries (2014) 
 explains: 
 ‘I almost have an aversion to the French Romantic improvisation style ... Even the 
 Haarlem competition [an international organ competition for improvisation] has 
 become infected with this dogma; it must be new, it must be creative, it must be 
 personal – all important of course but not the be all and end all. For me it’s much 
 26  I know of only three concert organists: Sietze de Vries, Wolfgang Siefen and David Cassan, who 
 improvise in Baroque forms. However, this refers specifically to recital contexts and does not take 
 into account organists who improvise in church contexts. Knowing the prevalence of tuition in 
 historical forms and styles of improvisation (particularly the techniques of Choral Vorspiel, Variation 
 and harmonisation), it is likely that a great deal of diatonic, tonal improvisation occurs in Germany; 
 however, very little of this way of improvising appears on concert stages compared to the French 
 Romantic style, and other, more contemporary languages. 
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 more interesting to be faced with a single manual meantone organ with a 4 octave 
 compass and to improvise something beautiful in two voices. That’s a real challenge.” 
 My interpretation of the ‘French Romantic style’ in de Vries’ description is that it is 
 based on a harmonic system of adapted modal scales as championed by the composer and 
 improviser Olivier Messiaen (1908-1992)  27  . An example  of these scales is given in Figure 23 
 Figure 23.  Modes of ‘limited transposition’  28  (Messaien,  1956) 
 This type of scale is presented by Messiaen in his treatise:  The Technique of my 
 Musical Language  (1956) as a system for generating  all melodic and harmonic aspects of the 
 musical texture. In contrast to the strict rules regarding the treatment of dissonant and 
 consonant intervals in diatonic systems (see Chapter 5.3.5 for a comparative view of Fux’s 
 [1725/1971] rules governing the motion of these intervals), dissonance and consonance are 
 treated more equally by Messiaen, as the aim is to create an chromatic, colourful sonority. 
 This means the improviser, harmonically-speaking, is in a position described by 
 28  Because the scale itself is constructed through alternate semitone and tone steps, there are only two 
 possibilities of modulation, each of which occurs through transposing the scale up one semitone, for 
 any other transposition replicates the original scale on another degree; thus, Messiaen (1956) refers to 
 these scales as ‘modes of limited transposition’. 
 27  Messiaen was a highly celebrated and influential improviser. Most of his improvising occurred as he 
 accompanied the Mass through his duties as organist at the  Église de la Sainte-Trinité, in Paris. 
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 Johnson-Laird (2002) as ‘neo-Lamarckian’ in which only appropriate ideas will be generated 
 in the moment as any combination of notes in the modal scale are acceptable; thus the 
 improviser is not dependent on the lengthy training customary in diatonic, tonal languages for 
 controlling the relations of dissonance and consonance at a similar level of fluency and 
 expressivity. 
 In a conversation I had with the concert improviser Wolfgang Mitterer, he compared 
 his experience of improvising in diatonic tonality with Messiaen’s scales of limited 
 transposition. 
 ‘It could be very stressful when you start a tonal thing, and then you lose the tonalities 
 and you can’t find it back! On the other hand if you forget this and come in with a 
 Messiaen style it’s not so difficult, because you just keep the [harmonic] tensions and 
 you don’t resolve them in this style’ (Wolfgang Mitterer, personal communication, 
 26th October, 2016). 
 Thus, for Mitterer, the challenge of maintaining the harmonic purity of diatonic tonality is 
 more challenging than the modal style, because there is no specific need to resolve the 
 dissonances in modes of limited transposition; these are maintained unresolved as part of the 
 colour and character of the style. 
 Lastly, I include a quote from the organist and improviser Jean Langlais (in Bailey, 
 1993), who compares the skills of improvisation in a free, atonal style, with the discipline of 
 a Baroque, contrapuntal form, featuring three independent voices: 
 ‘I met a very gifted man, both for the organ and for improvisation. He was the winner 
 of a competition in Haarlem. … I gave him three themes. And he did something really 
 free [atonal]. I then realised that he was very gifted but that his background was not 
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 developed sufficiently. Then I said ‘this is a very brief theme, do a trio with that’. And 
 he was unable to do a trio … Improvisation can be very complicated. Those people 
 who say ‘I can improvise easily’ - they are amateurs’ (p.38). 
 In spite of these quotations, it is not my intention to assert that one kind of harmonic 
 system (i.e. diatonic tonality) is harder than all others. Only that the rules of diatonic tonality 
 are more complicated to control and more unforgiving if one has not mastered them, than 
 other systems. As I suggested above, some individuals might greatly prefer the challenge of a 
 complex, rule-based system, and find the freedom of atonality difficult to master. My own 
 experience is reflected in Langlais’ words as (i) I discovered skills and fluency in improvising 
 using atonal systems did not transfer as skills using diatonic, tonal systems of harmony (ii) it 
 was the complications of constructing contrapuntal textures (independent voices) within tonal 
 systems of harmony which I found particularly difficult and challenging. 
 9.4.2. Perceiving tonal languages of music as improvisatory systems 
 I have already talked of the effect of emotional conditioning to certain styles and 
 languages of music as a result of former musical training (see Chapter 9.3.1) on individuals’ 
 ability to improvise. The same effect of former training can make it difficult for musicians to 
 perceive systems of diatonic tonality (most closely associated with the historic masterpieces 
 of canonic classical repertoire) in terms of opportunities for creative freedom and 
 self-expression. My own view as a novice was that tonal systems of harmony represented a 
 challenge or test of my skills, certainly not a musical language for having fun or relaxing! 
 Similarly, Wolfgang Mitterer told me: ‘It’s one thing to improvise on the organ [in a classical 
 style], and another thing to improvise in a free-jazz quartet. Which is one of the most free 
 things in a musical life - this conversation with three other people. Then you go for the 
 energy, not the harmonies; you use the harmonies to put energy’ (Wolfgang Mitterer, personal 
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 communication, 26th October, 2016). The composer and improviser Carlos ‘Zingaro’ (2006) 
 also describes conscious attempts to distance himself from classical styles as he sought 
 creative freedom: ‘After abandoning classical playing at 16/17, I kept my back turned to that 
 music because of basic trauma and frustration … even tried to learn the bass clarinet and the 
 trombone in order to ‘escape’ the violin … Improvisation gave me the possibility to figure 
 out different ways of using it … coming up with something that could finally surprise or 
 interest me’ (p.601). 
 Because of these learned associations between diatonic tonal systems and the classical 
 repertoire, I propose that it is particularly difficult to perceive historical styles of music in 
 terms of conceptual  1  underlying principles. For example,  one improviser I spoke to told me 
 that: ‘you cannot organise [an improvisation] per se as you would do in a Beethoven sonata 
 where motivic, logical things become like a big sudoku - everything locks together’ (see 
 conversation with Harry, Appendix D), a perspective which captures a  Werktreue  approach 
 towards musical structure in which every element in a work is fixed by the composer. 
 Compare this approach, however, with the following jazz musician’s perspective towards 
 musical structure: 
 ‘For jazz musicians, structures (a set form and harmonic structure) are a great 
 convenience in that they give us a framework for improvising where everybody in the 
 ensemble can be ‘on the same page’. The best analogy I have come up with is to a 
 clear glass kitchen mixing bowl. It’s rigid, but you can see through it. And no matter 
 what you put in it (pancake batter, candies, tuna salad, a goldfish in water), it retains 
 its shape. So each ‘chorus’ of improvisation you can put something different in the 
 musical bowl’ (Hersch, 2006, p.577). 
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 Hersch’s description makes explicit the conceptual  1  skills and approach towards 
 musical construction in his brilliant analogy of the ‘clear glass kitchen mixing bowl’, which 
 allows and encourages an organised freedom: ‘a framework ... where everybody can be on the 
 same page’. Again, the conceptual  1  mental construction  of the ‘set form and harmonic 
 structure’ is effortlessly conceived, and can be compared to my complex, effortful attempts to 
 describe my emerging conceptual  1  perception of Baroque  forms and harmonic structure! A 
 final example is given by Wessel (2006), who describes a more contemporary (free atonal) 
 approach in which the conceptual framework itself is created anew: ‘I will often develop my 
 musical concepts around the notion of a situation for the performers … The idea is a simple 
 one; capture material from your partner performer on the fly, transform it in some selected 
 manner, and re-inject it into the performance’ (p.426). For musicians such as Hersch, and 
 Wessel, the conceptual  1  nature of the task is explicit  and offers the correct blend of discipline, 
 organisation, and freedom which they need to stimulate their creativity quickly, in the 
 moment of performance. As I will argue in the following paragraphs, it is this conceptual  1 
 quality of approach which defines the particular quality of the improviser’s knowledge base, 
 yet, due to learned perspectives of the tonal language associated with historic styles of 
 repertoire, this language may be particularly difficult for classically-trained musicians to 
 construct in terms of underlying conceptual  1  principles. 
 9.5 Research question 5: Why did I find it so difficult to improvise according to a 
 planned musical structure? How could conscious instructions be incorporated into my 
 improvising without inhibiting the flow of imagination and fluency? 
 9.5.1 Are conscious instructions necessary? 
 With much talk of flow states, fluency and automatic performance, there is a 
 widely-held belief, often reinforced by expert improvisers themselves, that conscious 
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 instructions simply interfere in the improviser’s performance. For example, Robert Levin 
 stated: ‘I never, and I mean never, say “I’m going to modulate to f-sharp major now,” or “I’m 
 going to use a dominant seventh now” … I do not for one millisecond when I’m improvising 
 think what it is I’m going to be doing. I don’t say, “Oh I think it’s about time to end now …” 
 (in interview with Berkowitz, 2010, p.123). Or consider the following extract from a 
 conversation in which I asked a retired harmony teacher (Paul) to describe his awareness of 
 harmonising a hymn tune: 
 Paul. ‘I can hear it, in my head. And I can hear it in various different ways, you know: 
 are you going to use IIb or II7b  29  , or ... is the dominant  going to have a suspension in 
 the middle parts; is it going to have a 7th on the dominant? So, yes .. there are lots of 
 variations on the basic stock phrase, but I’ve got the sound of it in my head.’ 
 J. ‘The sound of it, yes, but going beyond the sound … Can you possibly describe 
 another kind of mental representation? Like an image or graphic?’ 
 Paul. ‘Well.. I’m not so good at doing it now - practically .. because I haven’t taught 
 A-level music for the last 8 years. I haven’t done any harmonising chorales or 
 anything for the last 8 years and you get out of the habit.’ 
 J. ‘Yes, but I’m interested in how you actually recall that information in a way that 
 allows you to do what you just showed me.’ 
 Paul. (thinks a long time.. then laughs) I don’t know to be honest. I really can’t put it 
 into words. There must be a lot of finger memory, you know, the shapes of chords ... I 
 29  Paul refers to chord symbols notating triads based on each degree of the scale, thus: IIb = a triad 
 with the second note of the scale as its root, in first inversion. 
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 have these stock moves in my head; I’ve got the sound of the chords, which I think is 
 there, certainly just before I play them. Sometimes the whole stock move is there in 
 my head before I play ..(for example)  the four chords.’ 
 Paul’s difficulties in describing his awareness of the task while improvising is 
 characteristic of experts who do rely more on automatic productions than conscious 
 construction. This makes it confusing for the novice improviser or researcher to understand in 
 what way improviser’s do represent the task in the moment of performance. As a novice 
 myself, I rejected the idea of ‘not thinking’ while improvising for several reasons: (i) my 
 experience of free atonal improvisation indicated that conscious instructions (i.e. a modal 
 scale) could be used without interfering with the flow of action; (ii) the style of the Baroque 
 music which I aimed to copy argued against a non-conscious approach: the clarity of 
 structure and constraints in, for example, a Fugue, or a Chorale Partita could not be 
 improvised without some form of conscious control or awareness of the sequence of events; 
 (iii) performance constraints, such as those typically faced by the church organist also argued 
 against non-conscious awareness, as Jean Langlais describes: … ‘in churches we are obliged 
 to improvise all the time. If a priest is very slow, we are obliged to adapt to that. If the priest 
 is very fast we also have to adapt’ (in interview with Bailey, 1993, p.37)  30  . 
 For these reasons I believed it necessary to accept the need for some kind of 
 conscious instruction, awareness and control on the part of the improviser over the 
 clearly-sequenced events of Baroque forms and musical structures. The question then was 
 how  to integrate instructions into one’s improvisation  without disrupting the flow of action, 
 and without even being aware of using them. Soon after I started the study, a clue to this style 
 30  Cognitive theories support this view, for example (Clarke, 1988): ‘An improviser must construct a 
 [mental] representation for at least a short sequence of events in advance, and cannot operate at speed 
 or with any fluency on an event-to-event level. [Experts] may have become unaware of these 
 hierarchical structures … but they undoubtedly exist’ (p.7) 
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 of cognition emerged in another conversation I had with the concert improviser Wolfgang 
 Mitterer: 
 WM. ‘You have to find a way... if you think “I’m in G minor and there’s the 
 possibility to go to D minor” .. if you think [like that] it never comes out a good 
 improvisation. You have to find a way to stop thinking and improvise freely’. 
 J. ‘So, a conscious decision: “I’m now in G major and I’ll head towards to D minor” 
 this would, as you say, kill the process?’ 
 WM. ‘My teacher would have said ‘You have to know both’ and, of course, he is 
 right. You have to know the theory and it’s good if you know this theory; because then, if a 
 thought comes during improvisation like “Oh, now this is G minor” then, this thought, if you 
 know what you’re doing (in theory), then this thought, which is coming up, doesn’t block 
 you. You also have the right thought to continue and can forget it again. I think it’s a mixture 
 finally, yea?’ (Wolfgang Mitterer, personal communication, 26th October, 2016) 
 Mitterer thus begins with the denial of conscious instruction (similar to Levin above) 
 but then he corrects this to describe a way in which the conscious thought “this is G minor” is 
 integrated into the automatic procedures of performance: so that “it doesn’t block you”. It is 
 this process of integration of conscious thought into one’s improvising which I now discuss. 
 9.5.2 Stages of integrating conscious instructions through the learning process 
 In the initial stages of skill learning, conscious instructions are used to ‘generate the 
 desired behaviour to at least some crude approximation [of the skill]’ (Anderson, 1982, 
 p.369), while there is little possibility of integration as appropriate actions must be discovered 
 for each sequence of the performance. This is why a novice's performance in particular is 
 characterised by pauses as they work out how to coordinate actions with mental instructions. 
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 There appear to be two distinct pedagogical approaches at this stage. One, is that 
 fluency and flow should be encouraged  before  conscious  instructions inhibit the student’s 
 ability to improvise (Whitmer, 2012; Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921; Dolan, 2005); in this way, 
 through movement, rather than conscious calculation, the student implicitly learns to 
 integrate conscious awareness into performance. This approach might be likened to riding a 
 bike, in which only efforts to move forwards and achieve balance can provide the procedural 
 knowledge. The other approach is that taken by treatises such as Dupré (1975) and Schouten 
 (1955) which try to clarify the conscious instructions so that the student is better able to 
 organise their actions. My own experience of trying both these approaches is documented in 
 the study, in which, due to my sensitivity to errors and a need for conscious, explicit, clarity 
 about the task (also noted in Kingscott & Durrant, 2010), I was drawn more towards the 
 second approach; though I rejected the written exercises in favour of designing my own 
 reduced scores  31  . 
 There now follows a stage of learning in which the novice learns to interpret 
 theoretical rules (which define a musical style) into a conceptualised  1  knowledge base of 
 patterns and formulas (i.e. Pressing, 1988; Kenny & Gellrich, 2002; see also Chapter 5 in my 
 study). I use the term conceptual  1  because of the  mental processes involved: the individual 
 takes a particular arrangement of notes, for example, a perfect cadence in C major, and 
 through the exercise of constructing this formula in many different musical contexts gains a 
 more generalised mental representation (see Figure 19). Theoretical knowledge is much 
 31  Whether one adopts a strategy of fluency or conscious calculation, the student aims at a new kind of 
 knowledge which, as Mitterer suggests above, doesn’t interfere with action. For novices of course, 
 this is impossible, as their conscious thoughts and instructions bear little relation to the actions they 
 perform. These actions must first be discovered and organised. Theoretical knowledge must, 
 therefore, become integrated through experience ‘in the field’, as Baily (2001) asserts when he says: 
 ‘only as a performer does one acquire a certain essential kind of knowledge about music’ (p.86). Note, 
 that the kind of performance we are talking about here is improvised, not interpretive performance, as 
 it is only through the creative acts of improvisation that one can achieve a particular understanding of 
 musical-theoretical knowledge as it becomes relevant to the task. 
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 reduced, because the cadence is no longer constructed through individual notes, but through 
 essential features represented by an image, or feeling - an act of construction - in the fingers. 
 It is this generalised way of constructing the cadence which creates the conceptual  1  mental 
 representation, and which I propose is the most distinctive quality of the improviser’s 
 knowledge. This stage of learning, in which the improviser acquires a basic conceptual 
 knowledge of formulas and patterns, is, in my experience, the most commonly addressed in 
 written treatises, and most clearly linked to conceptual learning in literature of improvisation. 
 The next stage in learning (and encoding of conscious instructions) is often more 
 difficult to capture as it results from a particular style of cognitive interaction with the 
 musical stimulus. In my study I described (see Chapter 5.4) a moment in which I 
 intentionally reduced an exercise to selected features in order to understand or ‘see’ 
 something in the musical structure. What I saw could not be communicated directly to 
 another person, yet, it was experienced as a critically important piece of information, 
 something I needed to know which accelerated my learning and deepened my knowledge of 
 the task. In this way the experience of emergent, conceptual  1  representations of the task can 
 take on distinctive features, as the Table 6 indicates: 
 Table 6 
 A comparison of two accounts of emerging conceptual  1  knowledge during learning 
 Rice (in Baily, 2008, p.125):  Personal Notes (7th August, 
 2017, see Appendix C) 
 Student’s awareness of 
 problem 
 ‘I had made a distinction 
 between accent and mordent 
 and melody note’ 
 ‘Originally I separated 
 harmony from counterpoint as 
 a separate discipline. It 
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 concerned me how the two 
 might be related’ 
 Emergent awareness of 
 conceptual  1  knowledge as 
 solution to problem 
 ‘I now understood that the 
 myriad sounds I perceived as 
 melody and ornamentation 
 were, from a player's 
 conceptual and physical point 
 of view, unified into a single 
 concept as ways of moving 
 from tone to tone’ 
 ‘I began to perceive … how 
 the music moved from 
 harmonic point to point. These 
 harmonies, which proceeded in 
 the form of a slow procession 
 through the piece provided the 
 stability of a structure from 
 which all the figurations 
 [contrapuntal elements] could 
 momentarily depart and 
 decorate’ 
 New concept  1  is used to guide 
 improvisation 
 ‘Gaidari [gaida players] needed 
 to think only of melody tones 
 and, as they moved between 
 them, their fingers produced 
 ornamental tones’ 
 My awareness of harmonic 
 ‘points’ informed my 
 improvising ... 
 Performance is dramatically 
 improved through conceptual  1 
 control 
 ‘I went from tense, slow 
 playing to relaxed, fast 
 playing in the blink of a 
 concept... I had found the 
 elusive gaida player's 
 fingers and solved le mystère 
 des doigts bulgares’ 
 … which now focused on 
 driving to the next point, and 
 establishing such a point in my 
 fingers and perception’ 
 . 
 In Table 6, I have aligned an extract from Timothy Rice’s account of learning to play 
 the  gaida  bagpipes (in Baily, 2008), with a similar  extract taken from my own journal. In 
 each case, there is a distinctive sequence of events. Initially, the student wrestles with a 
 particular problem: in Rice’s experience it was a problem of recreating a type of melodic 
 inflection and expressive character typical of the Bulgarian style he studied; in my case it was 
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 a similar problem but harmonic nature, as I tried recreate the chromatic, expressive motion of 
 a French  plein jeu ). In both instances the solution  to the problem emerged unexpectedly 
 through perceiving the musical elements in a new relationship or structure which is often 
 closely associated with a particular motion or technical approach: thus, Rice discovered 
 ‘ways of moving from tone to tone’, while in my account I perceived how the music ‘moved 
 from point to point’. The conceptual  1  representation  can therefore be seen to link an element 
 of theory with the organisation of embodied actions. The final act of the improviser is to use 
 the emerging concept  1  for generating similar passages  of music ‘as the main instrument of 
 thought’ (Vygotsky, 1986, p.139), facilitating fluent, imaginative, improvisation within 
 stylistic constraints. 
 Because of the highly experiential nature of this type of emerging knowledge, it is 
 often difficult for researchers to access or understand this stage of learning in the same way 
 as the acquisition of basic formulas and patterns. However, in spite of the intuitive way in 
 which improvisers encode aspects of musical style and performance at this more advanced 
 level, I believe they should still be understood in terms of basic processes of 
 conceptualisation  1  as I have demonstrated. Thus, when  Mitterer talks of having ‘the right 
 thought to continue and can forget it again’ I believe this should be understood as a 
 conceptual  1  mental representation of task which involves  an element of conscious theory and 
 explicit instruction, and therefore cannot be accounted for purely in terms of intuition, 
 emotion or inspiration (though these might also be involved). It’s interesting to note that, in 
 spite of the fact that conceptual  1  mental representations  cannot be directly communicated 
 from one improviser to another, it is nevertheless common for musicians to engage in a 
 period of formal study in which advanced stylistic features of a musical style (such as those 
 described above) can be absorbed and understood. For example, Kingscott & Durrant (2010) 
 refer to ‘a process of assimilation and formal learning [through which] one reaches a point 
 288 
 where meaningful improvisation may take place’ (p.141), while in my study I needed the 
 guidance of an expert improviser (Jürgen Essl) to show me techniques in extracting salient, 
 characteristic features from selected models. The two processes of explicit instruction and 
 subjective integration on behalf of the student, however, need not be exclusive as the student 
 is often able to interpret the professor’s instructions conceptually  1  (as I discovered) through 
 former experience in conceptualising  1  the basic formulas  and patterns. In many ways, 
 experience of participation in a practising community of improvisation also illustrates how 
 conscious goals and instructions can be assimilated into procedural actions and performance 
 behaviours (see Chapter 6.2.5.1). 
 How then do these stages of advanced conceptual  1  encodings  of conscious 
 instructions connect with the fluency and automaticity of expert performance? What of 
 ‘letting go’ and allowing automatic productions to take over? In skill-learning literature (i.e. 
 Schneider & Fisk, 1982), the interference of conscious control with (increasingly) fluent and 
 automatic actions is well documented; thus, we understand that all improvisers have to 
 negotiate a process of allowing procedural actions more autonomy, as the improviser learns to 
 take a step back, as Berkowitz (2010) explains: ‘“Letting go” means allowing the 
 proceduralised/automatised sub-elements, processes, and structures of the knowledge base to 
 guide the improviser from moment to moment, as he or she steers the “bobsled” at a more 
 global level’ (p.125). Després et al. (2016) also talk of a process of ‘unlearning’ one’s 
 knowledge as experts prepared for performance and tried to distance themselves from 
 habitual conscious ways of construction. In my own study I tried to capture this process of 
 letting go of conscious control in detail; a process which included the increasing use of 
 intuitive learning strategies (see Chapter 7.5), and faster and fluent automatic productions 
 controlled more remotely, through embodied sensations of metaphor (Johnson, 1987) and 
 semantic recognition (Snyder, 2000, see Chapter 8.3.4.1). 
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 However, I do not believe we should understand this transition from conscious control 
 to automated productions as involving a qualitative change in the nature of the mental 
 representations used, for two reasons: Firstly, it is more a question of degree or proportion, as 
 the improviser is (by my theory) already using conceptual  1  representations which integrate a 
 small element of conscious representation with automated actions; thus, as automaticity 
 increases, the proportions of unconscious to conscious increases, and the conceptual  1 
 structure, while remaining cognitively ‘light’ and unobtrusive, triggers and organises more 
 and more automated productions  32  . Secondly, I believe  that the concert improviser, rather 
 than developing a qualitatively new kind of knowledge, utilises certain techniques over 
 existing knowledge to form a distinctive kind of cognitive approach towards performance; 
 one in which conscious control adopts the characteristic distant, monitoring role (illustrated 
 above) over automated productions which must maintain fluency at all costs. This I 
 discovered as I approached my first public performance and realised that I would have to 
 ‘turn off’ any sense of critical feedback, and also accept any of the events of the 
 improvisation, working with these events within a sense of the whole musical structure or 
 schema  1  (see Chapter 8.4). A similar cognitive reorganisation  is also evident in Levin’s (in 
 Berkowitz 2010) description of preparing for a public performance: ‘I would lie awake in the 
 hotel room … before a concert thinking about a possible plot line for a cadenza. And I would 
 sit there saying “Let’s see: I could use such and such a theme, and I could take that in a 
 sequence, that would take me to such and such … The problem is that you get into the 
 concert and start to work and suddenly your mind goes into overdrive and you don’t do those 
 things, or you forget them, or you just go in another direction … And I began to realise 
 32  My conception of the improviser’s cognitive control over increasing automaticity thus runs close to 
 Anderson’s (1982) theory of composition and proceduralization, for example: ‘the composition of 
 multiple steps into one produces the speedup and leads to unitary rather than piecemeal application. 
 The dropout of verbal rehearsal is a result of the fact that proceduralization eliminates the need to hold 
 long-term memory information in working memory’ (p.384) 
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 you’re just going to have to let go of it and go wherever you go’ (p.123). Thus, we 
 understand from Levin, that his habitual ways of constructing the task, even as an expert, can 
 involve clear conscious planning, but that in the moment of performance he suppresses this 
 element of conscious control to allow automated productions more freedom. 
 9.6 Research question 6: What kind of knowledge did expert improvisers possess or 
 use? Did they acquire particular techniques for representing and encoding musical 
 structure? 
 In the previous paragraphs I illustrated the necessity of understanding the conceptual  1 
 quality of the improviser’s knowledge as the only means of explaining conscious awareness 
 and control over the improvisation without interfering in automatic, fluent productions. In the 
 following paragraphs I summarise the main features of a conceptual  1  knowledge for 
 improvisation, emphasising its role in creative decision making at all levels of learning, and 
 exploring the implications of an explicitly conceptual  1  knowledge for improvisation on 
 pedagogy and future research directions. 
 9.6.1 The main features of a conceptual  1  knowledge  for improvising, summarised 
 By emphasising the conceptual  1  quality of the improviser’s  knowledge I do not 
 propose a new cognitive theory of improvisation, or a radical departure from current 
 cognitive research. Having gained a knowledge which allows me to improvise it is interesting 
 to return to the cognitive theories I earlier reviewed (see Chapter 2.1). These theories clearly 
 describe important features of my present knowledge and skills: for example, I use a mental 
 representation or  referent  of musical structure and  of the task (Pressing, 1998); my 
 knowledge is cognitively ‘economical’ and provides (stylistically appropriate) learnt actions 
 to inform present decisions (Johnson-Laird, 2002); I also regularly rely on all three of 
 Clarke’s (1988) generative approaches (associative, hierarchical, and repertoire selection) to 
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 improvise musical material at three different layers of musical texture -  dispositio, elaboratio 
 and  decoratio  (Callahan, 2010). As general theories  and approaches, such research offers a 
 range of cognitive possibilities to the novice, but they cannot guide one’s learning towards 
 the clarity and certainty one needs to improvise. Beyond general descriptions of cognitive 
 processes there remains a degree of mystery over what the improviser actually does. 
 Therefore, the aim of this thesis has been to describe and articulate an acquisition of 
 knowledge which has clarity and certainty, and also to give this process a name - of 
 conceptual  1  learning, within the context of language  learning of children and adolescents as 
 described by Vygotsky (1986). 
 That improvisers use conceptual knowledge is not a new idea. Both Pressing (1998) 
 and Berkowitz (2010) explicitly state that expressive flexibility and structure can only be 
 combined fluently in real time through conceptual knowledge, but this is mentioned either as 
 one of several attributes of knowledge, (along with motorised patterns or a semantic 
 memory), or as a stage in learning, associated closely with basic formulas and patterns. I also 
 disagree with Berkowitz’s description of conceptual knowledge as communicated through 
 exercises and strategies (for example, of transposition, variation, and recombination), as my 
 experience showed it was possible to execute many such exercises without acquiring 
 conceptual insights into the task. Thus, there is insufficient recognition or elaboration of (i) 
 the specific role played by the individual in gaining conceptual knowledge; (ii) the way in 
 which conceptual knowledge, insights and representations guides one’s learning; (iii) the way 
 in which conceptual knowledge differs qualitatively from other, non-conceptual, forms of 
 musical perception, i.e.  Werktreue  attitudes, in which  every element is fixed. 
 Vygotsky (1986) on the other hand, places conceptual knowledge: ‘the result of such a 
 complex activity, in which all basic intellectual functions take part’ (p.106), at the heart of an 
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 individual’s ability to gain expressive control over language. It is also Vygotsky (1986) who 
 explicitly describes the cognitive interactions with the task which enable the individual to 
 obtain conceptual insights: 
 ‘The cultural task per se, however, does not explain the developmental mechanism 
 itself that results in concept formation. The investigator must aim to understand the 
 intrinsic bonds between the external tasks and the developmental dynamics, and view 
 concept formation as a function of the adolescent’s total social and cultural growth, 
 which affects not only the content but also the method of his thinking. The new 
 significative use of the word, its use  as a means  of concept formation,  is the 
 immediate psychological cause of the radical change in the intellectual process that 
 occurs on the threshold of adolescence’ (p.108). 
 Thus, as I have tried to capture and articulate throughout the thesis, it is these 
 emerging insights into the task - the realisation of a new significative use of a cadence, or 
 harmonic movement, or any particular arrangement of notes - which suddenly and 
 meaningfully connect these (formerly theoretical) objects to expressive musical gesture and 
 structure, which is the most important part of the learning experience in forming the 
 improviser’s knowledge. Therefore it is my belief that, by explicitly stressing the conceptual  1 
 nature of the improviser’s knowledge through all stages of learning, we gain a better 
 understanding of the student’s flow of control (Anderson, 1982), i.e., the speed, accuracy and 
 flexibility of their actions while improvising, and also a more convincing account of the 
 individual’s ability to acquire a sense of creative agency arising through the clarity of 
 conceptual  1  insights into the underlying patterns  and functions of musical construction. 
 Emerging conceptual  1  knowledge is peculiarly meaningful  and convincing for the 
 improviser, being an ‘intimate, direct encounter with experience in which we are personally 
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 involved’ (Jeffreys, 1966, p.143). This is why terms such as  recognition  or inward  naming  of 
 features and experience are invoked throughout the thesis. There is also a clarity to this kind 
 of mental representation which informs one’s actions and develops one’s perception of the 
 task and of oneself as creative agent. I mentioned earlier (see Chapter 6.4) that a conceptual  1 
 representation rarely provides a ‘clear, theoretical ‘map’, but this needs qualification. Vijay 
 (2004) makes a useful distinction between cognition of music which occurs  in-time  (for 
 example, improvisation) and cognitive processing which occurs over time, or is not time 
 dependent (such as composition or analysis). Whereas latter forms of understanding might 
 result in theoretical plans and maps (Clarke’s [1988] tree diagrams of hierarchical structure 
 are a good example), these kinds of representation do not describe the embodied clarity of the 
 concept  1  which emerges  in-time  and thus captures a  ‘real-time interaction with the structure 
 of one’s environment’ (Vijay, 2004, p.164) 
 It’s important therefore to understand the role of emerging conceptual  1  knowledge in 
 creatively empowering the improviser. The concept  1  not only guides and motivates one’s 
 actions but also engages one’s imagination; what Jeffreys (1966, p.143) calls an act of ‘total 
 perception, not a calculated checking’ and which automatically inspires motion and a new, 
 active construction of the musical stimulus, reflected in expressions such as ‘finding 
 pathways through the knowledge base’ (Berkowitz, 2010, p.88), or ‘going for the sounds’ 
 (Sudnow, 2001). This introduces the notion of movement into the experience of conceptual  1 
 knowledge: as one moves from a theoretical position to a more active, empowered 
 involvement in the task, and also towards new possibilities of action as an improviser. This 
 has important consequences on learning, as Polanyi (1959) describes when he says that: ‘the 
 shaping of knowledge is achieved by pouring ourselves into new forms of existence’ (p.34). 
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 Therefore, a large part of the conceptual  1  acquisition of knowledge depends on one’s 
 disposition for action, as it is only through a willful readiness to act, to experiment, to 
 manipulate musical structure towards expressive ends that one stumbles upon conceptual  1 
 understandings and representations. This is particularly significant for the solitary learner 
 who may not be guided and encouraged to make the kinds of free movements advocated, for 
 example by Dolan (2005) and Jaques-Dalcroze (1921). However, by understanding emerging 
 conceptual  1  knowledge as the motivating, guiding force  and substance of the improviser’s 
 knowledge throughout the various stages of learning, we can understand how the improviser 
 does in fact encode the task, as my original research question proposes. It is not a literal 
 encoding of information as I originally, resulting in a ‘shorthand’ static form of knowledge 
 (as a theory or proposition), but rather, an encoding of a particular experiential, imaginative 
 encounter with musical structure over time, as Vijay (2004) describes: ‘we may understand 
 musical  improvisation as the in-time, temporally extended  exploratory interaction with the 
 structure of one’s acoustic, musical-formal, cultural, embodied, and situated environment’ 
 (p.165). 
 The main events of this encoding process and knowledge formation can now be 
 summarised: 
 1. The novice begins with a period of unstructured experimentation. Improvisation is 
 experienced as an unfamiliar environment in which actions and their consequences 
 are unguided and unknown. 
 2. Through increasing familiarity, simple, directed actions can be linked to musical 
 consequences. This results in a more meaningful recognition of certain musical 
 elements and features, while improvising. This process of recognition is termed 
 Categorisation  1 
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 3. The intermediate learner acquires the ability to engage in problem-solving 
 exercises, and to experiment with rule-based systems of musical construction. This 
 results in a Conceptual  1  understanding of basic formulas  and patterns using a limited 
 stylistic language. 
 4. The learner now benefits from the guidance of an expert improviser and 
 participation in a practising community of improvisation. Conceptual  1  control is now 
 exercised over more refined stylistic principles. The student becomes aware of 
 performance behaviours, and learns to generate and create stylistic improvisation 
 more fluently. 
 5. The range of conceptual  1  knowledge expands quickly.  Productions become more 
 fluent and automatic, and the improviser is compelled to ‘let go’ of conscious control 
 and reflective decision making. Non-literal (metaphoric, embodied and semantic) 
 representations of musical events now guide the improvisation more intuitively. 
 Learning strategies also become more intuitive. 
 6. Expertise: new ways of mobilising the knowledge base become necessary for live 
 improvisation and public performance Critical feedback and conscious instruction 
 (which interfere with fluency and automated productions) are entirely suppressed and 
 attention focused on an emerging sense of the whole structure (Schema  1  ). 
 9.7 Implications of my study for pedagogic methods of teaching improvisation to 
 classically-trained musicians 
 An autoethnographic study necessarily emphasies the individual and personal nature 
 of learning, and I certainly benefited from a teacher who showed empathy towards students’ 
 feelings and perspectives, and was thus flexible in the strategies he used to mobilise their 
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 improvisational, creative skills. An outstanding improviser himself, Jürgen Essl not only 
 possessed the knowledge for improvising in a range of historic styles, but also knew how to 
 make improvisational ways of thinking ‘visible to the student’ as de Bruin (2017) 
 recommends. Many of the masterclasses I watched, on the other hand, served only to promote 
 the teacher’s perspective, while the student was simply criticised for the failings of their 
 performance. Of course, having emerged from a long period of highly-reflective self study, its 
 perhaps natural that I would emphasise the cognitive and emotional processes of learning 
 rather than the products (an approach which is particularly explored in Biasutti, 2015; 2017), 
 but, on the other hand, my learning was focused towards expert performance, in which 
 musical products cannot be ignored; in which context, facilitating student’s ability to perform 
 as improvisers also becomes a critical factor. 
 If I combine my experience of learning with the pedagogic literature I have read then 
 the following suggestions come to mind. 
 ●  Keeping theory to a minimum : a pedagogical approach  which is characteristic of 
 improvisatory musical cultures (i.e. Baily, 2008; Dunbar-Hall, 2009) and important 
 for encouraging rather than inhibiting action, is the ability to reduce theoretical 
 principles to their most essential features in relation to improvisation. 
 ●  Creative agency : a theme which appears in many papers  (Shevock, 2018; Borgo, 
 2007; Hickey, 2009) is the student’s feeling of confidence or agency. Central also to 
 my own learning experience was the necessity of acquiring this sense of creative 
 agency over the task, which motivated and facilitated my acquisition of knowledge. 
 Acquiring agency can be a complicated and individual process, involving tackling 
 self-beliefs, identifying musical goals, and designing one’s own strategies and 
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 exercises; yet it should be seen as an essential attribute of the improviser’s knowledge 
 and skills, without which, musical decision making is almost impossible 
 ●  Reflection and meta-learning : de Bruin (2017) states  that: ‘Articulation and 
 reflection are methods that help the student to focus observations of expert problem 
 solving, and gain access and control of their own problem-solving strategies’ (p.87). 
 As I have suggested above, the use of autoethnographic techniques such as journal 
 keeping, audio recording and filming, can help students to monitor their emotions, 
 focus their attention and gain a more objective awareness of their learning and 
 improvisation performance. 
 ●  Wertktreue  attitudes and beliefs : in contexts where  improvisation is taught to 
 classically-trained musicians, it would be beneficial to explicitly reflect and 
 acknowledge the influence of  Werktreue  attitudes and  ideals on musical practice; also 
 how these ideals affect individuals’ ability to improvise. 
 The fact that teachers such as Jürgen Essl develop a variety of approaches to teaching 
 improvisation reflects not only the diversity of students but also the range of different 
 experiences which individuals bring to the task. A feature of my study however was the 
 difficulty in transferring perspectives of musical structure typical of interpretive performance 
 to the flexible, conceptual  1  perspectives necessary  for improvising. This characteristic 
 problem for classically-trained musicians is, I believe, implicitly reflected in many of the 
 strategies mentioned in research, particularly when professors talk of instigating new 
 perceptions of musical structure in terms of variation and plurality (Hill, 2017); however, I 
 would propose that a more explicit recognition of the conceptual  1  quality of improvising 
 knowledge and cognitive control would help to unite many currently diverse strategies and 
 approaches to teaching. 
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 9.8 Suggestions for new research into learning and performing improvisation 
 Many of the suggestions are implicit in the thesis. I have earlier criticised cognitive 
 theories for being too general to apply to the lived experience of learning to improvise. One 
 of the aims of this study has been to make a more meaningful connection between these two 
 approaches, and much more work could be done in this area. For example, this study could 
 inspire researchers to investigate novices’ and intermediate students’ cognitive approach to 
 improvising rather than focusing purely on experts. Current studies in this field, such as 
 Custodero’s (2007) study of children’s improvising, already yield valuable information, but 
 there is very little information regarding adult learners of improvisation, while structured 
 studies, such as this, which gather data of learning patterns over extended periods of time are 
 practically non-existent. Methods of collecting improviser’s experience used in this study 
 such as journals and notebooks of daily experience are recommended, particularly as there is 
 evidence from literature that individuals can learn to identify, monitor, and articulate their 
 conscious thoughts and mental representations while performing and improvising music by 
 using such methods. Of particular note in this respect is Lisboa, Demos & Chaffin’s (2018) 
 research into musicians’ ‘performance cues’ in which a subject was taught to ‘practise the 
 thoughts and feelings they want to convey to the audience along with the actions that produce 
 the musical sounds’ (p.521); also Beck’s (1991) extraordinary account of discovering 
 ‘automatic thoughts’ in his subjects. The advantages of this approach are manifold: (i) rather 
 than deducing cognitive processes from the observation of experts, this would give 
 researchers direct access to earlier stages of knowledge formation and skill learning on which 
 expertise is based. (ii) that novices and intermediate learners generally use conscious, 
 effortful constructions of the task, which means they themselves are more aware of their 
 cognition than experts who have replaced these ways of cognition with more automated, 
 intuitive methods. There is no shortage of subjects for such studies, particularly in learning 
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 institutions such as Germany and France, which also offer clear pedagogical frameworks 
 within which the responses of students could be compared. 
 The study of improvisation within a practicing community (such as that which I have 
 described in the HMDK Stuttgart) might also encourage a different perception of 
 improvisation as being a more everyday, creative skill, similar to language production, rather 
 than something rare, to be understood in terms of innate expertise or extreme skills. In this 
 context, Vuust & Kringelbach (2017) suggest a number of approaches for empirical studies 
 of improvisers; but some of the theoretical frameworks used in this study could also be 
 employed for interpreting data and understanding embedded, experiential processes of 
 learning and knowledge formation. These include ecological frameworks of situated, adaptive 
 learning (Reybrouck, 2005) and biological theories of consciousness (Edelman, 1989, 1991), 
 which are particularly insightful into the neurological background of concept formation; 
 adults experience of second language learning (a subject currently only linked to 
 improvisation in Berkowitz, 2010), also a rich and developing field of artificial intelligence 
 which I have only tapped through a now rather distant source in Anderson’s (1982) models of 
 cognition. Artificial intelligence is a field which I myself would like to explore in the future, 
 with the aim of assisting in the design of cognitive models aimed at recreating human 
 concepts of rule-based creativity, which could be extraordinarily insightful for our 
 understanding of learning and performance processes of improvisation. Such models can, as I 
 discovered (see Chapter 5.4), equally inspire the clarity of investigative thought as modelled 
 on a production system, which can be so effective in learning contexts of improvisation. 
 9.9 Epilogue 
 To break out of one’s ideological situation and begin to improvise can be a disturbing 
 process as I have described, but worth doing, if only for its effectiveness in breaking the 
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 ideological chain. It was my experience that a structured approach to learning to improvise 
 carried me through the barriers of ideology to a different kind of musical life which is now 
 more natural, creative and rewarding. I hope that my thesis will encourage others to also take 
 this path. 
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